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A Study of *kalpanāpoḍha*
A Translation of
the *Tattvasaṃgraha* vv. 1212-1263 by Śāntarakṣita
and the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* by Kamalaśīla
on the Definition of Direct Perception*

Toru Funayama

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- AKBh Abhidharmakośabhāṣya by Vasubandhu. See AK.
- AKV Abhidharmakośavyākhyā by Yaśomitra. U. Wogihara (ed.), *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā. The Work of Yaśomitra*, Tokyo, 1932-1936.
- ADV Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti on Abhidharmadīpa. P. S. Jaini (ed.), *Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, Patna, 1977.
- AMV *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā (Chinese). Apidamodapiposhulun (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), tr. by Xuanzang (玄奘), Taishō 1545 (Vol. 27).
- K Krishnamacharya's edition of TS / TSP. See p. 51.
- Kās Sucaritamīśra's Kāśikā on Mīmāṃsāsloka-vārttika. See ŚV.
- Ga Gaekwad manuscripts of TS / TSP. See p. 51.
- TAV Tattvārthavārttika by Akalaṅka. M. K. Jain (ed.), *Tattvārthavārttik of Shri Akalaṅka-deva with Hindi Translation*, Benares, 1953.
- Tātparya Tātparyanibandhanaṭippaṇa (an anonymous commentary upon NBṬ).**
- TUS Tattvopaplavasiṃha by Jayarāśi. In Franco 1987.
- TBV Tattvabodhavidhāyinī by Abhayadevasūri. S. Sanghavi and B. Dośi (eds.), *Sammatitarka-prakaraṇam by Siddhasena Divākara with Abhayadevasūri's Commentary, Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*, 2 vols., reprinted in Kyoto, 1984 (original edition in 5 vols., 1924-1931).
- TBh Tarkabhāṣā by Mokṣākaragupta. H. R. R. Iyengar (ed.), *Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda*, Mysore, 1952, pp. 1-71.
- TBh (Tib.) The Tibetan Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā by Mokṣākaragupta. P 5762, Vol. 138, 361a8-399a8.
- TR Tarkarahasya. In Yaita 1989a.
- TRD Tarkarahasyadīpikā by Guṇaratna. L. Suali (ed.), *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya [A Review of the Six Systems of Hindu Philosophy] with Guṇaratna's Commentary Tarkarahasyadīpikā by Haribhadra*, Calcutta, 1986 (originally published in 1905-14).
- TS Tattvasaṃgraha by Śāntarakṣita. S. D. Shasti (ed.), *Tattvasaṃgraha of*

**I am grateful to Dr. Elliot M. Stern, Philadelphia, for allowing me to use this text before its publication.

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- TSP Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā by Kamalaśīla. See TS.
- TSop Tarkasopāna by Vidyākaraśānti. G. Tucci (ed.), *Minor Buddhist Texts*, Part 1, Roma, 1956 (reprinted in Kyoto, 1978; in Delhi, 1986), pp. 275-310.
- DhPr Dharmottaraṣṭadīpa by Durvekamiśra. See NB.
- NC Nayacakra by Mallavādin. Muni Jambuvijaya (ed.), *Dvādaśāraṇa Nayacakraṃ of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa with the Commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*. Part 1 (1-4 Aras), Bhavnagar, 1966.
- NCV Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī Nayacakrabālāvṛtti by Siṃhasūri. See NC.
- NP Nyāyapraveśakasūtra by Śaṅkarasvāmin. A. B. Dhruva (ed.), *The Nyāyapraveśa*. Part I: Sanskrit Text with Commentaries, Baroda, 1930 (reprinted in Delhi, 1987, as *Nyāyapraveśa of Dinnāga with Commentaries of Haribhadra Suri & Parsavadeva*).
- NPV Nyāyapraveśakāvṛtti by Haribhadra. See NP.
- NB Nyāyabindu by Dharmakīrti. D. Malvania (ed.), *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottaraṣṭadīpa [Being a Sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīka, a Commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu]*, Patna, 1955.
- NBT Nyāyabinduṭīkā by Dharmottara. See NB.
- NBT (V) Nyāyabinduṭīkā by Vinītadeva (Tib.). L. de La Vallée Poussin (ed.), *Tibetan Translation of the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti (A Treatise on Buddhist Logic) with the Commentary of Vinītadeva*, 1913 (reprinted in Calcutta, 1984).
- NBTṬ Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭīppaṇī. Th. Stcherbatsky (ed.), *Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭīppaṇī. Tolkovanie na socinenie Darmottary Nyāyabinduṭīkā. Sanskritskij tekst s primečanijami*, St.-Petersbourg, 1909.
- NBPS Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣesaṃkṣipta [sic!] by Kamalaśīla (Tib.). See Tosaki 1984.
- NBh Nyāyabhāṣya by Vātsyāyana. See NS.
- NBhū Nyāyabhūṣaṇa by Bhāsarvajña. S. Yogīndrananda (ed.), *Śrīmadācārya-Bhāsarvajña-praṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñam vyākhyānam Nyāyabhūṣaṇam*, Varanasi, 1968.

- NM Nyāyamañjarī by Jayantabhaṭṭa. K. S. Varadacharya (ed.), *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Tīppaṇi — Nyayasaurabha by the Editor*, Vol. 1, Mysore, 1969.
- NMGBh Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga by Cakradhara. N. J. Shah (ed.), *Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, Ahmedabad, 1972.
- NMukh Nyāyamukha by Dignāga (Chinese). Yinmingzhenglumenlunben (因明正理門論本), tr. by Xuanzang (玄奘), Taishō 1628 (Vol. 32 1a-6a).
- NV Nyāyavārttika by Uddyotakara.
- NV₁ NV edited by Taranatha Nyāya-Tarkatirtha and others. See NS.
- NV₂ NV edited by A. Thakur. A. Thakur (ed.), *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyatīkā of Vācaspati & the Pārisuddhi of Udayana*. [Volume I chapter I], Varanasi, 1967.
- NVT Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā by Vācaspatimiśra.
- NVT₁ NVT edited by Taranatha Nyāya-Tarkatirtha and others. See NS.
- NVT₂ NVT edited by A. Thakur. See NV₂.
- NVV Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa by Vādirājasūri. M. K. Jain (ed.), *Nyāya Viniścaya Vivaraṇa of Śrī Vādirāja Sūri. The Commentary on Bhaṭṭākalanādeva's Nyāya Viniścaya*, Vol. I [Pratyakṣa prastāva], Kashi, 1949.
- NS Nyāyasūtra by Gautama. Taranatha Nyāya-Tarkatirtha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha (eds.), *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyatīkā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1936 (reprinted in Kyoto, 1982).
- NSi Nyāyasiddhi by Jayapuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa. See PPañ.
- Pa Paṭan (Pattan) manuscripts of TS / TSP. See p. 51.
- PañS *Pañcaskandhakaprakaraṇa by Vasubandhu (Chinese). Dashengwuyunlun (大乘五蘊論) by Vasubandhu, tr. by Xuanzang (玄奘), Taishō 1612 (Vol. 31, 848b-850c).
- Pāṇini Aṣṭādhyāyī by Pāṇini. O. Böhtlingk, *Pāṇini's Grammatik*, Leipzig, 1887 (reprinted in Hildesheim / New York, 1977).
- PPañ Prakaraṇapañcikā by Śālikanātha. S. Śāstri (ed.), *Prakarana Pañcikā of Śrī Śālikanātha Miśra with Nyāya-siddhi*, Banaras, 1961.
- PBh Praśastapādabhāṣya (=Padārthadharmasamgraha) by Praśastapāda. V. P. Dvivedin (ed.), *The Praśastapāda Bhāṣya with Commentary Nyāyakandali of Sridhara*, 2d ed., Delhi, 1984 (1st ed. in Banaras, 1895).
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- Prameyakamal Martand* by Shri Prabha Chandra (A Commentary on Shri Manik Nandi's Pareeksha Mukh Sutra), Bombay, 1941.
- PV Pramāṇavārttika by Dharmakīrti.
- PV I Pramāṇavārttika, svārthānumāna. See PVSU.
- PV II Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi. Y. Miyasaka (ed.), Pramāṇavārttikakārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan), *Indo koten kenkyū* (インド古典研究; *Acta Indologica*) 2, 1971 / 72, pp. 1-206.
- PV III Pramāṇavārttika, pratyakṣa. See Tosaki 1979a, 1985.
- PVṬ (R) Pramāṇavārttikaṭikā by Ravigupta (Tib.). P 5722, Vol. 134, phe, 1a1-208a7.
- PVṬ (Ś) Pramāṇavārttikaṭikā by Śākyabuddhi (Tib.). P 5718, Vol. 131, je, 1a1-ñe, 348a8.
- PVP Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā by Devendrabuddhi (Tib.). P 5717(b), Vol. 130, che, the third chapter *pratyakṣa*, 142a3-319a8.
- PVV (M) Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti by Manorathanandin. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a Commentary by Manorathanandin*, Appendix to *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* Vol. 24, Part 3, 1938.
- PVSU Pramāṇavārttika(sva)vṛtti by Dharmakīrti. R. Gnoli (ed.), *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*, Roma, 1960.
- PVSUṬ Pramāṇavārttika(sva)vṛttitīkā by Karṇakagomin. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Karṇakagomin's Commentary on the Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti*, Kyoto, 1982 (reprinted from the edition originally published in 1943, as *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (Svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ. Svopajñavṛttyā, Karṇakagomiviracitayā tattīkayā ca sahitam)*).
- PVin I Pramāṇaviniścaya by Dharmakīrti, the first chapter (Tib.). T. Vetter (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam. Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung*, Wien, 1966.
- PVinṬ Pramāṇaviniścayaṭikā by Dharmottara (Tib.), the first chapter. P 5727, Vol. 136, dze, 1a1-196a8.
- PVinṬ (J) Pramāṇaviniścayaṭikā by Jñānaśrībhadrā (Tib.), the first chapter. P 5728, Vol. 137, we, 210a1-240a4.
- PS I Pramāṇasamuccaya by Dignāga (Tib.), the first chapter, in Hattori 1968, pp. 173-237.
- PS I (K): Tib. tr. by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i ses rab.

- PS I (V): Tib. tr. by Vasudharaṣṭita and Seṅ rgyal.
- PS V Pramāṇasamuccaya by Dignāga (Tib.), the fifth chapter. M. Hattori (ed.), *The Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga with Jinendrabuddhi's Commentary. Chapter Five: Anyāpoha-parīkṣā. Tibetan Text with Sanskrit Fragments, Kyōto daigaku bungakubu kiyō* (京都大学文学部紀要) 21, 1982, pp. 101-224.
- PST Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭikā by Jinendrabuddhi (Tib.), the first chapter. P 5766, Vol. 139, re, 1a1-91b4.
- PSV Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti by Dignāga (Tib.), the first chapter. See PS I.
- BAT Bālāvatātārarka by Jitāri (Tib.). See Shirasaki 1983.
- BSGT Blo gsal grub mtha' by dBus pa blo gsal, chapter 10: Sautrāntika. See Mimaki 1979.
- M Jaisalmer manuscripts of TS / TSP. See p. 51.
- MA Madhyamakālaṃkāra by Śāntarakṣita (Tib.). See Ichigō 1985a.
- MAV Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti by Śāntarakṣita (Tib.). See Ichigō 1985a.
- MBhD Mahābhāṣyadīpikā by Bhartṛhari. K. V. Abhyankar and V. P. Limaye (eds.), Śrīmahopādhyāyabhartṛharikṛtāśrīmahābhāṣyadīpikā, *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* Vol. 43, 1962, pp. 1-48.
- MV Madhyāntavibhāga by Maitreya. R. Pandeya (ed.), *Madhyānta-Vibhāga-Śāstra. Containing the Kārikā-s of Maitreya, Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu, and Ṭikā by Sthiramati*, Delhi, 1971.
- MVBh Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya by Vasubandhu. See MV.
- YBh Yogabhāṣya by Vyāsa. See YS.
- YS Yogasūtra by Patañjali. *Vācaspatimiśraviracita-Ṭikāsamvalita-Vyāsa-bhāṣya-sametāni Pātañjala-Yogasūtrāṇi*, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 47, 1932.
- VP Vākyapadīya by Bhartṛhari. W. Rau (ed.), *Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya. Die Mūlakārikās nach dem Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem pāda-Index versehen*, Wiesbaden, 1977.
- VPP Helārāja's Commentary Prakīrṇaprakāśa on VP. K. A. S. Iyer (ed.), *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Commentary of Helārāja. Kāṇḍa III, Part I*, Poona, 1963.
- Viṃś Viṃśatikā by Vasubandhu. S. Lévi (ed.), *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Deux traités de Vasubandhu, Viṃśatikā (la Vingtaine) accompagnée d'une explication en prose et Trīṃśikā (la Trentaine) avec le commentaire de Sthiramati*, Paris, 1925.
- ŚBh Śabarabhāṣya by Śabarasvāmin. See Frauwallner 1968.
- ŚV Mīmāṃsāslokaavṛttika by Kumārila. K. S. Śāstrī (ed.), *The Mīmāṃsā*

- Śloka-vārtika with the Commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamīśra*, Part 1, Trivandrum, 1926.
- S Shastri's edition of TS / TSP. See p. 51.
- SK Sāṃkhyakārikā by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Ramesh Chandra Tarka-Sankhya-Vedanta Mimamsatirtha (ed.), *Vācaspati Miśra's Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī with Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the Introduction to the Sāṃkhyatattvavilāsa of Raghunātha, etc., etc.*, Calcutta, 1935.
- HTU Hetutattvopadeśa by Jitāri. G. Tucci (ed.), *Minor Buddhist Texts*, Part 1, Roma, 1956 (reprinted in Kyoto, 1978 ; in Delhi 1986), pp. 261-274.
- HB Hetubindu by Dharmakīrti. See Steinkellner 1967a.

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INTRODUCTION

I. General Remarks.

The present work is an annotated English translation of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS) vv. 1212 - 1263 by Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725 - 788) and its commentary, the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (TSP), by his immediate disciple Kamalaśīla (ca. 740 - 795). This material amounts to approximately the first one-third of the chapter *Pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā* "The Examination of the Definition of Direct Perception." As this title clearly shows, the whole chapter is focused on the Buddhist definition of direct perception and related problems,¹ of which the portion translated below deals with the thesis that direct perception is necessarily free from conception and, as a subordinate topic, with the definition of conception. In order to clarify the authors' historical and philosophical position in the Buddhist tradition in India, I would like to present beforehand an outline of the historical development of the theory of direct perception and then refer to some characteristics of the text.

As is well known, the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition — i.e., the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition — to which our authors belong was founded by Dignāga (ca. 480-540) and then systematized by Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660) with a few but significant alterations. This school upholds two kinds of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) only: direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) of which the former is further concerned with conception as one of the most fundamental epistemological problems. In Buddhism direct perception as right knowledge meant a direct cognition which could not contain any error, whereas conception was often considered to be the root of all evils and mental troubles in the ordinary life of human beings.²

Dignāga formulated direct perception as a cognition which is free from conception (*kalpanāpoḍha*) in PS and, furthermore, defined conception as the connection with a name, a genus, etc. (*nāmajātyādiyojanā*). After him Dharmakīrti fol-

1 For an outline of the chapter see Hattori 1959. Roughly speaking, the chapter contains the two main discussions on the definition of direct perception: the analysis of the meaning of "free from conception" (*kalpanāpoḍha*) and of "non-erroneous" (*abhrānta*). The present study is concerned with the first only; the latter needs further research. For the previous studies of the latter topic see Yaita 1982; Nishikawa 1984a; and 1984b (mainly concerning the discussions by Dharmottara).

2 According to Dharmakīrti, for instance, conception (*vikalpa*) is an equivalent of nescience (*avidyā*; PVSV 50, 20-51, 1), whereas holy beings such as a *yogin* (PV III 281) and Samantabhadra to whom his religious devotion is directed in the *namaskāraśloka* of PV, are those beings who have annihilated the network of conceptual construction (*vidhūtakalpanājāla*).

lowed this definition of direct perception, first in PV without change and then in PVin and NB with the following modification: “Direct perception is free from conception and *non-erroneous*” (*pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham abhrāntam*). Consistent with this change he proposed his own definition of conception: “Conception is a cognition associated with an expression” (*abhiḷāpinī pratītiḥ kalpanā*) in verse; “Conception is a cognition which is capable of the connection with an expression” (*abhiḷāpasamsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā*), more exactly, but with the same connotation in prose. This appeared at the time to be a radical, new definition of conception.

Śāntarakṣita lived in the most active period of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition after Dharmakīrti. Namely, the system of the latter was fully accepted and absorbed within the tradition, on the one hand, and, on the other, after the full doctrinal establishment of each orthodox school, Buddhists had the need to refute those of their ideas which were opposed to Dharmakīrti’s. Besides, within the Buddhist party, too, diversions of interpretation stimulated controversies on several points.³

For instance, most commentators and doxographers whose texts are available now seem to have followed Dharmakīrti’s definition concerning direct perception as well as his definition of conception. However, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla appear to indicate that before them some Buddhists maintained both Dignāga’s definition of conception and Dharmakīrti’s definition.⁴ This fact, i.e., that there were some Buddhists who in principle followed Dharmakīrti’s theory of direct perception but followed Dignāga as to the definition of conception, is noteworthy in another text of the later period, viz., HTU, a doxographical piece by Jitāri.⁵ Thus TS could be said to be endowed with a unique character in the sense that the author, Śāntarakṣita, tries to integrate the definitions of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on conception through the examination of all the possible interpretations of Dignāga’s definition and then finally reaches his own conclusion, as mentioned below.

Studies in the Buddhist theory of direct perception have made progress since the 1960’s. Above all, very important contributions were achieved by the following excellent works: Prof. T. Vetter’s text and German translation of PVin I (Vetter

3 For instance, Vinitadeva’s ideas on direct perception are criticized by Dharmottara (cf. studies referred to in n. 1). Kamalaśīla reveals differences from Dharmottara’s view on several important points though they belonged to nearly the same period. For the chronology of Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Dharmottara see Krasser 1992.

4 See nn. 81, 82, and 84.

5 HTU 272, 23–25: *tac ca pratyakṣam nāmajatṛyādikalpanārahitaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ abhrāntaṃ ca yadi bhavati tadā pramāṇam ucyate*. See also nn. 81 and 92.

1966), Prof. Kajiyama's annotated English translation of TBh (Kajiyama 1966), Prof. M. Hattori's annotated English translation of PS (V) I (Hattori 1968), and Prof. H. Tosaki's Japanese translation of PV III (Tosaki 1979a, 1985). In these works the most important milestones in the history of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition in India, viz., the original contribution of Dignāga, the succeeding contribution of Dharmakīrti, and the writing of a doxography in the last period, have been philologically clarified and digested. Besides, Dr. E. Franco (1984) pointed out the importance of the chapter I take up now and settled the framework of Śāntarakṣita's interpretation of Dignāga. I hope that the present study which is immeasurably indebted to these works will make an additional contribution to modern philological studies of this tradition, especially with regard to the problem of the definition of direct perception, one of its most important and fundamental topics.

II. On Some Characteristic Features of TS and TSP.

The chapter *Pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā*, like other chapters of TS, takes an encyclopedic look at the problem of direct perception and solves it from the Buddhist standpoint in the late eighth century. This means that we can, indeed, collect extensive descriptions of the topic, but the author's own philosophical positions are not so evident, because his final answers are in most cases not different from Dharmakīrti's ideas. In spite of this general tendency, we can trace their characteristic features in several points the most important of which is, the aim of Śāntarakṣita's discussion; i.e., his endeavor to integrate the two different definitions of conception of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Thereby he tries to explain each subordinate topic, where the following further characteristics can be recognized :

A. The Interpretation of the Sentence of Definition: *pratyakṣam kalpanā-poḍham abhrāntam*.⁶

Roughly speaking, there were two main streams in the tradition of interpreting the syntax of the sentence of the definition of Dharmakīrti: One stream interprets the sentence as "That (cognition) which is free from conception and non-erroneous is direct perception" and the other, reversing the subject and the object, interprets it as "Direct perception is free from conception and non-erroneous." The former was held by Śākyabuddhi, Vinītadeva, and Kamalaśīla; the latter by Dharmottara and his followers. Śāntarakṣita himself is silent on this issue. That is to say, it is likely

6 See nn. 38 and 39.

that Kamalaśīla belonged to the older stream of the tradition⁷ along with Vinīta-deva, etc. However, it is not certain whether Kamalaśīla was intentionally opposed to Dharmottara.

B. On the Definition of Conception.

As stated above, there were two kinds of definition of conception in the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition: *nāmajātyādiyojanā kalpanā* by Dignāga (PS I) and *abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpanā* by Dharmakīrti (PVin I, NB I). Between these, Dignāga's definition, especially his usage of *ādi* (i.e., *nāmajātyādi-*), left room for various philosophical analyses: Though the expression could mean "name, genus, etc.,"⁸ this usage of *ādi* ("etc.") is somewhat strange because its normal usage allows for either "name, etc." or "genus, etc."⁹ as the correct form, and not "name, genus, etc." as in Dignāga's usage. Besides, the fact that the latter half of the compound, *yojanā*, is a feminine noun allows for two possibilities in connection with the other feminine noun, *kalpanā*, which the compound modifies; i. e., the compound could be analyzed either as a *tatpuruṣa* or a *bahuvrīhi*. Dharmakīrti spoke about his own definition only and kept silent about the relation between Dignāga's definition and that of his own. It is not difficult to conjecture that these circumstances directed Śāntarakṣita, who belonged to the scholastic environment after Dharmakīrti, toward a reconsideration of both definitions. The conclusion he finally reached was that both were stated with the same connotation.

Before he came to this conclusion he investigated Dignāga's definition as minutely as possible. According to him, the compound *nāmajātyādiyojanā*, "name-genus, etc., connection," could be interpreted in the following ways:

1. Connection with a name and a genus, etc.

- a. Conception is that cognition *by means of which* a connection with a name, which is to be accepted by Buddhists, and a genus, etc., which is

7 Cf. PSV on PSI 3c: *śes pa gañ la rtog pa med pa de ni* [PSV (K): om. PSV (V)] *mñon sum mo* (Hattori 1968: 176-177). ("That (cognition) in which there is no conception is direct perception.") Cf. also PSV on PS I 3d: *gañ la rtog pa de dag med pa de mñon sum mo* (Hattori 1968: 178-179; identical to *yatraiṣā kalpanā nāsti tat pratyakṣam*; see also n. 200). Cf. NVT₁ 130, 21-22; NVT₂ 241, 3: *seyam kalpanā yatra jñāne nāsty arhataḥ svarūpato vā tat kalpanāpodham pratyakṣam* [NVT₂: *tat* is added before *pratyakṣam* NVT₁].

8 This is no doubt the most natural understanding of the phrase if philosophical interpretations such as Śāntarakṣita's are not taken into consideration.

9 TSP 451, 21-23. The passage is translated on p. 73.

to be rejected as an idea of other schools, is realized.¹⁰

b. Conception is that cognition *which connects* a name, which is to be accepted by Buddhists, and a genus, etc., which is to be rejected as an idea of other schools, with the relevant object.¹¹

2. Connection with a name through a genus, etc.

Conception is that cognition *which connects* a name with the relevant object *through the medium of* a genus, etc., *both of which* are expressed from the Buddhist standpoint only.¹²

In this way, he presents two — more particularly three — interpretations of the compound. Although he states them as alternatives, the progress of the discussion suggests that interpretation 1b is preferable to 1a, and that interpretation 2 is the best among them. Moreover, Kamalaśīla sometimes uses the word “name” — which was originally used by Dignāga regarding arbitrary words only — as an equivalent to “word” (*śabda*) in the course of his discussions.¹³ This attitude is expounded first by Śāntarakṣita in the expression *śabdāyojanā* (TS 1232a) in the sense of *nāmāyojanā*. Thus, after giving alternative interpretations of the compound *nāmajātyādiyojanā* and finally favoring form 2 above, Śāntarakṣita declares that Dignāga’s intention — viz., that conception is a cognition which connects a name with an object — is no other than Dharmakīrti’s definition. Further, the author also offers interpretations of Dignāga’s ideas on conception as found in PSV and NMukh in accordance with this viewpoint.

C. TS(P) on the Demonstrations of *kalpanāpoḍha*.

After the examination of the definition of conception Śāntarakṣita proceeds to the problem of how “free from conception” is demonstrated. His way of discussing the problem and sources are found in PV and PVin. Further, the contents of this discussion were taken over by another of his works, i.e., MA,¹⁴ including five

10 The compound has been demonstrated to be a *bahuvrīhi*. For the details see pp. 74-75.

11 The compound must be a *tatpuruṣa*. For the details see pp. 75-76; and n. 116.

12 See pp. 76-77.

13 See nn. 61, 84, 126, 164, 169, 170, and 280.

14 MA 24-30. Further, TS is mentioned by name in MAV (330, 13: *De kho na bsdus pa*; on MA 96). This means that TS was written before MA which expounds Śāntarakṣita’s original standpoint as a critical syncretism of the Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka philosophies.

identical verses.¹⁵

D. Śāntarakṣita and Dharmakīrti; Kamalaśīla and Devendrabuddhi.

It is not surprising in commentary as massive as TSP that the source of many expressions can be found in preceding texts. Needless to say, statements of Dignāga and of Dharmakīrti, who formed the two wings of authority in this tradition, are often cited and, even more often, implicitly used in TSP. Besides, as pointed out by Frauwallner,¹⁶ Kamalaśīla in one context utilized a statement of Śākyabuddhi, the reason being, I suppose, that it was a prevailing idea in Kamalaśīla's age. During the course of this translation another of Kamalaśīla's sources revealed itself: a secondary usage of Devendrabuddhi's commentary on PV III 249. In TS 1263 Śāntarakṣita uses this verse, with a slight modification, and in commenting upon it Kamalaśīla, in turn, utilizes Devendrabuddhi's commentary, also with a slight modification.¹⁷

E. Kamalaśīla, Vinītadeva, and Jinendrabuddhi.

Although the definite chronology of Kamalaśīla,¹⁸ Vinītadeva, and Jinendrabuddhi¹⁹ is not certain, the following points suggest their similarities:

1. They have the same idiosyncrasy in their preference for the term *svarūpa* over *lakṣaṇa* in the enumeration of the quadruplet of wrong notions (*vipratipatti*)—

15 TS 1250 (=MA 25), TS 1251 (=MA 26), TS 1253 (=MA 28), TS 1254 (=MA 29), and TS 1255 (=MA 30). Cf. TS 1252abd (=MA 27abd). See nn. 216, 242, and 254.

16 Frauwallner 1933: 238-239. However, the context is not relevant to the present work.

17 See nn. 292-300; and Appendix I. This textual relation will be more interesting when we take into consideration that Devendrabuddhi is the immediate disciple of Dharmakīrti as is Kamalaśīla of Śāntarakṣita.

18 It is an interesting problem whether Kamalaśīla's commentary reflects more developed ideas than that expressed in TS, generated in response to the works of Śāntarakṣita. Krasser (1992) points out that Kamalaśīla was influenced by Dharmottara on certain issues. Besides, Kamalaśīla refers to Umbeka, who was not known to Śāntarakṣita (Schmithausen 1965: 216 n. 150). I could not find examples of Kamalaśīla's deviation from, or development of, the contents of TS in this work. On the contrary, the difference between Kamalaśīla and Dharmottara pointed out above concerning the syntax of the sentence of the definition of direct perception (pp. 46-47) is an example which inevitably suggests the possibility either that the former did not know the idea of the latter at all or that the former was intentionally opposed to the latter for some reason.

19 There is no evidence for fixing the date of Jinendrabuddhi. As a previous study on that issue see Hayes 1983.

viz., *svarūpa*, *phala*, *gocara*, and *saṃkhyā* — regarding direct perception.²⁰

2. They unanimously refer to the same illustration “Fetch the milch without the calf!” for explaining that the word “cognition” (*jñāna*) is omitted in the above-mentioned sentence of definition of direct perception.²¹

3. As pointed out above, Kamalaśīla as well as Śāntarakṣita was aware of the fact that the compound *nāmajātyādiyojanā* in PS is somewhat strange in terms of the usage of *ādi*. The same was also expressed by Jinendrabuddhi in yet another way.²²

III. On the Texts and the Methodology.

The translation of TS and TSP is made from the following texts:

1. TS 1212-1263:
 (Skt.) M 61b2-64a2
 K 1213-1264
 S 1212-1263
 (Tib.)²³ P 5764, Vol. 138, 'e, 55a4-57a7
 D 4266, Tshad ma Vol. 18, ze, 45a1-46b6
2. TSP on TS 1212-1263:
 (Skt.) M 150b2-154a4
 K 366, 14-398, 27
 S 448, 20-463, 16
 (Tib.)²⁴ P 5765, Vol. 139, ye, 24b8-34a2
 D 4267, Tshad ma Vol. 19, 'e, 1b1-9a2

For the purpose of offering the translation as literally and thoroughly as possible, it is indispensable that every available reference be collected from other texts and compared with each context of TS and TSP. This procedure is substantially

20 See the translation on p. 57; and n. 35.

21 See nn. 39 and 40.

22 See n. 96.

23 For the translators, Guṇākaraśrībhadra and Īi ba'od, see Naudou 1980: 214 n. 38; 221; and 230.

24 For the translators, Devendrabhadra and Grags 'byor śes rab, see Naudou 1980: 211-215; 230; 235-236; and Ruegg 1981: 114.

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followed in the notes for the translation where the textual differences among the above five versions of the texts are also noted.²⁵ The main abbreviations I employ are as follows:

M	Jaisalmer manuscripts ²⁶ of TS / TSP
K	E. Krishnamacharya's edition of TS / TSP
S	S. D. Shastri's edition of TS / TSP
Pa	Variant readings in the Paṭan (Pattan) manuscripts of TS / TSP which are found in the footnotes of S.
Ga	Variant readings in the Gaekwad manuscripts of TS/TSP which are found in the footnotes of S.

Further, the following methodological remarks should be taken into account for the notations in the translations and the notes:

1. In the translation I use S as the basic text. However, for the way of presenting the translation I follow the style of K for convenience sake; i.e., the translation of TS is arranged in the appropriate location within TSP.
2. Parentheses (...) in translations indicate that the enclosed words are the complements which are necessary on account of syntactical differences between Sanskrit (or Tibetan) and English; no translator's interpretation is added. On the other hand, brackets [...] in translations indicate that the enclosed words are added for a better understanding of the contents with the translator's interpretation.

25 In principle I tried to collect in the notes as many relevant passages as possible, at least in Buddhist Sanskrit literature, which would be of any help for similar research in the future. However, I could not fully consult PVinT. A philological research of that is not the scope of this article.

26 I owe a great debt of gratitude to the Venerable Jaina Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji for the acquisition of the black and white photoprints of these manuscripts which has not been possible before for scholars outside of India.

In the case of TS, only by reference to M was it possible for me to clarify better readings since the Tibetan of TS, as it is, is not so reliable for textual emendations.

Both TS and TSP in M are written in an amazingly beautiful Nāgarī script. TS is written in a very strict script and font, each folio in six (occasionally, five) lines in a rigid, well-ordered form. There are only a few marginal notations, compared with TSP. The verse-number is attached at the end of each verse, counting from the beginning of the chapter. On the other hand, TSP is written in a freer style than TS. Each folio consists of from six to eight lines. The notes, additions, and corrections in the margin reveal that it was read very well, although some of those marginal remarks apparently belong to the modern age. It is noteworthy that the marginal notations are mostly given with an indication of the line in which the word in question is written.

3. **Bold type** signifies the translation of TS to distinguish it easily from TSP. This is used also for presenting the Sanskrit texts of TS in the notes.
4. I follow S for the verse-numbers of TS. The folio number of M is also indicated in the notes for easy access. The locations of passages of TSP are, on the other hand, just indicated at the beginning of a new topic in the translation, and they are indicated in the case of notes only with reference to the location in S.
5. Each Sanskrit verse of TS in the notes is followed by the corresponding Tibetan translation; “Tib. (!)” indicates that the Tibetan does not fully reflect the reading or the structure of the Sanskrit. Passages of TSP in the notes are, when necessary, cited without mentioning the name of the text (i.e., TSP); e.g., (450, 14) indicates that the passage is quoted from S (p. 450, l. 14).
6. As pointed out by Kunst,²⁷ the Tibetan of TS is not reliable. It often contains corruptions and more often than not reveals that the translation was made without fully digesting the Sanskrit syntax. However, in spite of its textual defects, it must be consulted for criticism of the Sanskrit text. Further, Tib. *pratīkas* — i.e., the words which are quoted from TS and commented upon in the Tibetan TSP — are also useful for textual criticism because they often show a far better reading than the Tibetan TS.
7. The Tibetan passages from other texts cited in the notes for reference are generally taken from P. Different readings in D are occasionally referred to in brackets but their exact locations are omitted except in the case of TS which is the most important text in this work.
8. When one of the Tibetan versions keeps a preferable reading and another is problematic or corrupt, I indicate the point by using a semicolon and brackets as, e.g., “*kalpanā*; *rtog* [D: *rtogs* P] *pa*.” When both P and D reveal good, but different, readings I follow P as the basic text.
9. A passage is occasionally underlined for emphasis.

27 Kunst 1939: VIII.

SYNOPSIS OF THE TRANSLATION

(*Indicates that the topic is found only in TSP.)

- I. Introduction [1212]. (translation p. 57, l. 3)
- II. Direct perception defined: That (cognition) which is free from conception (*kalpanāpoḍha*) and non-erroneous (*abhrānta*) is direct perception [1213ab]. (58, 7-60, 11)
 - A*. References to other definitions. (58, 7)
 - B*. On the syntax of the definition. (59, 4)
 1. On the definiendum and the definition; on the word order in the sentence. (59, 4)
 2. The word “cognition” is omitted. (60, 7)
- III. On “being free from conception.” (61, 2-116, 3)
 - A. On conception. (61, 2-94, 14)
 1. Conception defined: A cognition associated with an expression (*abhilāpini pratītiḥ*) [1213bc]. (61, 4)
 - a*. Introductory remarks. (62, 1-64, 1)
 - (1) Reference to other definitions of conception criticized by Śāṅkara-svāmin, etc [1213cd]. (62, 1)
 - (a) The definition by the Sarvāstivāda school. (62, 15)
 - (b) The definition by the Yogācāra school. (63, 2)
 - (2) Etymological explanation of the word *abhilāpin*. (63, 4)
 2. Demonstrations to prove the above definition of conception. (64, 3-69, 8)
 - a. Conception is known through one’s direct perception. (64, 3)
 - (1) The first demonstration [1214]. (64, 5)
— Corroboration of the first demonstration by means of inference [1215]. (65, 12)
 - (2) The second demonstration [1216]. (67, 10)
 - b. Conception is also demonstrated by an inference [1217]. (68, 5)
 3. The examination of Dignāga’s definitions of conception. (69, 10-94, 14)
 - a. Introduction. (69, 10-71, 12)
 - (1) *pūrvapakṣa*: conception should be defined not only as associated with an expression but as capable for the connection with a genus, etc. [1218ab]. (69, 10)
 - (2) General response: Genus, etc., is not maintained by Buddhists and it is not perceived [1218cd]. (70, 4)
— Additional remarks on the non-perception of a genus, etc. [1219]. (70,

13)

b. Interpretations of the definition in PS I 3d: “name-genus, etc. connection” (*nāmajātyādiyojanā*). (72, 2-88, 7)

(1) The first interpretation. (72, 2-76, 9)

(a) “Name-genus, etc.” (*nāmajātyādi*) being interpreted as “name” and “genus, etc.,” respectively expressing Dignāga’s own idea, which is to be accepted, and the opinion of other teachers, which is to be rejected [1220]. (72, 7)

(b) Interpretations of “connection” (*yojanā*). (73, 10-76, 9)

1) The whole compound interpreted as a *bahuvrīhi* conception as that which has the connection with name and genus, etc. [1221]. (74, 4)

2) The compound as a *tatpuruṣa* conception as that which connects a name and a genus, etc. [1222]. (76, 4)

(2) The second interpretation: The definition of conception as expressing Dignāga’s own idea only (*svamatasiddhaiva*) [1223ab]. (76, 11-86, 17)

(a) The interpretation of PSV I (*yadṛcchāśabdeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo ’rtha ucyate...*) (76, 16-83, 2)

1) The expression “a thing is expressed being distinguished by a name” in PSV should be syntactically connected also in the cases of genus-, quality-, action-, and substance-words [1223cd]. (77, 9)

2) The interpretation of “by a genus, etc.”: a thing, being distinguished by a name by means of a genus, etc., is expressed as a “cow,” etc. [1224ab]. (78, 3)

3) The interpretation of PS I 3d: that which connects a name through the medium of a genus, etc. [1224cd]. (78, 13)

— Excursus: the definition is not too narrow (*avyāpti*) regarding arbitrary words, either. (79, 3)

a) From a realistic point of view [1225a-c]. (79, 7)

—* From the standpoint of the theory of a whole. (80, 2)

—* From the standpoint of *pariṇatidarśana*. (80, 11)

b) From the Buddhist standpoint. (81, 7)

— Dignāga separated arbitrary words from genus-words because they are separately known to people [1225d]. (81, 22)

— Dignāga expressed both arbitrary words and genus-words separately only in conformity with the commonalty [1226-27]. (82, 8)

(b) The interpretation of PSV I (*anye tu arthaśūnyaiḥ śabdair eva*

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- viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate*) [1228]. (83, 4)
- (c) Integration of the definitions. (84, 4-88, 7)
- 1) Dharmakīrti's definition, *abhilāpinī pratītiḥ*, should be accepted also by other teachers who hold conception being connection with a genus, etc. [1229-33]. The interpretation of PSV I (on the word *ucyate*). (84, 4)
 - 2) Dignāga's real intention: the reconciliation of the first and the second interpretations of PS I 3d [1234-35]. (87, 2)
- c. Interpretations of Dignāga's definition in NMukh. (88, 9-91, 8)
- (1) The first interpretation: the definition as stating both Dignāga's own idea and other teachers' opinion [1236]. (88, 9)
 - (2) The second interpretation: The definition as stating Dignāga's own idea only [1237]. (90, 19)
- d. The examination of the criticism of the Buddhist idea of conception upheld by Uddyotakara, etc. [1238-41]. (91, 10-94, 14)
- (1) On the criticism in terms of the problem of the property and the property-possessor in Dharmakīrti's definition. Interpretation of PSV I (*yatraiśā kalpanā nāsti tat pratyakṣam*). (91, 10)
 - (2) On Uddyotakara's criticism that direct perception as defined by Dignāga cannot be expressed by the word "direct perception." (91, 15; 94, 8)
- B. Demonstrations of "being free from conception." (94, 16-116, 3)
1. Corroborations in terms of direct perception. (94, 16-107, 11)
 - a. General idea: direct perception's being free from conception is known from self-perception because even a person whose mind is preoccupied with in something else, such as past affairs, perceives blue, etc., which is right before his eyes [1242]. (94, 16)
 - (1) Direct perception is experienced in coexistence with conception, being different from each other, so that direct perception cannot contain conception. (95, 4-97, 6)
 - (a) Conception of past affairs, etc., arises independently from direct perception [1243]. (95, 4)
 - (b) Impossibility of assuming two different conceptions in simultaneity [1244]. (96, 3)
 - (c) A summary [1245]. (97, 2)
 - (2) The examinations of the counter-arguments to the theory of simultaneity. (97, 8-107, 11)
 - (a) *pūrvapakṣa*: cognitions which occur successively are wrongly con-

ceived to be simultaneous because they occur quite rapidly as in the case of a fire-brand [1246]. (97, 8-99, 8)

(b) Responses. (99, 10-107, 11)

1) The objection is not relevant to the main topic, i. e., direct perception's being free from conception, so that it is not the real impediment to the topic [1247]. (99, 10)

2) The simultaneous occurrence of sense-perception with conception is not an error as the opponent claims [1248]. (100, 12)

3) Counter-evidences to the objection [1249-52]. (101, 14)

a) The example of a sound such as *latā* in reference to the example of seeing a dancer, etc. (102, 4; 104, 9)

b) In the case where there is only conception in the mind. (102, 7; 105, 3)

c) All mental activities are of the same nature in terms of their momentariness. (102, 9; 105, 8)

4) The example "like a fire-brand" commits a fallacy called "being devoid of a probandum" [1253-55]. (105, 14)

2. Corroborations in terms of inference. (107, 13-116, 3)

a. A syllogism by a non-perception of the cause [1256-59]. (107, 13)

(1) The examination of the objection. The word-particular (*śabdasvalakṣaṇa*) as the signified (*vācya*) or the signifier (*vācaka*) is only a falsely imputed thing [1260-61ab]. (110, 3)

(2) On the other hand, direct perception which cognizes the particular is not conceptual [1261cd-62]. (111, 9)

b. A syllogism by a perception of that which is incompatible with a pervader [1263]. (113, 3)

TRANSLATION OF TS 1212-1263 AND ITS TSP

(M 150b2; S 448, 19; K 366, 14; P 24b8; D 1b1)

There are four kinds of wrong notions (*vipratipatti*) which other schools hold with regard to right knowledge (*pramāṇa*): (wrong notions) concerning its nature (*svarūpa*), effect (*phala*), object (*gocara*), and number (*saṃkhyā*)²⁸. For the purpose of demonstrating the clear²⁹ definition of right knowledge by means of refuting the (wrong notions, the master has already stated,) “**ascertained by two-fold right knowledge both endowed with a clear definition.**”³⁰ In order to corroborate this³¹ (the master now) states:

Direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) which are assumed by other (teachers) in order to establish (categorical) qualifications (*upādhi*)³² are not correct [as right knowledge] for they (should) be defined as follows.

// TS 1212 //³³

28 These four wrong notions are mentioned also in NBPS by Kamalaśīla himself. For the text and Jap. tr. see Tosaki 1984. Cf. also nn. 35-37; and DhPr 35, 15-26.

29 *spaṣṭam pramāṇalakṣaṇam ādarśayitum* (448, 20). My translation of *spaṣṭam* as an adjective is based on the following passage: *spaṣṭam ca tallakṣaṇam ceti viśeṣaṇasamāsaḥ* (15, 18) on TS 3a (*spaṣṭalakṣaṇasamyukta*-.). The word *spaṣṭam* is, on the other hand, translated as an adverb in the Tibetan 25a1: *mtshan ñid gsal bar bstan pa'i don du*.

30 TS 3ab: *spaṣṭalakṣaṇasamyuktapramādvitayaniścitam*. Tib. P 'e 2a3-4; D ze 1b3: *mtshan ñid gsal dan ldan pa yi // tshad ma gñis kyis gtan la dbab //*. For an exposition on the passage see TSP (15, 18-21). Further, the contents of TS 3ab are concerned with Chapters 17 (Pratyakṣalakṣaṇa-parīkṣā), 18 (Anumāna-p^o), and 19 (Pramāṇāntarabhāva-p^o). Of these the last chapter is concerned with the problem of *saṃkhyāvipratipatti* (cf. TSP 16, 21-22; 530, 13). Chapter 17, on the other hand, is concerned with the problems of the definition (*lakṣaṇa*, *svarūpa*) and the effect (*phala*; cf. TS 1343ff.); and any independent discussion on the object (*gocara*) is not evident.

31 *etatsamarthanārtham* (448, 21). M originally reads *samarthanam* but is corrected into *samarthanārtham* [sic!] in the margin.

32 The word “qualifications” in this context means falsely imputed categories such as the six *padārthas* upheld by the Vaiśeṣika school. Kamalaśīla states elsewhere that “qualification” is a synonym of *viśeṣaṇa*. TSP 14, 20: *guṇādayaś ca te upādḥayaś ca viśeṣaṇānīti viśeṣaṇasamāsaḥ* (on TS 2ab cited below). These qualifications are not maintained to be real because they are in opposite to the Buddhist idea of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*; cf. TS 2a-c: *guṇadravyakriyājāṭisamavāyādyupādhibhiḥ / śūnyam*. “(Dependent origination) which is devoid of such qualifications as quality, substance, action, genus and inherence”).

33 M 61b2: *patyakṣam anumānam ca yad upādhiprasiddhaye / parair uktaṃ na tat sid-dham evamlakṣaṇakam hi tat* ^a // Tib. P 55a4-5; D 45a1-2: *mñon sum ni dan* [P: *dan ni D*] *rjes /*

(Here,) in order to establish (categorical) qualifications (means) in order to establish such qualifications as quality (*guṇa*), substance (*dravya*), action (*kriyā*), genus (*jāti*), and inherence (*samavāya*).³⁴ Other (teachers) (means) the Vaiśeṣika (teachers), etc. As follows (means) as (the master) shall state (in the following discussions).

(M 150b3; S 449, 8; K 366, 21; P 25a3; D 1b4)

Among these (four wrong notions) (*tatra*) the wrong notion regarding the nature³⁵ of direct perception is that direct perception is, as right knowledge, either accompanied by conceptual (cognition)³⁶ or the eye and the other (sense organs) which are not cognition by nature.³⁷ Refuting them (the master) states the definition of this (direct perception):

↘ dpag la // bye brag can du bsgrub [P: sgrub D] pa'i phyir // pha rol pos smras de mi 'grub // de ni mtshan ñid 'di dag ldan //.

^a Cf. ŚBh 22, 11: *pratyakṣam tāvad animittam. — kim kāraṇam — evamlakṣaṇakam hi tat.*

34 The wording of *guṇadravyakriyājātisamavāyādyupādhi*-(448, 22) follows TS 2ab (see n. 32) which is further commented upon as follows: *guṇās ca dravyāṇi ca kriyās ca jātiś ca samavāyaś ceti dvandvaḥ. jātiśabdena param āparam ca dvividham api sāmānyam grhyate^a. ādiśabdena antya-dravyavartinām viśeṣānām^b, ye ca dharmiviyatirekiṇo dharmāḥ kaiścid upavarṇyante, yathā ṣaṇṇām api padārthānām astitvaṃ sadupalambhakapramāṇaviśayatvaṃ^c ity evamādayaḥ, teṣāṃ grahaṇam* (14, 16-20).

^a PBh 311, 14: *sāmānyam dvividham, param āparam ca.*

^b Cf. PBh. 321, 12-13: *anteṣu bhavā antyāḥ svāśrayaviśeṣakatvād viśeṣāḥ.*

^c Cf. PBh 16, 1-2: *ṣaṇṇām api padārthānām astitvābhideyatvajñeyatvāni.*

35 The idea that the accurate definition of direct perception aims at the exclusion of its misunderstandings by other teachers is often expressed in commentaries on Dharmakīrti's works. For examples of these see Tosaki 1984: 486 n. 1. It is interesting to note here that Vinītadeva (NBṬ (V) 39, 6), Jinendrabuddhi (PST 20b7), and Kamalaśīla agree in their wording preferring *svarūpavipratipatti* to *lakṣaṇavipratipatti* against other commentators such as Dharmottara (NBṬ 35.1; PVinṬ 7b8), Jñānaśrībhadrā (PVinṬ (J) 218a7), and Manorathanandin (PVV (M) 154, 10).

36 According to Kamalaśīla's own NBPS, this idea seems to be claimed by the Nyāya school. NBPS 478, 24-25: *Rigs pa can rnam ni mñon sum thams cad ñes pa'i bdag ñid yin pa'i phyir, rnam par rtog pa dan bcas pa kho na'o zes zer ro* (see also Tosaki 1984 [=NBPS]: 488-489 n. 10). In addition to this, Kumārila of the Mīmāṃsā school also maintains **savikalpakapratyakṣa* as one kind of direct perception (cf. ŚV, *pratyakṣa*, v. 120).

37 According to NBPS (479, 4-7), the upholders of this idea are, for example, the Vaiśeṣika school and the Sāṃkhya school. This kind of *vipratipatti* in other texts is pointed out by Tosaki (1984). The problem of qualitative perception and non-qualitative perception in PBh is analyzed by Hattori (1968/69). In addition to these, there is another interesting passage concerning our context: In PVinṬ (J), Jñānaśrībhadrā introduces — in reference to the wrong notions on the definition of direct perception — those ideas as (1) NS 1. 1. 4 (218a7-8), (2) Sāṃkhya idea which suggests Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition^a, ↗

(That which is) free from conception and non-erroneous is direct perception.

// TS 1213ab //³⁸

Here, [the attributes] being free from conception and being non-erroneous in cognition being stated after (*anūdyā*), (the master) prescribes (*vidhīyate*) [its attribute] being direct perception,³⁹ for in every case⁴⁰ the definiendum (*lakṣya*) is

√ (3) the one which is parallel to YBh^b, and (4) ŚV, *pratyakṣa*, v. 112 and v. 120 (218b2-4). Jñānaśrībhaddra further states that the NS 1. 1. 4 is upheld by the Nyāya school and it is common to the idea of the Vaiśeṣika school. This is different from Kamalaśīla's way of understanding in NBPS mentioned above. Moreover, after introducing these definitions, Jñānaśrībhaddra expounds that *all* the schools mentioned above hold the theory that direct perception is connected with conception (218b4: *de dag thams cad kyañ mñon sum rtog pa dan bcas par 'dod do* //).

^a PVinT (J) 218b1: *Grāñ can gyi žugs pa thub pa ser skya ni yul so sor žen cin mthoñ ba ni mñon sum mo žes ser ro* // . Cf. *pratiṣṭāyādhyaśāśāyo drṣṭam* in SK 5.

^b PVinT (J) 218b1-2: *drañ sroñ Chur lhuñ na re dbañ po lña dan ldan pa gañ sems kyis phyi rol gyi dnos po ñe bar bžag* [P: gžag D] *pas / spyi dan bye brag gi mtshan ñid kyi dnos po las bye brag ñes par 'dzin pa sems kyi 'jug pa lña las mchog gi 'jug pa ni mñon sum yin no žes smra'o* // . Cf. YBh 11, 1-3: *indriyapṛāṇālikayā cittasya bāhyavastūparāgāt tadviśaya sāmānyaviśeṣātmano 'rthasya viśeṣādvadhāraṇāpradhānā vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam pramāṇam*.

38 M 61b2-3: *pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham abhrāntam abhilāpinī / pratītiḥ kalpanā kṛptihetutvādyātmikā na tu* // [1213a-d]. Tib. P 55a5-6; D 45a2: *mñon sum rtog pa dan bral žin* // *ma 'khrul pa 'o^a rtog pa ni* // *brjod pa dan ldan šes pa ste^b // tha sñad rgyu sogs bdag ñid ni* // *ma yin^c*. Śāntarakṣita owes *pāda* a-c to PVin I v. 4a-c: *mñon sum rtog bral ma 'khrul ba / ... rtog pa mñon par brjod can gyi* // *šes pa* (i.e., *pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham abhrāntam abhilāpinī / pratītiḥ kalpanā*). Cf. NB I 4-5: *tatra pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham abhrāntam. abhilāpasamsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā*. See also n. 43.

^a Tib. *pratīka*: *mñon sum rtog bral ma 'khrul ba* (25a4).

^b Tib. *pratīka*: *rtog* [D: *rtogs* P] *pa mñon par brjod can gyi* / [P: // D] *šes pa* (25b1).

^c Tib. *pratīka*: *ñe bar btags pa yi* / [P: *pa'i* for *pa yi* / D] *rgyu ñid la sogs bdag ñid min* (25b2-3).

39 *tatra jñānasya kalpanāpodhatvam abhrāntatvam cānūdyā pratyakṣatvam vidhīyate* (449, 11; Tib. 25a5). Here it is very interesting that Kamalaśīla explains the relation between the definition and the definiendum by using the formulation “*x anūdyā y vidhīyate*”, the contents of *x* and *y* being completely opposed to Dharmottara's idea as exposed in NBT 40, 7-8: *tatra pratyakṣam* [: *pratyakṣatvam*] *anūdyā kalpanāpodhatvam abhrāntatvam ca vidhīyate*. “In this case, ‘direct perception’ being repeated [after the previous *sūtra*], its being free from conception and being non-erroneous are prescribed.” This idea is also found in PVinT 43a7-8: *mñon sum žes bya ba ni mtshan gži rjes su brjod pa ste / ... mñon sum rjes su brjod nas rtog pa dan bral pa ñid la sogs pa'i mtshan ñid sgrub par byed pa yin no* // . “Direct perception is the definiendum and is repeated [after the previous *sūtra*]. ... ‘Direct perception’ being repeated, (its attributes) being free from conception and being non-erroneous are prescribed.” Regarding these passages see Stcherbatsky 1930: 15 n. 1; Franco 1987: 432-436 n. 185; and Yaita 1984: 19. However, the relation between the ideas of these two teachers on this point is not clear.

An earlier usage of the formulation “*x anūdyā y vidhīyate*”^a in Buddhist logic and epistemology is found in PVT (Ś) II 87a2: *tshad ma slu med can šes pa žes bya ba ni mi slu ba can ñid dan šes pa ñid mtshan gži rjes su bstan nas tshad ma ñid ni mtshan ñid brjod pa'o* // . “‘Right knowledge is the ✓

prescribed [as the predicate] as, for example, (in the sentence) “That which trembles is the fig (tree).”

Here direct perception is the definiendum because the subject is none other than the definition of that (direct perception); the main topic (*prakṛta*) is not the definition of “free from conception” and “non-erroneous,” (for) if that were the case, they would be prescribed.

Since [perception’s identity as] a cognition (*jñāna*) is (syntactically) meant by implication through the denial of conception (*kalpanā*) — as, for example, in (the sentence) “Fetch the milch without the calf!” the milch cow (is meant by implication) through the denial of the calf — for this reason (the word) “cognition” is not employed.⁴¹

↘ cognition which does not deviate’ [= PV II 1a]. (The attributes) being non-deviating and being a cognition, which are the definiendum (**lakṣya*), being stated after, (the attribute) being right knowledge, which is the definition (**lakṣaṇa*), is prescribed.” The Skt. parallel of this runs as follows: *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam iti avisaṃvāditvaṃ jñānatvaṃ ca (mtshan gzi) anūdya prāmāṇyaṃ (mtshan ñid) vidhīyate* (identified in Steinkellner 1981: 290; the latter parentheses are mine). Here, the formulation in question is noteworthy, but the interpretation of the definition and the definiendum looks problematic. Śākyabuddhi uses the formulation also in his commentary on PV III 123a in PVT (Ś) 222b4: ... *rtogs pa dañ bral ba ñid bstan nas mñon sum ñid ston par byed pa yin te*/. “(The attribute) being free from conception (**kalpanāpodhatva*) being stated after, (the attribute) being direct perception (**pratyakṣa-tva*) is prescribed.” In the course of discussion he also states that “direct perception” is the definiendum (PVT (Ś) 222b3) in accordance with Devendrabuddhi’s idea (PVP 195b8-196a1).

The meaning of *anūdya* (“being stated after”) is not equivalent in the above passages: Dharmottara uses the word to mean “to repeat a word which is already employed in the previous *sūtra*,” whereas Śākyabuddhi and Kamalaśīla seem to take the word in the sense of “to be stated after the preceding factor of the concerned sentence,” because there is no preceding usage of the words before their sentences. Consequently, the interpretation of the whole sentence *pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham abhrāntam* should be differentiated: Dharmottara understands it as “Direct perception is that cognition which is free from conception and non-erroneous” (cf. NBT 40, 8-9: *yat tat bhavatām asmākaṃ cārtheṣu sāṅgāt-kārijñānam prasiddham tat kalpanāpodhābhrāntatvayuktam draṣṭavyam*), whereas Śākyabuddhi and Kamalaśīla take the same sentence as “That cognition which is free from conception and non-erroneous is direct perception.” Kamalaśīla’s idea is further understood from the example he offers; i.e., “That which trembles is the fig tree” where the latter element, fig tree, is the definiendum which corresponds to *pratyakṣa* in the sentence of the definition. Probably Kamalaśīla’s idea on the interpretation of the sentence of the definition partakes of an idea older than Dharmottara’s because Vinītadeva also interprets *pratyakṣa* as the predicate and *kalpanāpodham abhrāntam* as the subject of the sentence. NBT (V) 39, 12-13: *rtog pa dañ bral zin ma ’khrul ba gañ yin pa de ni mñon sum yin par rig par bya’o*. “That which is free from conception and non-erroneous is understood to be direct perception.” Cf. also NBT (V) 42, 3-5 (translated in n. 50).

^a Cf. Kāś 209, 12-13: *yat pratyakṣam tad evamlakṣaṇakam iti lakṣaṇavidhiḥ, yad evamlakṣaṇakam tat pratyakṣam iti lakṣaṇānuvādaḥ*.

40 For *sarvatvaiva* (449, 11) the Tibetan reads *thams cad du* (25a5); i.e., *eva* omitted.

41 *kalpanāpratiṣedhāc ca jñānasya sāmārthyabdhavāt “avatsā dhenur āñiyatām” iti yathā* ↗

(M 150b5; S 449, 16; K 367, 2; 25a8; 2a3)

(In order to clarify) what (kind of) conception⁴² is then intended here as that which a cognition is free of to be direct perception, (the master) states:

Conception is a cognition associated with an expression (*abhilāpinī pratītiḥ*).

// TS 1213bc //⁴³

↘ *vatsapratīṣedhena godhenor iti, ato jñānam iti noktam* (449, 14-16). Cf. Tib. (25a7-8): *rtog pa bkag pas śes pa ūgs kyis thob pa'i phyir / dper na be'u med pa'i bžon ma 'on cig ces bya bas be'u bkag pas ba lañ bžon ma rtogs pa lta bu yin pas de'i phyir śes pa źes brjod do //*, where the underlined passage means either "‘cognition’ is (implicitly) stated" or just a corruption.

This statement has the following parallels:

1. NBT (V) 43, 9-17: *śes pa ni mñon sum mo źes bya ba la mdo las śes pa ma smos par ji ltar rñed ce na / rtog pa ni śes pa kho na dañ 'brel ba la 'khrul pa yañ śes pa'i chos yin pas [for par (?)] mthoñ ste / de lta bas na rtog pa dañ bral ba dañ ma 'khrul pa ni śes pa kho na la bya'o // dper na be'u med pa'i drus ma khrid de śog cig ces byas na / rta rgod ma khrid de mi 'on gi ba drus ma khrid de 'on bas / 'di ltar de ñid be'u dañ 'brel par mthoñ ba de bžin du / 'dir yañ rtog pa dañ 'khrul pa ni śes pa kho na dañ 'brel par mthoñ gi gžan dañ ni ma yin pas śes pa kho na mñon sum du 'dod do //*. "(Question:) [According to you] direct perception is cognition. However, 'cognition' not being stated in the fundamental text, why is (such a meaning) acquired? (Answer:) It is understood that conception is connected only with cognition and (being) non-erroneous is also a property of cognition. Therefore, (the words) 'free from conception' and 'non-erroneous' are stated with relation to cognition only. For example, (when one hears the sentence) 'Fetch the milch without the calf!' one does not fetch a mare but fetches the milch cow. Hence this (i. e., milch) itself is understood as connected with the calf. Likewise, in this case too, 'conception' and 'erroneous' are understood to be connected with cognition, and not with anything else. Therefore, direct perception is maintained to be none other than cognition." The original Sanskrit passage is found in Malvania's note in NB (263, 7-10) and Tātparya 32, 3-8: *sūtre anupāttaṃ jñānaṃ labhyate kuta iti ced, ucyate. kalpanayā jñānasyaiva sambandho dr̥ṣṭaḥ, bhrāntiś ca jñānadharmāḥ. tasmāt kalpanārahitam abhrāntaṃ ca jñānam evocyate. tadyathā, avatsā [corr.: savatsā] dhenur āṇiyatām ity ukte na vaḍavāṇiyate, kim tu godhenuḥ. evam ihāpi kalpanayā bhrāntyā ca jñānasyaiva sambandho dr̥ṣṭa iti jñānam eva pratyakṣam iṣyate iti*. The Sanskrit and the Tibetan are different regarding the underlined words.

2. PST 20b8-21a2: *rtog pa dañ bral ba nes par bstan pa las kyañ / [D: // P] de śes pa'i bdag ñid do źes rtogs par bya ste / gañ gi phyir śes pa kho na la rtog pa dañ 'dres pa yod la / de'i phyir de bkag pas de kho na rtogs so // dper na bžon ma be'u med pa khyer la śog ces be'u bkag pas ba lañ bžon [P: bžen D] ma kho na rtogs [D: rtog P] par bya'i gžan ma yin pa bžin no //*. "Further, by means of indicating 'free from conception,' it is known that that [which is free from conception] is essentially cognition. As only cognition has the connection with 'free from conception,' therefore, by the negation of that (i.e., 'free from cognition'), only that (i.e., 'cognition') is understood; as, for example, (in the sentence) 'Fetch the milch without the calf!' by the negation of calf only milch cow and nothing else is understood." For a Skt. reconstruction of the passage see Jambuvijaya 1966: 60 n. 15.

42 *kalpanā* (449, 16); *rtog* [D: *rtogs* P] *pa* (25a8).

43 The text is presented in n. 38. The source of the expression is PVin I 40, 6-8: */ rtog pa mñon par brjod can gyi // śes pa [=v. 4bc: abhilāpinī / pratītiḥ kalpanā] rtog pa ni brjod pa dañ 'drer ruñ ba snañ ba'i śes pa ste / [= abhilāpasamsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā; identical to NB I 5]. Cf. ↗*

Now Śāṅkarasvāmin⁴⁴ and others refuted in detail (conception) as essentially being a cause of verbal expression, etc. (*klptihetutvādyātmika*). Is this (kind of conception also) intended (in our definition) or not? (In reference to this the master) states:

It is, however, not (meant as) essentially being a cause of verbal expression and the like.

// TS 1213d // ⁴⁵

(The word) “meant” (should) be added. By this (statement) it is explained that the refutations propounded by the opponents on this point of discussion do not pertain because (our definition) is not concerned with the thesis of those (who are criticized by them).

Verbal expression (*klpti*)⁴⁶ (means) verbal designation (*vyapadeśa*). It should be understood that a genus, etc., is a cause of that (verbal designation) for, without qualifiers such as a genus, verbal designation does not hold⁴⁷. What is meant by the words **and the like** should be (such notions) as reflection (*vitarka*) and investiga-

↘ TBh 11, 15-12, 1: *tatra pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhīrāntam. pūrvāparam anusamdhāya śabda-samkīrṇākārā pratītir antarjalpākārā vā kalpanā. yathā vijñāpuruṣasya so 'yaṁ ghaṭa iti pratītiḥ. bālamūkatiriyāgādīnām antarjalpākārā parāmarśarūpā vā pratītiḥ* (as a different kind of formulation of *kalpanā* and *pratīti*; for the translation of the passage see Kajiyama 1966: 40-41).

44 Śāṅkarasvāmin's (Tib. *bDe byed bdag po*) refutation mentioned here is not known elsewhere (cf. TSP 490, 25 in another context). Though the name is found in PVV (M) 159, 17 (*ācāryīyāḥ Śāṅkarasvāmiprabhīrtayaḥ*), the identity of this Śāṅkarasvāmin with the teacher in our text is not certain. According to Tosaki (1979: 228 n. 56.), Śāṅkarasvāmin cited in PVV (M) above propounds a demonstration of the establishment of the non-conceptuality of direct perception; viz., this Śāṅkarasvāmin belongs to some Buddhist party. Moreover, Devendrabuddhi calls the person Srid pa'i bdag (po) (i. e., *Bhāvasvāmin (?)), etc., and Ravigupta mentions him as Harisami (i. e., *Harisvāmin), etc.

45 The text is presented in n. 38.

46 The exact meaning of *klpti* (cf. Tib. *btags pa* D, *brtag pa* P; cf. also *tha sñad* and *ñe bar btags pa* in n. 38) is not certain. It is paraphrased by *vyapadeśa* in TSP (cf. *avyapadeśya* in the definition of direct perception in NS 1. 1. 4). The difference between the definition refuted by Śāṅkarasvāmin, etc., and that which is maintained by Śāntarakṣita might lie in the following point: The former discusses conception (*kalpanā*) being a cause of verbal expression (*klpti*) in terms of causality between verbal expression and conception, whereas the latter defines it as any cognition which is capable of the connection with words, where the causal viewpoint is not taken into account.

47 This is an explanation of the formulation of conception as a cause of verbal expression which is criticized by Śāṅkarasvāmin, etc. That is, it is presumably a general reference to some Buddhist ideas including the ideas by the Sarvāstivāda school and the Yogācāra school as described below (nn. 48-49). If this is the case, “genus, etc.” in this context would mean not the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika school, etc., but a genus, a quality, an action, and a substance which are — based on Dignāga's definition of conception — maintained by some other Buddhists, as mentioned later (after TS 1218 onwards).

tion (*vicāra*), as the causes (respectively) of grossness and minuteness of the mind which are connected with words,⁴⁸ and, likewise, the conception of the grasping and the grasped (aspects of cognition) (*grāhyagrāhakakalpanā*), etc.⁴⁹

Expression (*abhilāpa*) (means) a word as the signifier (*vācakaḥ śabdaḥ*), and it is of universal form.⁵⁰ That (cognition) in which (an expression) exists as a

48 *śabdasaṃsargacittaūdarīkasūksmatāhetu vitarkavicārau* (449, 22; cf. Tib. 25b5: *sgra dan 'dres pa dan / sems rtsin ba* [P: *rtsins pa D*] *dan 'zib pa'i rgyu rtog pa dan dpyod pa dan* /). This passage refers to the definition of conception by the Sarvāstivāda school. A similar reference is found in NBT 21, 4-5: ... *Vaibhāṣikā indriyavijñānaṃ vitarkavicāracaitasikasamprayuktam kalpanāṃ icchanti*. "The Vaibhāṣikas maintain sense-cognition being conception which is linked with reflection and investigation as mental functions." References are also found in AK II 33ab — *vitarkacārāv audāryasūksmate* — and its commentary AKBh 60, 25 — *cittaūdarikatā vitarkaḥ cittasūksmatā vicāraḥ*. "Reflection is grossness of the mind. Investigation is minuteness of the mind." Elsewhere Vasubandhu equates *vitarka* with *svabhāvavikalpa* (AKBh 22, 22). Further, Yaśomitra (AKV 64, 25-28) cites the following passage of the *Pañcaskandhaka* (i.e., the **Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* by Vasubandhu): *vitarkaḥ katamaḥ. paryeṣako manojalpaḥ, cetanāprajñāviśeṣaḥ, yā cittasyaūdarikatā. vicāraḥ katamaḥ. pratyavekṣako manojalpaḥ, tathaiva yā cittasya sūksmatā*. "What is reflection? It is a murmur of the mind which looks after (the object); it is a special will and intellect which is grossness of the mind. What (then) is investigation? It is a murmur of the mind which fully examines (that object) which, in the same way (as in reflection), is minuteness of the mind." Cf. the Chinese translation in PañS 489b27-29.

One point deserves to be discussed here: In these two texts *vitarka* and *vicāra* are defined as grossness and minuteness of the mind — or two functions of the mind — and not as the *cause* of those functions as stated in TSP. In fact, Vasubandhu suggests the distinction of "grossness and minuteness of the mind" from "the causes (cf. *nimittabhūta* in AKBh 61, 2; and *hetu* in AKV 138, 23-24) of grossness and minuteness of the mind." Cf. also ADV 81, 4-7: *vitarko nāma cittaūdarīyalakṣaṇaḥ saṃkalpa-dvītyānāmā viṣayanimittaprakāravikalpī saṃjñāpavanoddhataṇṭṭiḥ, audārikapañcavijñānakāya-pravṛttihetuḥ. vicāras tu cittasaukṣmyalakṣaṇo manovijñānapravṛtṭyanukūlah* (for an analysis and Jap. tr. of the passage see Yoshimoto 1982: 54-55 and 225-226).

49 This is a reference to the definition of conception by the Yogācāra school. Similar arguments are found in NBT 21, 5-6: *Yogācāramatena ca tathāgatajñānaṃ advayaṃ muktva sarvajñānaṃ grāhya-grāhakatvena vikalpitaṃ kalpanā*. "According to the view of the Yogācāra school, every cognition (belongs to) conception which is conceptualized in terms of the grasped and the grasping (aspects of cognition) in contrast to the non-dual cognition of the Tathāgata." Arguments are also found in DhPr 47, 22-23: *yadī jātyādiyojanātmikā kalpanā, sā jātyādyabhāvād eva na sambhavati. atha grāhya-grāhakahāvena pravartamānaṃ jñānaṃ kalpanā, tadā sarvaṃ asarvajñānaṃ tathā pravṛttam iti*. "If conception is (defined as) being essentially the connection with a genus, etc., it is not possible because a genus, etc., does never exist. If conception is (defined as) being cognition which is at work in terms of the grasped and the grasping (aspects), then every cognition of non-omniscient being (*asarvajñāna*) functions in that sense (i.e., conception as defined above)." Further, the following passages also show similar definitions of conception: PVV (M) 1, 16 (*kalpanā grāhyagrāhakādhyāropaḥ*); on the word *vidhātākalpanājāla* in the *namaskāraśloka* of PV; and MVBh 9, 13 (*abhūtaparikalpo grāhya-grāhakovikalpaḥ* on MV 1. 2 [= 1. 1]). Cf. also Viṃś 10, 25-28.

50 *abhilāpo vācakaḥ śabdaḥ, sa ca sāmānyākāraḥ* (449, 23-24). Cf. TSop 277, 27-28: *abhilāpo vācakaḥ śabdaḥ. sa ca sāmānyākāraḥ*; NBT 47, 10: *abhilāpyate 'neneti abhilāpaḥ, vācakaḥ śabdaḥ*; and PVinT 49a5-6: *'di la brjod pa yod pas na rjod pa can no // 'di 'ñid rnam par 'grel par śād pa /*

(cognitive) image is called as such (i.e., *abhilāpin*).⁵¹

(M 151a1; S 449, 25; K 367, 11; P 25b6; D 2b3)

How then⁵² is cognition of such a kind (viz., as associated with expression,) established? (In order to answer this the master) states:

That (cognition) which is capable of connecting a word with an object, even if the word in the form of “tree,” etc., is not actually applied, appears as if it were connected with an expression.

// TS 1214 //⁵³

↘ 'dis don brjod pa'i phyir brjod pa ni sgra la bya'o // (cf. Yaita 1984: 30-31). Cf. also NMGBh 53, 8-9: *abhilapyate 'nena hy abhilāpaḥ śabdāḥ, tena samsargaḥ sambandhas, tadyogyaḥ sāmānyākāraḥ pratibhāsate 'syām iti abhilāpasamsargayogyapratibhāsā*.

Before Kamalaśīla, Vinītadeva provides two kinds of explanations for the word *abhilāpa* which is used in NB 5: *abhilāpa* is a word as the signifier (*vācakaḥ śabdaḥ*) by which an object is expressed (*abhilapyate 'nena*) and it means a general form (**sāmānyarūpa*) of the word^a; or alternatively, it means the general feature of an object as the signified (*padārthasāmānyam vācyam*)^b. Vinītadeva concludes the topic by stating that “That cognition which has not the form of the general features of word and object is direct perception as right knowledge.”^c These ideas of Vinītadeva are critized in the commentaries on NBT. See NBT 23, 19-24, 1; DhPr 52, 18-19; and Tātparya 29, 6-15.

^a NBT (V) 41, 2-3: *'dis rjod par byed pas na rjod pa ste smra bar byed pa sgra'i no bo yin no //*; and Tātparya 29, 14: *abhilapyate 'neneti. śabdasāmānyam*. In this case the word *abhilāpa-samsargayogya*- “capable of the connection with an expression” in NB 5 means the general feature of an object (**arthasāmānya*) (NBT (V) 41, 5-6).

^b NBT (V) 41, 11-12: *de ni brjod par bya ba* [corr.: *ba'i*] *yin pas rjod pa ste / bsñad par bya ba don gyi spyi gañ yin pa'o //*; and Tātparya 26, 15: *abhilapyata ity abhilāpaḥ. padārthasāmānyam vācyam*. In this case the word *abhilāpasamsargayogya*- means the general feature of a word (**śabdasāmānya*).

^c NBT (V) 42, 3-5: ... *sgra dan don gyi spyi'i rnam pa ma yin pa'i śes pa gañ yin pa de ni mñon sum gyi tshad ma yin no*. Cf. also NBT (V) 39, 12-13 (translated in n. 39).

51 *sa vidyate yasyāḥ pratibhāsataḥ sā tathoktā* (449, 24). Cf. Tib. 25b6: *snan ba gañ la 'di yod pa de la de skad ces bya'o //*; NBT 48, 2-3: *abhilāpasamsargāya yogyo 'bhidheyākārābhāso yasyām pratītau sā tathoktā*.

52 *punar* (449, 25); *yañ* [D: *gañ* P] (25b6).

53 M 61b3: *śabdārthaghaṭanāyogyā vrkṣa ityādirūpataḥ / yā vācām aprayoge 'pi sābhilāpeva jāyate* // [1214]. Tib. (!) P 55a6; D 44a2-3: *sgra don 'drer run ba // śin* [D: *śi* P] *zes bya sogs tshul gyis ni // gañ zig sgra dan ma 'dres kyañ // de ni brjod pa nid du 'gyur //* (see also nn. 54 and 55). Tib. *pāda* d, *de ni brjod pa nid du 'gyur*, would suggest Skt. **sā + abhilāpinī + eva* (or **sā + abhilāpatvena*) *jāyate*. This separation of *sā* (*de ni*) is apparently wrong, but *nid du* is worth noticing: there is no indication of Skt. *iva*. It might be possible to conjecture that the original Skt. was **sābhi-lāpaiva* (i.e., *sābhi-lāpā + eva*) and, in that case, the whole sentence would mean as follows: “That (cognition) which is capable of connecting a word with an object, [viz., conception,] appears to be *really* connected with expression, [viz., to be really connected with word,] even if the word [itself] ↗

The (syntactical) connection (of “in the form of ‘tree,’ etc.” should be understood as) “That which (is capable of connecting a word with an object), even if the word in the form of ‘tree,’ etc., is not actually applied, (appears as if it were connected with an expression).”⁵⁴ Alternatively, the (syntactical) connection (can be understood) with relation to the former part as “(That cognition) which is capable of connecting a word with an object in the form ‘tree,’ etc., (appears as if it were connected with an expression even if the word is not actually applied).”⁵⁵ (The master) shows by this (verse) that conception [as associated with an expression] is established by direct perception itself (*pratyakṣata eva*)⁵⁶ because conception [of such a nature] is known to all living beings by their direct experience (*anubhava-*)⁵⁷.

(M 151a1; S 450, 9; K 367, 17; P 26a1; D 2b4)

That is to say, this⁵⁸ (conception) is established as a cause of activities (*itikartavyatā*)⁵⁹ from infancy onwards. Indicating this (point, the master states):

On account of the continuing presence (*anvaya*) of residue impressions (*vāsanā*) due to repeated acquaintance with (the connection between) name and object (*nāmārthabhāvanā*) his previous existence, even a newborn (child) is good at activities because he is linked with

↘ in the form of ‘tree,’ etc., is not actually applied.” However, this plausible reading has a problem; i.e., in TS 1216c below, we find another example of Tib. *ñid* for *iva* in extant Skt., where the Tibetan translation is certainly wrong (see nn. 72 and 73). This reveals that the Tibetan TS is not always reliable regarding the reading of *iva* / *eva*.

54 Tib. *pratīka* 25b7: *śiñ źes bya sogs ño bo yis // gañ źig brjod dan mi ldan yañ* // (cf. n. 53).

55 Tib. *pratīka* 25b7-8: *śiñ źes bya sogs ño bo yis // sgra don sbyor bar ruñ ba yis* // (cf. n. 53). I follow the first interpretation for the translation of the verse. According to this second explanation, on the other hand, the verse would mean as follows: “That (cognition) which is capable of connecting a word with an object in the form of ‘tree,’ etc., appears as if it were connected with an expression even if that word is not actually applied.”

56 *pratyakṣata eva* (450, 7); Tib. *mñon sum ñid kyis* [D: *kyi* P] (25b8). Direct perception here means self-cognition (*svasamvedana*). Cf. PV III 123: *pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham pratyakṣenaiva sidhyati / pratyātmavedyaḥ sarveṣāṃ vikalpo nāmasaṁśrayaḥ* //. “It is understood by direct perception itself that direct perception is free from conception. All beings internally cognize conception as being based on a name.” Cf. also PS I 7ab; and NB I 10.

57 *anubhavasiddhatvāt* M [Tib. *ñams su myoñ bas grub pa'i phyir ro* 25b8-26a1]; *anusiddhatvāt* KS (450, 8). Another possible reading of the passage is as follows: ... because conception [of such a nature] is established by the direct experience of all living beings.

58 No translation of *asau* in the Tibetan.

59 *itikartavyatā* (450, 9); *'di ltar bya ba* [P: only *bya ba* D] (26a1).

this (conception).

// TS 1215 //⁶⁰

Previous existence (means) previous birth. There one had **repeated acquaintance with (the connection between) name and object**, i.e., practice with (the connection between) word⁶¹ and object. There is a **continuing presence**, i.e., continuation, of those residue impressions, i.e., capacity, which⁶² are set down by this (repeated acquaintance) on account of which (conception) exists in an infant too. This is why even the (newborn child) is actually equipped with cognition connected with an expression.⁶³ **Because he is linked with this** conception, (the baby) becomes **good at**, i.e., skilled in, activities which are exemplified by smiling, crying, sucking the breast, being pleased, etc.⁶⁴ Therefore⁶⁵, by these (activities) which are effects (of conception,) conception as stated above, (viz., as associated with expression,) is certainly inferred even in⁶⁶ an infant.⁶⁷ The same idea is expressed[by Bhartṛhari]:

60 M 61b3-4: *atītabhavanāmārthabāvanāvāsanānvayāt / sadyojāto 'pi yadyogād iti-kartavyatāpaṭuḥ* // . Tib. P 55a6-7; D 45a3: 'das dus srid pa [P: par D] miñ don la // goms pa'i bag chags rjes 'jug phyir // skyes ma thag pa gañ 'brel pas // 'di ltar bya zes sgrin por 'gyur // . A similar discussion is found in NBT and PVinT (see nn. 64 and 69).

61 This paraphrase reveals that *nāman* (name) and *śabda* (word) have the same connotation in this context.

62 No translation of *yā* (450, 11) in the Tibetan.

63 *tenābhilāpinī pratītiḥ tasyāpi bhavaty eva* (450, 12); *des na mñon par brjod pa can gyi* [D: gyis P] *śes pa de la* [D: om. P] *yañ 'gyur ba ñid yin no* // (26a2-3).

64 Cf. NBT 50, 1-51, 1: *bālo 'pi hi yāvad drśyamānaṃ stanaṃ sa evāyam iti pūrvadr̥ṣṭatvena na pratyavamsrati tāvan nōparatarudito mukham arpayati stane*. "... for, even (in the case of) an infant, as long as he does not identify the breast he is now looking at with the one which he has previously seen in the form 'This is identical with that !,' he does not stop crying to put himself to the breast." Cf. also TSop 278, 6-9: *kutaḥ punar bālakasya kalpanā siddheti cet. tatkāryasya pravṛtṭyādīlakṣaṇasya pradārśanāt. tathā hi bālako 'ṅguryādīparihāre stanādaḥ pravartate*. "(Question:) But then how is conception of an infant established? (Answer:) By indicating the effect of that (infant's conception) which is characterized by his activities and so on. That is to say, an infant puts himself to (mother's) breast and so on, keeping away from her finger and so on."

65 No translation of *ato* (450, 14) in the Tibetan.

66 *bālasyāpi* (450, 14); *byis pa la* [D: om. P] *yañ* (26a4).

67 A syllogism using an effect as its reason could be formulated here as follows: He who is skilled in activities has conception which is defined as cognition associated with an expression as, for example, a dumb person (*mūka*)^a; and an infant is skilled in activities as exemplified by smiling, crying, sucking the breast, being pleased, etc. Cf. Tātparya 28, 12-14: *atra prayogaḥ. bālo dharmī, pūrvāparadr̥ṣṭā-kārābheda-grāhivikalpajñānāyukta iti sādhyam, stane mukhārpaṇād iti kāryahetuḥ*.

^a Cf. NBT 23, 2; TBh (in nn. 43 and 70); and ŚV, pratyakṣa, v. 112c for *bālamūkādi*.

All activities in the world are based on words. (Therefore) even an infant, with his mental residues set down in his previous (birth), understands these (activities).⁶⁸

⁶⁹Moreover, that (conception) comes about in these (infants) in a way that reveals an object which is characterized as a word-sound (*dhvani*) in the form of vague syllables (and) which exists only within (the mind) (*antarmātraviparivartinam*!) as if it were external, on account of this (conception the infants) in some later period become skilled in the understanding of convention (*saṃketa*).⁷⁰

(M 151a3; S 450, 19; K 368, 1; P 26a6; D 3a1)

By the (following verse the master) expresses again the establishment of conception by means of direct perception.⁷¹

And that (conception) which is quite vividly understood at the time

68 Cited from VP I 129. For the text see n. 70.

69 *sā punaḥ saṃmūrcchitākṣarākāradhvanivīṣṭam antarmātraviparivartinam* [corr. by the Tibetan below: *antarmātrāvi*° MKS] *artham bahir ivādarśayanti teṣāṃ samupajāyate yayā paścāt saṃketa-grahanakuśalā bhavanti* (450, 17-18). Cf. Tib. P 26a5-6; D 2b7-3a1: *yi ge dan rnam par ma phyed pa'i rnam pa can de* [P: *te / D*] *yañ sgra'i khyad par can nan tsaṃ du yons su gsal ba phyi rol gyi don lta bur te ston pa gañ gis* [D: *gi P*] *phyis* [D: *phyir P*] *brda 'dzin pa la mkhas par 'gyur ba de yañ de dag la ñe bar skye ba yin no* // (equivalent to * *sā punaḥ saṃmūrcchitākṣarākārā dhvanivīṣṭam*... (?)). My translation follows the Sanskrit formulation.

Similar expressions are found in PVinṭ 49b4-5: *sgra'i snañ ba yañ de la yod pa yin no ze na. de la skye ba gzan du goms pa las sgra'i rnam pa mi gsal ba yod dam med kyañ ruñ ste*... (identical to DhPr 51, 17-8: *śabdākāro 'pi tatrāsty eva... iti cet. astu tatra janmāntarābhyāsāt mūrcchitāḥ śabdākāraḥ*...; identified in Yaita 1984: 33); TSop (in n. 70); and TBh (in n. 43).

70 The following (TSop 278, 6-14) seems to be based on TSP upon TS 1215: *kutaḥ punar bālakaṣya kalpanā siddheti cet.*^a *tatkāryasya*^b *pravṛttyādilaṅkāṣaṇasya pradārśanāt. tathā hi bālako 'nguryādi-parihāre stanādaḥ pravartate.*^c *tad uktam — itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabdavyapāśrayā / tām pūrvā-hitasamskāro bālo 'pi pratipadyate // iti.*^d *bālaka punaḥ saṃmūrcchitākṣarākāradhvanivīṣṭā buddhi-viparivartinī kalpanā ūhyā yayā paścāt saṃketagrahanakuśalo bhavati.*^e Cf. TBh 12, 3-6: *nanu bālamūkādīnāṃ antarjalpākāraṃ kalpanājñānam astīti kuto nīcetavyam iti cet. vikalpakāryād iṣṭāniṣṭopādānaparihārāt. drṣṭam cedam kāryam bālamūkādau, īpsitārthasvīkaraṇam anīpsitārthatyaajanam nāma* (for the translation of the passage see Kajiyama 1966: 41).

^a Cf. *kutaḥ punar idrīṣi pratītiḥ siddhety āha* (449, 25).

^b Cf. *ato 'nayā kāryabhūtāyā yathoktā kalpanā bālasyāpy anumīyata eva* (450, 14).

^c For the translation see n. 64.

^d Cited in 450, 15-16. VP and TSP read *yām* instead of *tām* in *pāda c*.

^e *sā punaḥ saṃmūrcchitākṣarākāradhvanivīṣṭam antarmātraviparivartinam artham bahir ivādarśayanti teṣāṃ samupajāyate, yayā paścāt saṃketagrahanakuśalā bhavanti* (450, 17-18; see also n. 69).

71 *pratyakṣataḥ* (450, 19); *mñon sum gyis* [D: *gyi P*] (26a7).

**when one considers or reflects, etc., as if it were penetrated by words⁷²
cannot be denied.**

// TS 1216 //⁷³

(M 151a4; S 450, 20; K 368, 4; P 26a7; D 3a1)

By the (following verse the master) expresses the establishment of (conception) also by means of an effect as a logical indication (*kāryalingataḥ*) which is referred to as verbal activity (*śabdavyavahāra*):

**The fixed relation between word and object through a determination
by that (conception) is (indeed) erroneously (imputed). (But) if this
(conception) were nonexistent, this (fixed relation) (*sā*!) would not be
possible even if (it were) of such a kind (*īdṛśy api*!), (viz., erroneous,)
because other (external) things are not fit [as objects of words].**

// TS 1217 //⁷⁴

72 *pāda* c (see n. 73) is based on VP I 131: *na so 'sti pratyayo loka yaḥ śabdānugamād rte / anuvid-dham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate* // (*bhāsate* is occasionally replaced by *jāyate*, *gamyate*, or *varṭate* in citations). A similar expression is found in TSop 278, 5-6: *tatpratibhāsino 'rthākārasyecchā-dhīnasamketānuvidhāyinā śabdenābhidhātum śakyatvāt*. Cf (!). Jha 1937 (p. 616): "... cannot be set aside by mere words"; i.e., *śabdair* modifies *pāda* d.

Apart from the context of TSP, the word *śabdānuviddha* generally tends to be referred to as a characteristic of the *savikalpakapratyakṣa*-theory mainly of the Vaiyākaraṇa school as, for example, in TBV 489, 2-3: *atrāha Vaiyākaraṇaḥ — na vākṣaṃsparśarahitā kācit pratipattir asti, śabdānuviddhā-yās tasyāḥ pratibhāsanāt*; Prameya 39, 1-2: *ye 'pi Śabdād-vaitavādīno nikhilapratyayānām śabdānuvid-dhatvenaiva savikalpakatvaṃ manyate*...; and TR 82, 14-15: ... *sarvaṃ eva śabdānuviddham iti Bhāṭṭa-Śaiva-Vaiyākaraṇāḥ*.

73 M 61b4: *cintotprekṣādikāle ca vispaṣṭaṃ yā pravedyate / anuviddheva sā śabdair apa-hnotum na śakyate* //. Tib. (!) P 55a7-8; D 45a3-4: *sems kyis dpyod* [D: *spyod* P] *sogs^a dus su yañ // de ni rnam par gsal bar rtogs // sgra yis rjes rtogs de ñid la // bsñon par nus pa ma yin no //*.

According to the Tibetan, the verse seems to mean as follows: "And at the time of examination by the mind, this (conception) is quite vividly understood and this very presence of the words cannot be denied." This Tibetan appears to be translated from **anvaya* or **anugama* instead of *anuviddha* and to neglect the particle *iva* which is substituted by *eva* (*ñid*). Moreover, this confusion of *iva* with *eva* occurs often in the Tibetan. For example, the same verse of Bhartṛhari is translated into Tibetan in PVinT (J)^b, TBh (Tib.)^c, TSP (Tib.)^e 225a7-8, and BAT 80, 24-27, among which the first two confuse *iva* with *eva*.

^a Cf. Tib *pratīka* 26a6: *sems kyis* [D: *kyi* P] *dpyod sog*.

^b PVinT (J) 219a6: *sgra yi* [D: *sgra'i* P] *rjes gro ma gtogs pa'i // śes pa 'jig rten na yod min // śes pa rjes su bsgrubs pa ñid // thams cad sgra du śes par bya //*; cf. *pāda* cd: **anuviddham eva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena gamyate*.

^c TBh (Tib.) P 5762 (ze) 367b1-2: *rtogs te 'jig rten na yod min // sgra yi rjes 'gro las gžan gañ // śes pa thams cad sgra dan ni // rjes su ldan pa kho nar shañ //* (the position of *pāda* a and *pāda* b is reversed in D); cf. *pāda* cd: **anuviddham eva ... bhāsate*.

74 M 61b4-5: *tasyāś cādhyavasāyena bhrāntā śabdārthayoḥ sthitiḥ / anyāyogād asat- /*

This is because (the master) previously⁷⁵ negated (the idea) that **the fixed relation between word and object** is real and established that it is **erroneously (imputed)**. Then if this conception **were nonexistent**, then this fixed relation between word and object **would not be possible even if (it were) of such a kind**, viz., even if (it were) erroneous⁷⁶, because that [relation between word and object]⁷⁷ is established (*tasyā vyavasthānāt*!)⁷⁸ by way of its [i.e., conception's,]⁷⁹ intention (*abhiprāya*) and because it has [already] been explained that other external things such as the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*)⁸⁰ are not fit as objects of words (*vācya*).

(M 151a5; S 451, 9; K 368, 11; P 26b2; D 3a3)

Isn't it the case that other (teachers)⁸¹, too,⁸² assume that conception is

\ tve 'syāḥ sedṛśy api^a na sambhavet // Tib. (!) P 55a8; D 45a4: *de yañ nes pa med pa yi^b // des kyañ mñon par zen pa las // 'khrul pa'i sgra dan don du gnas // de dan 'dra 'aṅ* [P: yañ D] *mi srid do //*. The Tib. *pratīka* introducing the verse runs *de las yañ* (26a7).

^a *sedṛśy api* KPaGa [cf. *sā* . . . *īdṛśy api* 450, 22]; *sadṛśy api* MS.

^b *pāda* a for Skt. *pāda* c (?)

75 *pūrvam* MS (450, 21): *pūrvair* (i. e., "by previous [teachers]") KPaGa. The word "previously" seems to indicate the general contents of the previous chapter, Śabdārthaparīkṣā (e. g., TS 870). See also n. 274.

76 Passage 450, 21-23 is translated into English by Franco (1987: 448 n.210) in connection with a passage of TUS.

77 "That" (*tasyā*(s) 450, 23; see also n. 78) is taken to mean the "fixed relation between word and object" (*śabdārthavyavasthā*). The word is commented upon as "*śabdārthasya*" in the margin of M. In that case, however, the sentence should be read as follows: "This is because word and object are *not* established (*tasya + avyavasthānāt*) by way of conception's intention."

78 *tasyā vyavasthānāt* [Tib. *de rnam par gźag pa'i phyir* 26b1]; *tasyāvyavasthānāt* KS (450, 23). See also n. 77.

79 "Its" (*tad-* 450, 23) is commented upon as "= *kalpanā*" in the margin of M. Cf. PV I 70ab: *tasyā abhiprāyavaśāt sāmānyam sat prakīrtitam* /. "The universal is (erroneously) stated to be real by way of its (i. e., conception's *buddhi*) intention."

80 This does not necessarily mean that Kamalaśīla here regards the particular definitively as external objects because it possibly also has a meaning in the following sense: All others, *even if one hypothetically takes them as external objects such as the particular*, are not fit as the objects of words.

81 It is likely that this is a reference to other Buddhist interpreters of Dignāga's definition (*nāmajātyādiyojanā kalpanā*) who were biased against Dharmakīrti's definition (*abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpanā*). This is pointed out by Franco (1984: 390-391; 398 n. 5; and 1987: 437-438 n. 186). The idea of Franco which I would like to follow is very interesting as a working hypothesis, especially when we take into consideration the evidences of other texts. For instance, it is likely that Dignāga's idea still prevailed for centuries after Dharmakīrti as suggested from the fact that Jinendrabuddhi wrote a commentary on PSV; and Jitāri took up Dignāga's idea as the definition of conception almost at the last stage of the *pramāṇa* tradition of Buddhism (for the passage see n. 5 above).

82 The exact sense of *api* (451, 9) is not clear. The function of this particle seems quite different ↗

(defined) not only as cognition associated with an expression⁸³ but also as capable of the connection with a genus, a quality, an action, etc.⁸⁴ Why is this (latter kind of conception) not to be included?

(In order to answer this objection the master) states:

Other (teachers) uphold conception as also capable of the connection with a genus, etc. (However) this (kind of conception) is not suitable because a genus, etc., is denied and because it is not perceived.

// TS 1218 //⁸⁵

And because . . . not perceived is correlated with a genus, etc., [as its subject,] and this (reason) is stated as a refutation [of their assumption] on the condition that a genus, etc., is (hypothetically) accepted (by them as real).

(M 151a5; S 451, 13; K 368, 17; P 26b4; D 3a5)

By the (following verse the master) supports the very (point that a genus, etc.,)

↘ from another usage of *api* on the next line (451, 10) which corresponds to the same particle in TS 1218b. In the above translation I interpret the passage of objection not as a real quotation but as an assumed objection uttered by Kamalaśīla himself.

Another possible interpretation of the passage is as follows: “(Objection:) Other teachers, too, assume that conception is (defined) not only as cognition associated with an expression but also as capable of the connection with a genus, a quality, an action, etc. Why isn’t this (latter kind of conception) not to be included (in your definition)?” In this case, “other teachers” (*anye*) must mean those teachers referred to by those who make this objection, and “too” (*api*) has the sense of “not only the objector himself but also other teachers”; consequently, the sense of *anye* in TSP cannot be the same as that in TS in this interpretation. Cf. Eng. tr. by Franco 1984: 391.

83 *abhilāpinīm pratītiṃ kalpanām* (451, 9); *mñon par brjod pa can gyi* [P: *gyis* D] *śes pa rtog* [corr.: *rtogs* PD] *par* (26b2).

84 It is very interesting, as Franco (1984: 394) points out, that name (*nāman*) is not mentioned here. This reveals that they might have regarded *abhilāpinī pratītiḥ* of Dharmakīrti as more or less identical with *nāmakalpanā* in Dignāga’s definition. Moreover, this identification of *nāman* with *abhilāpa* is also traced in Śāntarakṣita / Kamalaśīla’s own idea (see Introduction, p. 48). It is quite presumable that, in some period after Dharmakīrti, there appeared some thinkers in a Buddhist party who upheld Dharmakīrti’s definition of conception, on the one hand, and still hesitated to thoroughly abandon Dignāga’s definition, on the other. As mentioned below (see nn. 92 and 94; cf. n. 121), similar Buddhist ideas are found in other texts where they refer to the five kinds of conception which originate from Dignāga.

85 M 61b5: *jātyādiyojanāyogyām apy anye kalpanām viduḥ / sā jātyāder apāstatvād adṛṣṭeś ca na saṃgatā* //. Tib. P 55a8-b1; D 45a4-5: *rigs la sogs dan ’byor ’os la // rtog pa yañ na gžan gyis śes // rigs la sogs pa de bsal* [P: *gsal* D] *phyir // mi snañ bas ni^a mi ’thad do* //. Cf. Jap. tr. in Tosaki 1979a: 234 n. 70. The verse is analyzed in Franco 1984: 398 n. 6.

^a Tib. *pratīka: mi snañ phyir na* (26b3).

is not perceived:

Insofar as a genus, etc., is not perceived and [— even if it did exist —] its connection [with the substratum] does not manifest itself — as, for example, in (the mixture of) milk and water, etc. — how is it possible to connect it with the object?

// TS 1219 //⁸⁶

And . . . as, for example, in (the mixture of) milk and water, etc. (*kṣīrodakādivac ca*)⁸⁷ (means the following): As long as milk and water, etc. — being mixed — do not appear as distinguished (from each other), it is not possible to connect them.⁸⁸ In the same way a genus, etc., — even if it did exist⁸⁹ — insofar as it does not appear as distinguished⁹⁰ from the substratum (*āśraya*), it is not possible [to connect it] with its⁹¹ substratum.

86 M 61b5-6: *jātyādīnām adṛṣṭatvāt tadyogāpratibhāsanāt / kṣīrodakādivac cārthe ghaṭanā ghaṭate katham* // Tib. P 55b1-2; D 45a5: *rigs la sogs rnam mi snañ bas*^a // *de dan 'brel pa mi snañ phyir* // *chu dan 'o ma sogs 'dra* [D: 'da P] *na*^b // *don la sbyor ba ji ltar 'grub* // Cf. Jap. tr. in Tosaki 1979a: 237 n. 78; and Eng. tr. in Franco 1987: 499 n. 298 (cf. also Franco 1984: 398 n. 9).

In the Tibetan above, the syntax of the two ablative clauses is not clear. The first ablative (*mi snañ bas*, i.e., *adṛṣṭatvāt*) might be the reason for the second ablative (*de dan 'brel pa mi snañ phyir*, i.e., *tadyogāpratibhāsanāt*). However, the Sanskrit reveals through “and” (*ca*), which is omitted in the Tibetan, that both ablatives are equally the direct reasons for *arthe ghaṭanā ghaṭate katham*. Besides, *ghaṭanā ghaṭate* is a kind of play on words: *ghaṭanā* is a synonym of *yojanā*, and *ghaṭate* is paraphrased by *śakyate* in TSP.

^a Tib. *pratīka*: *rigs la sogs pa mi 'dod pas* [P: // added D] (26b4).

^b Tib. *pratīka*: *chu dan 'o ma la sogs bzin* // (26b4-5).

87 The source of the illustration is PVin I 44, 11-14: *rigs dan yon tan dan bya ba dan ldan pa dag ni 'di la mi srid pa ñid do* // *rañ bzin thadad pa dan 'brel pa dag mi snañ bas sbyor ba mi rigs pa'i phyir dan / de ltar rtogs pa med pa'i phyir / chu dan 'o ma dag bzin no* // (Skt. *jātiguṇakriyāvatām etan na sambhavaty eva, rūpavivekasambandhayor apratibhāsanena ghaṭanāyogāt, kṣīrodakavad atadvedinī*; Steinkellner 1972: 202). The example *kṣīrodaka* is also used in TUS 246, 15-16. For an exposition of the example see Frauwallner 1958: 335; Vetter 1966: 103 Anm. 18; and Franco 1987: 499-500 n. 298.

88 Cf. Tib. *rnam par gzag* [D: *bzag P*] *par* (26b5) instead of *ghaṭanā* (451, 14).

89 For *jātyādīnām sattve 'pi* (451, 15) the Tibetan reads *rigs la sogs pa rnam 'brel pa yod pa yin na yañ* (26b5-6; “even if the connection with a genus, etc., did exist”).

90 The word *vivekena* is based on PV III 146b-d: . . . *jātyāder vivekenānirūpaṇāt / tadvatā yojanā nāsti kalpanāpy atra nāsty atah* // “Because a genus, etc., is not ascertained as distinct (from the substratum of the genus, etc.) there is no connection with the possessor of that (genus, etc.) By this reason there is no conception with regard to this (genus-possessor, etc).” See also PVin in n. 87.

91 *tadāśrayeṇa* (451, 15) is a *taṭpuruṣa* compound. It is translated into Tib. as *rten de dan* (26b6) as a *karmadhāraya* compound.

(M 151a6; S 451, 17; K 368, 23; P 26b6; D 3a6)

(Opponent:) If that is the case, conception is not to be (defined) as the connection with a genus, etc. Why then did the author of the definition, (i.e., Dignāga,) state that the connection with a name, a genus, etc., is conception (*nāmajātyādiyojanā kalpanā*, PS I 3d)?⁹²

(In order to answer this, the master) states:

In order to indicate the object to be rejected and the one to be accepted (*heyopādeyaviśaya*) by stating the two items, (i.e., the connection with a name and the connection with a genus, etc., Dignāga) stated this conception in two ways, that which is known well (respectively) to his own party and to the opponents.

// TS 1220 //⁹³

Here **(the object) to be rejected** (means) conception as the connection with a genus, etc., **which is known well to the opponents**, and **(the object) to be accepted** (means) conception as the connection with a name, etc., **which is known well to his own party**. In order to show all this, both kinds of conception are indicated (in the expression *nāmajātyādiyojanā*).⁹⁴

92 The key phrase *nāmajātyādiyojanā* is variously interpreted in the subsequent discussion in the text. I take the compound here simply as *tatpuruṣa*. The Tibetan (26b7) reads as follows: *min dan rigs sogs dan 'brel pas* [D: / added P] *rtog* [corr.: *rtogs* PD] pa. "Owing to the connection of a name and a genus, etc., [it is called] conception." The source of the expression is PS I 3d: *nāmajātyādiyojanā*. Cf. PS I (V): *min dan rigs sogs su sbyor ba'o*, and PS I (K): *min dan rigs sogs bsres pa'o* (Hattori 1968: 176-177). Further, Dignāga's definition is cited or referred to in the following texts:

1. Cited correctly as *nāmajātyādiyojanā* in NV₂ 207, 19-20 (see n. 94); NBhū 176, 15-16 (the word is paraphrased by *nāmādisamsarga*); DhPr 42, 10; and TAV 53, 29.

2. Cited as *jātyādiyojanā* in PVT (R) 62a2-3; PPañ 138, 1; NSi 138, 7; and NVV 520, 3-4.

3. Cited as *nāmajātyādikalpanā* in HTU 272, 23.

4. Referred to in other form: *nāmajātiguṇakriyādravyasvarūpāpannavastvantaranirūpanā-nusmaranavikalpanā* in NC 59, 2-60, 1, using also Vaibhāṣika's definition, i.e., *nirūpanānusmaranavikalpenāvikalpakāḥ* in AK I 33ab. Cf. also TAV 55, 14-17; and TUS 182, 5-6 (*gunacalanajātyādiviśeṣotpāditam vijñānam kalpanā*).

93 M 61b6: *heyopādeyaviśayakathanāya dvayoktitaḥ / parāparaprasiddheyam kalpanā dviividhā* // Tib. P 55b2; D 45a5-6: *blañ dan dor ba'i yul dag ni // bstan pa'i phyir na gnīs gsuñs te // bdag dan gzan la 'di 'grub pa'i // rtog pa rnam gnīs gsuñs pa yin* //.

^a Tib. *pratīka*: *gnīs su bsad pa'i phyir* (27a1).

94 Here the author maintains a distinction between *svaprasiddha* (*svamata*, i.e., *nāmayojanā*) and *paraprasiddha* (*paramata*, i.e., *jātyādiyojanā*). However, it is not likely that Śāntarakṣita was the first propounder of this distinction. Uddyotakara also introduces Dignāga's definition, separating *nāman* /

How is it understood? Hence (the master) states, “**by stating the two items.**” (That is to say) name-genus-etc. (*nāmajātyādi*) (means) a “name” and a “genus, etc.” (and the whole compound means) the connection of them.⁹⁵ In this way the two groups are stated (in the one compound). Otherwise (the expression) would have been formulated only as “the connection with a name, etc.,” or “the connection with a genus, etc.,” which, however, is not a complete enumeration (*parigaṇana*) because (in that case) it would follow as an undesirable conclusion that the word “etc.” is not effective.⁹⁶

(M 151a8; S 451, 24; K 369, 4; P 27a3; D 3b2)

(Opponent:) Isn’t it the case that conception is a property of cognition (*jñānadharmā*), and what constitutes the main topic here is only the explanation of (cognition’s) lacking of that (conception), because we are discussing perception, and not the explanation of the lacking of a property of an object (*arthadharmā*)?⁹⁷ The connection of a name and a genus, etc.,⁹⁸ with their possessor (*tadvadbhiḥ*)⁹⁹

↘ from *jātyādi*: *atha keyaṃ kalpanā. nāmajātyādiyojanā* [NV₂: *nāmajātiyojaneti* NV₁]. *yat kila na nāmnābhīdhīyate na ca jātyādibhir vyapadiśyate viśayasvarūpānuvidhāyi paricchedakam ātmasamvedyam tat pratyakṣam iti* (NV₁ 130, 4-6, NV₂ 207, 19-21; cited in DhPr 42, 10-11). A similar idea is found in NBhū 176, 18-19: ... *ity eṣa pañcavidhā kalpanā parasiddhyodāhṛtā, svamate tu sarvaiveyam nāmakalpaneti*. “... In this way these five kinds of conception are illustrated with reference to the other [non-Buddhist] teachers’ well-established idea. In [Dignāga’s] own idea, however, every conception belongs to this name-conception.” Cf. also TAV 55, 14-5.

95 That is, the first half of the compound constitutes a *dvandva*, i.e., “name” and “genus, etc.” As for the analysis of the whole compound, on the other hand, Kamalaśīla’s explanation here in TSP on TS 1220 is quite simple (*nāma ca jātyādayas ca nāmajātyādayas teṣāṃ yojanā*, 451, 21). This is because the intention of TS 1220 is only to show the *dvandva* structure of the first half.

96 A similar idea is expressed by Jinendrabuddhi in PST 21a3-4: *min ni sogs pa’i sgras bsduṣ na yaṅ / rigs la sogs pa rnamṣ dan nus pa mtshuṅs pa ma yin pa’i phyir logs su byas pa’o // nus pa mtshuṅs pa ma yin pa’i min ni min la yod pa’i [D: nad P] kyi phyir dan / rigs la sogs pa rnamṣ ni de las bzlog pa’i phyir te / rigs la sogs pa rnamṣ yonṣ su brtags pa yin gyi de kho na’i du yod pa rnamṣ ma yin no //*. “Even though a ‘name’ could be implied in the word ‘etc.’ its syntactical implication is not the same (as that of a genus, etc.), so that a (name) should be distinguished. The difference between their syntactical implications (is realized by the following points:) A name does certainly exist, whereas a genus, etc., is different from that; a genus, etc., is a conceptually assumed thing and does not exist in reality.” For a Skt. reconstruction of the passage see Jambuvijaya 1966: 101 (in the section Dignāgaviracitaḥ sva-vṛttiyuktaḥ Pramāṇasamuccayaḥ) n. 9.

97 Cf. The Tibetan structure of *nanu...* (451, 24f.): *’on te... don gyi chos dan bral bar bstan pa ni ma yin pa yin nam* [D: na P] (27a3-4).

98 Cf. Tib. *min dan rigs la sogs pa ni min dan rigs la sogs pa de dan ldan pa dan sbyor ba gan yin pa* (27a4) instead of *nāmajātyādīnām ca yā yojanā tadvadbhiḥ* (451, 25).

99 The word *tadvat* means the individual as a substratum of a genus, etc. It is used, for example, in PS V 9c-10a and PV III 146b-d.

is a property of an object¹⁰⁰ and not of cognition. Therefore, the author of the definition¹⁰¹ (Dignāga) stated a pointless matter.¹⁰²

Expecting to be criticised in this way (the master) states:¹⁰³

Indicating the immediate cause of [conception] itself this “connection with a name [and a genus,] etc.” occurs (in one’s mind). Therefore (Dignāga’s definition) is not off the point.

// TS 1221 //¹⁰⁴

The immediate, i.e., direct, **cause** (*nimitta*) is the cause (*kāraṇa*) of that (conception); that (cause) is cognition associated with an expression; and this (cognition) is thus called connection because it arises as if it were two things schematically arranged.¹⁰⁵ [However, in reality] nothing connects anything because (in their ultimate nature) all elements of existence (being instantaneous) are devoid of function (*nirvyāpāra*).¹⁰⁶

Indicating that (immediate cause)¹⁰⁷ (is realized) in two ways.¹⁰⁸ That (conception) by means of which (*yataḥ*)¹⁰⁹ there is a connection with a name [and a genus,]

100 Tib. *don gyi chos yin gyi* (27a4) for *arthagato dharmah* (451, 25-26).

101 *lakṣaṇakāraṣya* (451, 26) is translated into Tib. as *mtshan ñid byed pa* (27a5) and not as *mtshan ñid mdzad pa*. This might be related with the fact that the word appears in an opponent’s idea.

102 The distinction between *jñānadharma* and *arthadharma* here seems to be related to the discussion in PVin I v. 4, especially in PVin I 40, 15-17. For similar discussions see PVinT 51a7-8 and PST 21a8-b1. Cf. NBT in n. 41.

103 Skt. *pratīka* runs *nāmādiyojanā ceyam iti* (452, 7) without *-ādi* after *iti*, though it certainly indicates the whole verse. The Tibetan (27a5) is also without *-ādi*.

104 M 61b6-62a1: *nāmādiyojanā ceyam svanimitam anantaram / ākṣpya vartate yena tena nāprastutābhidhā* //. Tib. (!) P 55b2-3; D 45a6: *min la sogs dan sbyor* [D: *sbyer* P] *byed 'di'i // ran gi rgyu mtshan de ma thag // gan gis 'phag par gnas gyur pa // des na gnas skabs min brjod min* //.

105 “The two things” (*vastudvaya* 452, 8) here means “name” and “genus, etc.,” but it is not clear why they are called *vastu* which is often used to denote a real entity. A possible interpretation regarding this point is as follows: A name and a genus, etc., are — even though nothing is connected in reality — connected as if (cf. *ākāra* “appearance”) they were two real things. The fact that the opponent assumed here is a realist might also have something to do with this problem.

106 *nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmānām* (452, 9-10). It is a secondary usage of PSV on PS I 9d: *nirvyāpārā hi sarvadharmāḥ* (Hattori 1968: 182-183; 107 n. 1. 66).

107 “That” (*tasya* 452, 10) is commented upon as *nimittasya* in the margin of M.

108 “In two ways” (*dvābhyām prakārābhyām* 452, 10) is commented upon as “in terms of conception of a name and in terms of conception of a genus, etc.” (*nāmakalpanāto jātyādikalpanāś ca*) in the margin of M.

etc.,¹¹⁰ is called as such, (viz., as the connection with a name and a genus, etc.). Further, (this is virtually) a *bahuvrīhi* compound — even though the substrata [of “name and genus, etc.” and of “connection”] are different (*vaiyadhikarāṇya*) — because [the compound] is an indicator (*gamaka*) [of conception]¹¹¹ or because the effect is metaphorically attributed to its cause.¹¹² The motive (*prayojana*)¹¹³ of (the employment of) metaphorical attribution is to point out the nature of the cause of the effect (in question) distinguished¹¹⁴ from all the other (irrelevant) causes.

(M 151b2; S 452, 14; K 369, 16; P 27b1; D 3b6)

Alternatively,¹¹⁵ “connection” rather (means that) that (cognition) by which a name and a genus, etc., are connected (*yojyate 'nayeti yojanā*). The compound being constructed as “that which connects a name, a genus, etc.”¹¹⁶ (conception thus

109 That is, the compound is explained as an ablative relation; i.e., *nāmajātyādiyojanā* originates from *kalpanā*. Cf. Franco 1984: 393.

110 *nāmādīnām* MKS (452, 10) [cf. Tib. *min la sogs pa* 27a8]; *tābhyām* PaGa.

111 The passage *gamakatvād vaiyadhikarāṇye 'pi ca bahuvrīhiḥ* (452, 11) seems to mean as follows: The compound *nāmajātyādiyojanā* is analyzed to be a *bahuvrīhi* compound because it has a function to indicate *kalpanā*. The author draws readers' attention here to the grammatical point that this compound belongs to a rather special kind (cf. the employment of *api*) of *bahuvrīhi* called *vaiyadhikarāṇyabahuvrīhi*, where the substrata of the former factor (i.e., *nāmajātyādi*) and of the latter factor (i.e., *yojanā*) of the compound are different and therefore their case-endings are different when the compound is analyzed (i.e., *nāmajātyādīnām* [gen.] *yojanā* [nom.]), unlike a normal compound called *sāmānādhikarāṇyabahuvrīhi* such as the word “*bahuvrīhi*” itself which is analyzed appositionally as *bahavo vrīhayo yatra* (cf. Abhyankar/Shukla 1977: 283 and 370). A similar reference to this kind of compound is found in Kāṇvakagomin's commentary on the word *prākṛtasakti* in the second introductory verse of PV I: *prākṛtasaktiḥ prākṛtāni bahiḥśāstrāṇi tatra saktir yasyeti, gamakatvād vyadhikarāṇo bahuvrīhiḥ. prākṛtā vā saktir yasyeti sāmānādhikarāṇa eva* (PVSVT 3, 8-9).

112 That is, conception is the cause, and the connection with a name and a genus, etc., is the effect. The expression *kāraṇe kāryopacārāt* is used in NB III 2, and the usage of *upacāra* in this way in the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition is traced back to Dignāga as, for example, in PSV (K) 124b4 on PS III 1ab.

113 For examples of the necessity of a motive as the basis for the employment of metaphorical attribution see PVSV 1, 12-15 (identical to HB 1*, 6-8) and Steinkellner 1967b: 84-85 Anm. 6.

114 *viśiṣṭakāryakāriṇaḥ* (452, 12); *khyad par can gyi* [D: *gyis* P] *'bras du byed pa'i* (27b1).

115 *atha vā* (452, 14); *rnam pa gcig tu na* (27b1).

116 This reveals that the compound *nāmajātyādiyojanā* is a genitive *tatpuruṣa* (i.e., *nāmajātyādīnām yojanā*), and the word *yojanā*, derived from the causative of verb \sqrt{yuj} , means an instrument or a means to connect a name and a genus, etc. I think that this interpretation of the compound is valid throughout the subsequent discussions and is the final answer to this issue. I do not agree with Franco (1984: 393) who considers that the compound is an instrumental *bahuvrīhi*. Further, Jinendrabuddhi also seems to understand the meaning of *yojanā* not as a mere connection but as the thing by which \nearrow

explained was) indicated [by Dharmakīrti] to be that very cognition associated with an expression (*abhilāpiny eva pratītiḥ*), so that there is no misinterpretation (in his words). This (etymological explanation the master) shows (in the following verse):

Alternatively, this [construction of the compound is to be explained as follows]: “A name, a genus, etc., are all connected by this (connection).” A conception explained in such a way is stated [by Dharmakīrti] as a cognition associated with an expression (*abhilāpinī pratītiḥ*).

// TS 1222 //¹¹⁷

(M 151b2; S 452, 17; K 369, 20; P 27b3; D 3b7)

By the (following half verse the master) states another reply (to the opponent):¹¹⁸

Alternatively, what is stated (by Dignāga) is just only conception that is established in his own opinion . . .

// TS 1223ab //¹¹⁹

(Opponent:) If this is the case,¹²⁰ how are the following passage in the *Vṛtti* (viz., PSV) by the master (Dignāga to be) interpreted?:

In the case of arbitrary words, a thing is expressed being distinguished by a name (as, for example,) *Ḍittha*. In the case of genus-words, (a thing is expressed being distinguished) by a genus (as, for example,) cow (*go*). In the case of quality-words, (a thing is expressed being distinguished) by a

\ the object possessed of a name, a genus, etc., is connected. Cf. PST 21a4-6: *miñ dan rigs la sogs pa rnam s kyī sbyor ba ni miñ dan rigs sogs sbyor ba ste / . . . miñ la sogs pa rnam de dan ldan pa'i don dan gañ gis sbyor bar byed yañ dag par sre* [D: *sri P*] *bar byed pa'i śes pa de rtog pa'o* // . “The connection of a name and a genus, etc., is the meaning of *nāmajātyādiyojanā*. . . Conception is that cognition by which that name, etc., is connected, [i.e.,] mingled, with an object which is possessed of (that name, etc.)”

117 M 62a1 - 2: *nāmajātyādayaḥ sarve yojyante vānayeti sā / tathoktā kalpanā proktā pratītir abhilāpinī* // . Tib. (!) P 55b3-4; D 45a6-7: *miñ dan rigs sogs rnam s kyī 'am^a // yañ na 'di la de sbyor bas // brjod pa dan ldan śes pa de // rtog par brjod ces gsuñs pa yin* // .

^a Tib. *pratīka*: *yañ na miñ dan rigs sogs kun* (27b2-3).

118 *parihārāntaram* MK: *parihārāntam* S (452, 17).

119 M 62a2: *yad vā svamatasiddhaiva kevalā kalpanoditā* /. Tib. P 55b4; D 45a7: *yañ na brjod pa 'ba' žig ñid // bstan pas ran gi 'dod pa grub* // .

120 That is, “If the compound *nāmajātyādikalpanā* is expressed only from Dignāga’s own standpoint as stated in TS 1223ab.”

quality (as, for example,) white (*śukla*). In the case of action-words, (a thing is expressed being distinguished) by an action (as, for example,) a cook (*pācaka*). In the case of substance-words, (a thing is expressed being distinguished) by a substance (as, for example,) a staff-bearer (*daṇḍin*) or a horn-bearer (*viśāṇin*).¹²¹

For by this passage it is elucidated respectively that an object which is connected also with qualifiers such as a genus, etc., is explained.

Hence, (in order to answer this, the master) states:

... because “a thing is expressed being connected with, [i.e., distinguished by,]¹²² a name” should be (syntactically) connected in all cases.

// TS 1223cd //¹²³

In all cases (means not only in the case of arbitrary words) but also in the case of genus-words, etc. The following is meant: Just as when arbitrary words are employed (*prayujyamāṇeṣu*!)¹²⁴ a thing is expressed being distinguished by a name, in the case of genus-words, etc.¹²⁵ — such as a cow, etc. — a thing is (also) expressed being distinguished by a name. In this way this (expression, i.e., “a thing is expressed as distinguished by a name,”) should be (syntactically) connected with all the sentences (of PSV, the text in question).¹²⁶

(M 151b4; S 453, 4; K 370, 3; P 27b8; D 4a4)

(Opponent:) If this is the case, [viz., if the phrase “a thing is expressed as distinguished by a name” is correlated with all the five cases], how will the further instrumental, (namely,) “by a genus,” “by a quality,” “by an action,” or “by a sub-

121 PSV on PS I 3d. Cf. Eng. tr. in Hattori 1968: 25; and Franco 1984: 397. Citations and secondary usages of this passage are also found in the following texts: NVT₁ 130, 19–21 (Hattori 1968: 83 n. 1. 27); and NBhū 176, 16–19. Cf. NPV 35, 12–15; NM 240, 9–11; Kāś 254, 15–17; NCV 60, 4–12; TAV 55, 8–9; and TRD 38, 21–39, 3.

122 As pointed out by Franco (1984: 400 n. 19), the word *yukta* is no more than a substitution for *viśiṣṭa* for metrical reasons.

123 M 62a2: *sarvatra nāmnā yukto 'rtha ucyaṭa iti yojanāt* //. Tib. P 55b4–5; D 45a7: *thams cad du yañ min dañ don // sbyor bas sbyor ba zes gsuñs so //*.

124 *yathā yadrcchāśabdeṣu prayujyamāṇeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyaṭe* M [cf. Tib. *ji ltar 'dod rgyal ba'i sgra sbyor ba dag la min gi khyad par can gyi don brjod pa* 27b6–7]; *prayujyamāṇeṣu* om. KS (452, 22–23).

125 *jātyādiśabdeṣu* (452, 23); *rigs la sogs pa'i sgra dag las* (27b7).

126 In this interpretation a name (*nāman*) must mean a word (*śabda*) because it is applied to all the five categories.

stance,” be (syntactically) connected?

(In order to answer this, the master) states:

On the other hand, their usefulness is known through these, (i.e., a genus, etc.), because they are (syntactically connected) by the instrumental case.

// TS 1224ab //¹²⁷

(That is to say,) a thing, being distinguished by a name by means of a genus which is an instrument (*karaṇabhūta*), is expressed (as, for example,) “cow.” Likewise, (a thing is expressed being distinguished by a name) by means of a quality, etc., (as, for example, “white,” etc.) In this way **their usefulness is known through these, (i.e., a genus, etc.), because they are** (syntactically) connected **by the instrumental case.**

(Opponent:) If this is the case, how should (this way of interpretation of PSV) be (syntactically) connected in the fundamental text (*sūtra*), i.e., the “name-genus-etc. connection” (*nāmajātyādiyojanā*, PS I 3d)?

(In order to answer this, the master) states:

The meaning which results [from this interpretation] is [that that which connects] a name through the medium of a genus, etc., is this, (i.e., the compound “name-genus-etc. connection” as conception).

// TS 1224cd //¹²⁸

The word “connection” should be added. By the word **this** (*seyam ity anena*!)¹²⁹ (the master) indicates conception which is to be understood by necessity of the compound. That means that that which connects through the medium of a genus, etc., is (the meaning of) “genus-etc. connection,” (and) that which connects a name through the medium of a genus, etc., is (the meaning of) this “name-genus-etc. connection.”¹³⁰ This results as the meaning of the compound (from the inter-

127 M 62a2: *tais tu karaṇavibhaktiā sāphalyam anubhūyate* /. Tib. P 55b5; D 45a7-b1: *des ni byed pa'i byed tshig ñid* // 'bras bu dan bcas śes par bya //. The Tib. *pratīka* for *tais tu* reads 'di yis (28b8-29a1).

128 M 62a2-3: *nāmno jātyādibhiḥ seyam ity artho 'dhyavatiṣṭate* //. Tib. P 55b5; D 45b1: *min dan rigs la sogs rnam kyis* // *de yi śes* [D: *žen P*] *bya'i don du gnas* //.

129 *seyam ity anena* [cf. Tib. 28a3: 'di śes bya ba 'dis ni]: *seyam iti* / *anena* KS (453, 9). This possibly means *seyam ity anena śabdena* (or *vacanena*).

130 That is, from this viewpoint conception is that (cognition) which connects a name (i.e., a word,) through the medium of a genus, etc.

pretation of PSV, the text in question).

(M 151b6; S 453, 12; K 370, 13; P 28a5; D 4a7)

(Opponent:) If that is the case, (your) establishment [of the definition of conception] is too narrow (*avyāpin*), because there is no basis for application (*pravṛttinimitta*), such as a genus, in the case of arbitrary words.¹³¹

Expecting to be criticized in this way, (the master) states:

Moreover, this (definition) should not be considered to be too narrow because there actually exists a genus denoted by arbitrary words.

// TS 1225abc //¹³²

The following is meant: Words such as “*Ḍittha*”¹³³ that are regarded as arbitrary words [denoting the person *Ḍittha*, etc.] cannot — while accompanying him from birth to the moment of death — denote that reality (*vastu*) in its unique difference which differs through the variations of each moment;¹³⁴ they are (therefore) applied (only) to denote the genus inherent¹³⁵ in that reality which is [conceptually] determined within the limits of a long span of time, for otherwise how could (such words) which are conventionally accepted as referring to a part of reality that is determined by a certain stage (of life) such as childhood impart also the reality that

131 I cannot trace this objection in other texts, but the idea that arbitrary words do not have a basis for application might be relevant to the following passages: *yādṛcchā nāma yāsati pravṛttinimitte 'rthagatam pravartakam nivartakam vā niyamahetum antarena pravartate nivartate vā sā yādṛcchā* (MBhD 59, 9-10; Tanizawa 1987: 41); and *sā [= kalpanā] dvividhā samāsataḥ; yādṛcchikī naimittikī ca. nāmagrahanād yādṛcchikī, jātyādighrahanāc ca naimittikī grhītā. nimittanirapekṣam nāma yādṛcchikam 'Ḍittho' 'Davitthaḥ' ityādi...* (NCV 60, 4-6). Also, Hattori (1968: 85 n. 1. 28) summarizes Jinendrabuddhi's idea on the concept of *śabdappravṛttinimitta*.

132 M 62a3: *yādṛcchāsabdavācyāyā jāteḥ sabbhāvato na ca / avyāptir asya mantavyā prasiddhes tu prthaksrutih* [1225a-d]. Tib. (!) P 55b5-6; D 45b1: 'dod rgyal sgra yi brjod bya ba'i^a // 'di yi ma khyab par šes bya // so so'i sgrar ni rab tu grub [P: 'grub D]^b //. This Tib. does not make sense; a translation corresponding to Skt. *pāda b* (*jāteḥ sabbhāvato na ca*) is lacking.

^a Tib. *pratīka*: 'dod rgyal sgra yis [D: *pa* added P] *brjod par bya la* (28a6).

^b Tib. *pratīka*: *rab tu grags phyir* (28b8).

133 The Tibetan has *kho bo* (28a6), i.e., **aham*, instead of *Ḍittha*.

134 *pratīkṣaṇabhedabhinnam asādhāraṇabhedena vastu gamayitum āśaktāḥ* (453, 15-16). Cf. Tib. (28a7) *skad cig re re'i dbye bas tha dad pa thun moṇ ma yin pa'i dños po tha dad par go bar mi nus pa rnams* (i.e., **pratīkṣaṇabhedabhinnam asādhāraṇam vastu bhedenā gamayitum āśaktāḥ* (?)). I do not follow the Tibetan because *°bhinnam asādhāraṇam* is a tautology.

135 The usage of the word “inherent” (*samaveta*) does not necessarily mean that it is a non-Buddhistic theory; it is occasionally used in a Buddhist context; e.g., NBT 38, 4-5; and DhPr 39, 14-17.

is specified by (another) stage (of life) such as old age?¹³⁶

Some people hold the opinion¹³⁷ that a body is not momentary — then what is it? — but is constituted of (different stages) at different times (of life). Also to them it is established that there appears an utterly, ever different substance (*anyad anyadravyam*!) [— viz., a living body undergoes, so to speak, metabolic change —] in (each) different stage (of life) because of the connection of (the body) with the waning parts¹³⁸ or because of the waning of the parts¹³⁹ with the lapse of time. [Therefore there is no such one and the same body denoted by the words applied to it at different times, and a genus should be maintained as the object of such arbitrary words.]

In the case of the theory of transformation (*parīnatidarśane*!),¹⁴⁰ too, that reality which is connected with a certain stage (of life), [say stage A,] is maintained as the object of a word for that (stage), and once some other stage than (that stage A) is approached (*avasthāntarasamāśraye*!),¹⁴¹ that very reality (in stage B) could

136 ... *nirūḍhāḥ katham vṛddhādyavasthopahitabhedam api vastu pratipādayeyuḥ* (453, 17–18). Cf. Tib. (28a8–b1) ... *yod pa ji ltar rgan po la sog pa'i gnas skabs kyi khyad par ston par 'gyur*; i.e., the Tibetan omits *nirūḍhāḥ*, *upahita*, *api*, and *vastu*.

137 It is not clear who is the propounder of this opinion. It seems that the view is related to the theory of a whole (*avayavin*) and its parts (*avayavās*) and consequently to the theory of causality in terms of the non-existence of an effect before its production (*asatkāryavāda*) because Kamalaśīla concludes that there should appear a new substance, i.e., a new body, each time that the parts change on the wane. If that is the case, it could be related with a theory by the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools. However, in Kamalaśīla's context a new body seems to be regarded not as a whole but only as a part of the body-continuum through one's life. I do not find the theory of a whole and its parts in this temporal aspect in texts of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools.

138 °*avayavasambandhād* MK: °*avayasambandhād* S (453, 20).

139 *yathākālam apacīyamānāvayavasambandhād avayavāpacayād vānyad anya* [MK: om. S] *dravyam avasthābhedeṣv iti siddham* (453, 20–21). Cf. Tib. (28b2) *dus ji lta ba bzin du bsam pa'i* [D: *pa' P*] *yan lag dan 'brel pa'i phyir* [P: / added D] *gnas skabs tha dad dag tu rdzas gzan dan gzan yin no šes bya bar grub po* // (28b2); i.e., the Tibetan has *bsam pa'i* (either **cintyamāna* (?) or, more likely, a corruption of *ñams pa'i*) for *apacīyamāna* and omits a translation of *avayavāpacayād vā*.

The exact meaning of the passage is not clear to me, in particular the theoretical difference between *apacīyamānāvayavasambandhād* and *avayavāpacayād*, the latter of which seems redundant. Does it mean that the former alternative suggests the theory of a whole, whereas the latter is a theory without the postulation of a whole?

140 I provisionally interpret this theory (*parīnatidarśana* [MK: -*daśana* S (453, 22)]; *yoṅs su 'gyur ba'i lta ba* 28b2) as the one held by the Sāṃkhya school. On this assumption, it would be closely related to the theory of causality in terms of the existence of an effect before its generation (*satkāryavāda*). Cf. n. 137. However, it might also be possible to interpret it not as the theory of the Sāṃkhya school but as the Buddhist *parīṇāmanavāda* when the concept of continuum (*saṃtāna*) is taken into account (cf. Hattori 1974: 125).

141 *tataś cāvasthāntarasamāśraye* M [cf. Tib. *de lta yin dan gnas skabs gzan la brten pa na* 28b3]: ↗

not be denoted by that word. (For example,) in the same way as the word “milk” which has a specific capacity to denote fresh milk is not applied to [denote] curd, so (a word applied) in the case of a body [which is once applied to denote that reality in stage A] cannot be employed [to denote that reality] in other stages. Therefore a genus must inevitably be maintained (*avaśyābhyupagantavyā!*)^{141a} [as the object of words used to denote a person in all stages of his life].

Alternatively, [it is better to suppose that] genus, instead, is not real. Even in that case the establishment [of our definition of conception] is not too narrow. That is to say, those very differences which are the differences from what is not intended [in a designation] are the (so-called) universal, so that the same differences¹⁴² are in all cases appropriated [as the object] by genus-words. Therefore it is certain¹⁴³ that even arbitrary words denote a genus.¹⁴⁴ The same idea is expressed [by Bhartṛhari]:

When a genus is the object of words, words require the genus [as their object] and when [the individual functions as the object of arbitrary words,] words (require) that individual [as their object] just like the genus, [viz., the individual is a being which has the same function as a genus]. Therefore [in both cases] words [can be said to] express the genus.¹⁴⁵

(Opponent:) Then for what purpose did the author of the definition (Dignāga) explain arbitrary words separately from genus-words?

(In order to answer this, the master) states:

However (Dignāga employed) separate statements [for arbitrary words]

↘ *tataś cāvasthāntaram samāśrayeta* KS (453, 23). Another possible interpretation of the passage is as follows: “... and, therefore (*tataś ca*), once some other stage (B) is approached, ...”

141a *avaśyābhyupagantavyā* MKPaGa: *avaśyam abhyupagantavyā* S (453, 25). Cf. Tib. 28b4-5: *gnod mi za bar rigs khas blañ bar bya'o* //.

142 *bhedā eva* MKS (454, 10) [cf. Tib. *tha dad pa ñid* 28b6]: om. PaGa.

143 According to Shastri's note (S, p. 454, n. 4), the manuscripts Pa and Ga seem to wrongly omit the passage from *api* (454, 11) to *yadṛcchāśabda* (454, 15) which is kept in MKS and Tib.

144 *yadṛcchāśabdā api jātyabhidhāyinaḥ santu* (454, 11). A similar idea is found in Helārāja's commentary on VP III 1. 12; in particular, VPP 26, 2-3: ... *tasmāj jātiṃ viśeṣaṃ vā pratipādayantaḥ sarve jātyabhidhāyinaḥ iti jātyabhidhānavyāptiṃ nigamayati*. “... Therefore, insofar as all (words) indicate a genus or the individual, they denote the genus. In this way [the word *atas* in v. 12d] concludes (the discussion of) the pervasion of the denotation of a genus.”

145 *jātau padārthe jātir vā viśeṣo vāpi jātivat / śabdair apekṣyate yasmād atas te jātivācinaḥ* // (454, 13-14; cited from VP III 1. 12). Cf. Tib. 28b6-7: *rigs ni tshig gi don yin na // rigs sam* [D: *ma* P] *rigs ldan khyad par ni // sgra yis byed ces gañ gi phyir // de phyir de dag rigs rjod byed* //, where *jātivat* is wrongly translated as *rigs ldan* (i.e., **jātivān*).

and genus-words] because (such separate statements) are widely known to people.

// TS 1225d //¹⁴⁶

Words such as “cow” are widely known¹⁴⁷ to people as genus-words, whereas (words) such as “Citrāṅgada” (are widely known)¹⁴⁸ as name-words (*saṃjñāśabda*; i.e., *yadṛcchāśabda*). This is why (Dignāga employed) separate words.

(M 152a3; S 454, 18; K 371, 4; P 29a1; D 5a1)

By the (following verse) the other party criticizes (the above idea):

(Opponent:) Isn't it the case that [only one of the following alternatives should be maintained: i.e.,] either only genus-words (should be admitted by you) (*jātiśabdo 'stu !*) because the object of (words) is the exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*), or only arbitrary words (should be admitted) because (words) depend on the speaker's intention?

// TS 1226 //¹⁴⁹

(M 152a3; S 454, 19; K 371, 7; P 29a1; D 5a1)

By the (following verse the master) replies:

You are right. The (reverend Dignāga) who is skilled in logic stated it in this way, [i.e., through the employment of separate statements, only] in conformity with the commonalty, for to just this extent words follow the conventional path in this [definition of Dignāga].

// TS 1227 //¹⁵⁰

146 The text is presented in n. 132.

147 Tib. *grags* (29a1) for *pratīṭāḥ* (454, 16).

148 *grags pa* is added in the Tibetan (29a1).

149 M 62a3 - 4: *nanv anyāpohavācyatvāj jātiśabdo 'stu^a kevalaḥ / vivakṣāparatantratvād yadṛcchāśabda^b eva vā* // Tib. P 55b6-7; D45b1-2: 'o na brjod bya gžan gsal phyir // rigs sgra 'ba' žig yin pa 'am // brjod 'dod gžan dbaṅ gyur pa'i phyir // 'dod rgyal sgra ṅid ma yin nam //.

^a *jātiśabdo 'stu* M: *jātiśabdas tu* KS.

^b *yadṛcchāśabda* MKS: *vivakṣāśabda* PaGa.

150 M 62a4: *satyaṃ lokānuvṛtṭyedam uktaṃ nyāyavidedṛśam / iyān eva hi śabdo 'smin vyavahārapatham gataḥ* // Tib. (!) P 55b7; D 45b2: 'jig rten rjes 'braṅs [P: 'braṅ D] 'di yod par // rigs pa mkhyen pas gsuṅs pa yin // 'di ṅid tsaṃ gyis [P: gyi D]^a sgra yis ni // 'dir ni tha sñad lam du žugs //, where the translation of *īdṛśam* is omitted, and *yod par* for *satyaṃ* (cf. also JHA 1937 (p. 623): “It is true that . . .”). My interpretation of *satyaṃ* in the sense of agreement with the opponent follows the Tib. ↗

For to just this extent (means) the five kinds (of words) embodying the distinctions of name-, genus-, quality-, action-, and substance-words.

(M 152a3; S 454, 21; K 371, 11; P 29a2; D 5a2)

(Opponent:) If what is intended is conception as established only in his own opinion, then why did the master (Dignāga) afterwards separately explain conception established in his own opinion through the passage “Others maintain, on the other hand, that a thing is expressed being distinguished only by words that are empty of a real entity?” (PSV on PS I 3d)¹⁵¹

(In order to answer this, the master) states:

However a genus, etc., [as a real entity] is here, [i.e., in our system,] not distinguished [from the individual] as [assumed] by the commonalty. For the purpose of explaining this, (the master Dignāga) stated, “Others (maintain), on the other hand, [that a thing is expressed being distinguished only by words that are empty of a real entity].”

// TS 1228 //¹⁵²

The following is meant: A genus, etc., as distinguished from an individual, such as *śābaleya* (-cow), etc., does not exist in the real sense (*pāramārthikāḥ*!)¹⁵³ but is (only) a conventional being (*sāmṃvṛta*).¹⁵⁴ For the purpose of teaching this, the author of the definition (Dignāga) stated this (passage), and it is not for the purpose of separately showing an additional kind of conception.

Others (in Dignāga’s expression means) Buddhists.¹⁵⁵ **By (words that) are empty of a real entity** (means) by those words which are independent of a genus,

\ pratika: *bden te (žes bya ba la sogs pas)* (29a1-2).

^a Tib. *pratika*: *’di ltar ’di tsam* (29a2).

151 The passage is discussed by Hattori (1968: 25; 85-86 n. 1. 29) to which Franco (1984: 397) provides the additional information that it is relevant to YS 1. 9 (*śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpah*.) in terms of the wording.

152 M 62a4-5: *te tu jātṛyādayo neha lokavad vyatirekiṇaḥ / ity etatpratipattiyartham anye tv ityādi varṇitam* //. Tib. P 55b7-8; D 45b2-3: *rigs sogs de yañ ’jig rten bžin* // *’dir ni tha sñad yod ma yin* // *de dag ’di las rtogs bya’i phyir* // *gžan du ’di skad gsuñs pa yin* //.

153 *pāramārthikāḥ* MK: *paramārthikāḥ* S (454, 24).

154 A similar expression is found in NM 240, 12-13: *jātijātimator bhedo na kaścit paramārthataḥ // bhedāropanarūpā ca jāyate jātikalpanā* //. “In reality there is not any distinction between a genus and its possessor, and the conception of a genus arises having a false imposition of that distinction as its very nature.” Cf. also NMGBh 54, 15-16.

155 The passage is discussed by Hattori (1968: 85-86 n. 1. 29).

etc., [as a reality] and refer to nothing but the exclusion (of others).¹⁵⁶

This is the (correct) meaning of the master's (Dignāga's) sentence.

(M 152a4; S 455, 15; K 371, 20; P 29a7; D 5a5)

This conception (defined as) associated with an expression is not only approved by us, it has to be accepted necessarily (*avaśyābhyupagantavyā!*)¹⁵⁷ also by other (teachers), for otherwise the (whole) world could not be verbally designated. (In order to) show (this, the master) states:¹⁵⁸

Cognition associated with an expression has to be accepted necessarily (also) by those who have recourse to conception as the connection with a genus, etc. [1229]. Otherwise [even for these] there could be (*kalpate!*) no conception because no connection exists on account of the separation of the two things, being independent from each other, as in the case of (two) connected things¹⁵⁹ [1230], and likewise, therefore,¹⁶⁰ absolutely nothing could thereby be verbally designated; (in reality, however,) this (world) is considered to be verbally designated being firmly conjoined with factors such as a genus [1231]. “The connection with a genus, etc.,” [however,] does not logically deviate from “the connecting of a word” (*śabdayojanā*), [viz., the former is pervaded by the latter]. In this sense the (words) “is expressed” (*ucyate*) are effective (in Dignāga's explanations in PSV)

156 For *apohamātra*- (455, 13-14) the Tibetan reads *gžan sel ba tsam* (29a6-7); i.e., **anyāpohamātra*-.

157 *avaśyābhyupagantavyā* MKPaGa: *avaśyam abhyupagantavyā* S (455, 15-16).

158 The Skt. *pratīka* runs *jātyādiyojanām yepīti* (455, 16-17), but this must be understood in the sense of *jātyādiyojanām yepītyādi* [cf. Tib. 29a8: *gañ yañ rigs sogs sbyor ba yi* / [P: // D] *žes bya ba la sogs pa*].

159 The exact meaning of the verse is not clear to me. I preliminarily understand it as follows: “Otherwise [even for these] there could be no conception because no connection exists on account of the distinction between the two [— according to this assumption — real] things, [i.e., the reality and the genus,] being independent from each other, as in the case of (two independent) things [which — for example, only accidentally —] come into contact [with each other and between which there is no *samavāya*-relation].” The Tibetan (see n. 161) omits the translation of *yuktayor iva*. The commentary on this part in TSP runs as follows: “For otherwise, [i.e., if one did not accept distinction by word], because no connection exists — as in the case of the recognition of many (separate) things being independent from each other — there could not be a conception” (455, 19-20).

160 In the above translation I take *tataś ca* in *pāda* b to mean “therefore”; i.e., in consequence of the assumption that conception as *abhihāpini pratītiḥ* is not maintained. Another possible interpretation of the verse is as follows: “And, likewise (*evam ca*), absolutely nothing could thereby be verbally designated. Therefore, this (world) is considered . . .”

[1232].

// TS 1229–32 //¹⁶¹

Though conception is regarded (*abhyupagatāyām*!)¹⁶² by other (teachers) also as the connection with a genus, a quality, an action,¹⁶³ and a substance, conception is none other than that which connects a name.¹⁶⁴

That is to say, in this [assumption of the opponents]¹⁶⁵ a reality which is particularized as¹⁶⁶ a genus, etc., is recognized being distinguished by a name itself, for otherwise, [i.e., if one did not accept distinction by a word,] because no connection exists¹⁶⁷ — as in the case of the recognition of many [separate] things being independent from each other — there could not be a conception, and consequently, the world would be dumb.¹⁶⁸ Further, by the same reason, [i.e., because every kind of conception is based on that which connects a name,] even when one looks at a

161 M 62a5–b2: *jātyādiyojanāṃ ye 'pi kalpanāṃ samupāśritāḥ / tair abhyupeyā niyatam pratītir abhilāpinī* // [1229]; *anyathā yojanābhāvād yuktayor iva bhāvayoh / svātantryeṇa paricchedāt kalpanā naiva kalpate*^a // [1230]; *evaṃ cāvvyavahāryaṃ^b syāt sarvaṃ viśvam idam tataḥ / jātyādirūpasamśṛṣṭam vyavahāryam idam matam* // [1231]; *jātyādiyojanā śabdāyojanāvvyabhicārīṇī / evaṃ cocyata ity etat phalavaj jāyate vacaḥ* // [1232]. Tib. (!) P 55b8–56a3; D 45b3–5: *gañ zig rtog* [P: *rtogs* D] *pa la brten nas* // *gañ dag rigs sogs sbyor bas kyañ* // *des kyañ brjod pa dan ldan pa'i* // *rtogs pa nes par khas blañs 'gyur* // [1229]; *gžan du dños po gñis dag gi* // *sbyor ba yod par mi 'gyur te* // *rañ dbañ du ni yonñs gcod pas* // *rtog pa ñid du brtags pa min* // [1230]; *de ltar na yañ sna tshogs pa* // *'di kun tha sñad med par 'gyur* // *rigs sogs tshul la brten nas ni* // *'di ni tha sñad ñid du 'dod* // [1231]; *rigs la sogs dan sbyor ba'i sgra* // *sbyor ba la ni ma 'khrul ba'o* [P: *pa'o* D] // *de skad bstan pa'i tshig de rnam* // *'bras bu dan bcas tshig tu 'gyur* // [1232].

^a *kalpate* M (not fully clear); *kalpyate* KS. *kalpate* is preferable from the context. The word is paraphrased by *bhavet* in TSP (455, 20).

^b *cāvvyavahāryaṃ* M: *vāvvyavahāryam* K: *vā vyavahāryam* S. Cf. also *tha sñad med par, avyavahāryam* TSP (455, 16); and *tataś ca mūkam eva jagat syāt* (455, 20).

162 *abhyupagatāyām* MK: *abhyupamatāyām* S (455, 18).

163 Cf. Tib. 29b1: *rigs dan yon tan dan* [P: om. D] *rdzas sbyor ba'i*, i.e., Tib. omits *kriyā*.

164 *nāmāyojanaiva* (544, 18); *min* [corr.: *mi* PD] *sbyor ba ñid* (29b1). “Name” (*nāman*) here must mean “word” (*śabda*) in this context.

165 The exact meaning of this *tatra* (455, 18) is not clear: “In case one regards conception as the connection with a genus, etc.” (?)

166 I take *jātyādivyavacchinnaṃ vastu* (455, 18; cf. *jātyādi / vyavacchinnaṃ vastu* M) in the sense of **jātyāditvena vyavacchinnaṃ vastu*. Tib. 29b1: *rigs la sogs pa rnam par bcad pa'i dños po*.

167 Jha (1937: 624) wrongly takes *yojanābhāvāt* as *yojanā + bhāvāt* (“there being connection”). See Tib. 29b2: *sbyor ba med pa'i phyir*. In this sense his translation of TS 1230ab (*yojanābhāvād*) is also not tenable.

168 *tataś ca mūkam eva jagat syāt* (455, 20). It corresponds to 1231ab (*evaṃ cāvvyavahāryaṃ syāt sarvaṃ viśvam idam tataḥ*) and also to TSP 455, 16 (*jagad avyavahāryam syāt*). In this context, ↗

person carrying a staff (*daṇḍayuktaḥ puruṣaḥ*), one cannot apply (the name) “staff-bearer” (*daṇḍin*) (to the person) as long as one does not recall the specific name (*nāmabheda*).¹⁶⁹

It is by this very reason — i.e., that all connections are pervaded by that which connects a word (*śabdāyojanā*)¹⁷⁰ — that the words “is expressed” (*ucyate*) must be effective (in such an explanation by the master Dignāga as) “A thing is expressed being distinguished by a genus as, for example, ‘cow’” and so on, for otherwise, without name, “is expressed” would never be (meaningful) because naming-activity is (only) a property of words.

(M 152a7; S 456, 9; K 372, 11; P 29b5; D 5b2)

By the (following verse the master) summarizes the establishment of conception:

Therefore, since there is no dispute[— in that every kind of conception is based on words —] among the advocates who stand on all (their own) established theories, I can establish this conception without any effort !

// TS 1233 //¹⁷¹

\ conception as that which connects a name is a basis to distinguish a variety of things in the world. Further, this illustration by the “world” (*viśva*, *jagat*) is used often in other contexts, too, for the demonstration of something which is concerned with the variety of phenomena in the world; e.g., TSP 29, 15-18 (see also K 23, 4 for the correction); 162, 21-22; and 246, 16-17. These expressions originate in PVS 20, 22-24: *tau cen na bhedaḥ tadā na kasyacit kutaścid bheda ity ekaṃ dravyaṃ viśvaṃ syāt. tataś ca sahotpattivinaśau, sarvasya ca sarvatropayogaḥ syāt* (cf. for the significance of the passage see Funayama 1990: 617-618; and 633 n. 13)

169 Originally, a “staff-bearer” was an example of substance-words (*dravyaśabda*) in the context of PSV, but here Kamalaśīla by the same example illustrates that all kinds of conception are based on the connection of words (*nāmayojanā*), extending the sense of *nāman* from a proper name to any word.

170 This reveals quite well that in the expression “that which connects a name” (*nāmayojanā*) a “name” is a synonym of a “word” (*śabda*) in Śāntarakṣita / Kamalaśīla’s idea. It is used in order to integrate all kinds of connections, ranging from *nāmayojanā* in the narrow sense to *dravyāyojanā*. This idea, although it is expressed for the first time in TS 1232ab and its commentary here, is presupposed possibly as early as in TS 1218 (see also n. 84). Once the term *śabdāyojanā* is employed, it is not surprising that Śāntarakṣita states that Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s definitions should mean the same, because the former means *śabdāyojanā*, and *abhilāpa* in the latter definition is paraphrased by *vācakaḥ śabdaḥ* (449, 23).

171 M 62b2-3: *tasmāt samastāsiddhāntasamsthītānāṃ pravādināṃ / avivādād^a ayatnena sādhyeṇa kalpanā mayā* // . Tib. P 56a3-4; D 45b5: *de phyir rgol ba pa rnam kyis // grub mtha’ ↗*

(M 152a7; S 456, 10; K 372, 14; P 29b6; D 5b3)

Now¹⁷² (in order to express) the real intention of the author of the definition, (Dignāga,) who indicated the well-established (definition of) conception,¹⁷³ (the master) states:

Approving all these,¹⁷⁴ (the master Dignāga) here [in the definition of conception in PS] made the statement about a name and a genus, etc., as a way of mentioning his own opinion and that of other teachers [1234], (and, further,) stating (*ity eva sa bruvaṇ*!) that this alone is that with regard to which we differ from these (other teachers), he expressed immediately after (that) that formulation: “Others, on the other hand, maintain [that a thing is expressed being distinguished only by words that are empty of a real entity].”

// TS 1234-35 //¹⁷⁵

↘ *yaṅ dag gnas kun gyis* [D: *kyis* P] // *rtsod* [D: *cod* P] *pa med par rtogs* 'di'o // *kho bos dpyad de bsgrubs pa yin* //.

^a *avivādād* KS: *avivādān* M. Cf. “*avidādād ayatnena pāṭhāntaram*” in the margin of M.

172 *yad vā* MS (456, 10) [cf. Tib. *yaṅ na* 29b6]: om. KPaGa.

173 *kalpanām siddhirūpām* (456, 10; *siddhi*: in the sense of *siddha* (?)). Cf. Tib. 29b6: *grub pa'i no bo rtog pa rnam*s, i.e., “the well-established [five kinds of] conceptions.”

174 The gist of TS 1229-33 is that *jātyādiyojanā* is completely based on *nāmayojanā*. It is referred to by the words “all these” in this verse, the idea being repeated in the subsequent commentary (456, 11-12).

175 M 62b3: *etad āgūrya sakalam nāmajātyādivarṇanam / matayoḥ svānyayor ittham upādānam ihākarot* // [1234]; *tebhyo 'smākam iyaṇ eva bheda ity eva sa bruvaṇ^a / anye tv ityādikaṃ vākyam anantaram ado jagau* // [1235]. Tib. (!) P 56a4-5; D 45b5-6: *min dan rigs sogs brjod pa yis^b // kun tu* [P: *du* D] *brtags pa de dag kun // de ni de bzin bdag gzan gyis^c // 'di ni^d 'di ltar khas blaṅs pa'o^e //* [1234]; *de rnam dan ni bdag nid kyi // khyad par 'di nid tsaṃ mo* [P: *kyi tsaṃ* instead of *tsaṃ mo* D] *žes // des gsuṅs^f gzan du 'di^g la sogs // tshig ni de rjes* [P: *brjod* D]^h *gsuṅs pa yin* // [1235].

^a *eva sa bruvaṇ* M: *evam abruvaṇ* KS.

^b Tib. 1234a deviates from Kamalaśīla's idea. The Tibetan (corresponding to Skt. 1234b) takes *varṇanam* (*brjod pa yis*) either as the subject or as an instrumental phrase; however, according to TSP, *-varṇanam* is an accusative, being the object of *akarot*.

^c The meaning of instrumental *gyis* is not clear. The Tibetan lacks the translation of *matayoḥ*; instead, the Tibetan reads *de ni de bzin* (equivalent to **sa tathā* (?)).

^d 'di ni should be 'dir ni if it was translated from *iha*.

^e *khas blaṅs pa'o*, which is usually the translation of *abhyūpa√gam*, seems to be a translation of *upādānam* here (cf. *ston pa* for *upādāna* in TSP, n. 179).

^f Tib. 1235c, *des gsuṅs*, supports the reading of *sa bruvaṇ* in M. If, on the other hand, the form *abruvaṇ* (i.e., “not stating,”) in KS were accepted, the verse would mean as follows: “As he did not state it in such a way that just this is, with regard to which we differ from these (other teachers, therefore) ✓”

¹⁷⁶As for the explanation of the object to be rejected and the one to be accepted, that is already elucidated in statements such as “The connection with a genus, etc., is logically concomitant with that which connects a name” (*nāmāyojanāvinābhāvinīty!*).¹⁷⁷ ¹⁷⁸The statement about a name and a genus, etc. is (syntactically) connected with **made**. On the other hand, **as a way of mentioning his own opinion and that of other (teachers)**¹⁷⁹ is for the purpose of an explanation of the object to be rejected and the one to be accepted.¹⁸⁰

(M 152b1; S 456, 14; K 372, 22; P 29b8; D 5b4)

(Opponent:) In that case how should the passage of the *Nyāyamukha* be interpreted?

(In order to answer this, the master) states:

↘ he expressed immediately after (that) the formulation ‘Others...’

^g *iti* is translated as ‘di.’

^h *de rjes* looks like a translation of *anantaram*, but I do not find such a rendering elsewhere; *de brjod* does not make sense.

176 *etad āgūryeti. heyopādeyaviśayakathanam* [KS: / added M (concerning the punctuation)] *jātyādiyojanā...* (456, 11). As is previously stated (451, 18–19), “the object to be rejected” (*heyaviśaya*) refers to “the connection with a genus, etc.” (*jātyādiyojanā*), and “the object to be accepted” (*upādeyaviśaya*) refers to “that which connects a name” (*nāmāyojanā*). It might also be possible to interpret the sentence as follows: “The words ‘approving (all) these’ explain the object to be rejected and the one to be accepted. [Namely,] it was previously elucidated in such statements as ‘The connection with a genus, etc., is logically concomitant with that which connects a name.’” This way of interpretation might be supported by the following Tib. 29b6–7: ... ‘*di dag thams cad ces bya ba ni blañ bar bya ba dañ dor bar bya ba’i yul ston pa’o // rigs la sogs pa’i sbyor ba ni*... In this case, however, the double function of one *pratīka* would have to be presupposed: First, *etad āgūryeti* would have the function of introducing the whole verse in the sense of **etad āgūryetyādi* and second, of indicating in particular the words “approving all these” only.

177 *jātyādiyojanā nāmāyojanāvinābhāvinī* M: *jātyādiyojanā nāmāyojanām vinā bhāvinī* KS (456, 11–12): *jātyādiyojanām vinā nāmāyojanām vinā bhāvinī* (?) PaGa. Cf. Tib. 29b7: *rigs la sogs pa sbyor ba ni min* [corr.: *mi* PD] *sbyor ba med na mi ’byuñ ba yin no*. The word *avinābhāva* here means that there is a logical concomitance between *jātyādiyojanā* (as *vyāpya*) and *nāmāyojanā* (as *vyāpaka*) as in the case of a *svabhāvahetu*-inference. The idea is previously stated as *jātyādiyojanā śabdāyojanā-vyabhicāriṇī* (TS 1232ab) and as *śabdāyojanāyā sarvā yojanā vyāptā* (455, 22).

178 Tib. 29b7: *rigs la sogs pa sbyor ba ni min sbyor ba med na mi ’byuñ ba yin no źes bya ba la sogs pa śnar bśad pa* [P: / added D] *min dañ rigs la sogs pa rjod pa /* [P: // D] *źes bya ba ni byas źes bya ba dañ ’brel to //*; the syntax of ... *pūrvopavarṇitam. nāmājāty...* (456, 12) is not clear in the Tibetan.

179 Tib. 29b8: *rañ dañ gźan gyi lugs* [P: *yul* D] *ston pa ni* for *svānyayos tu mayayor upādānam* (456, 13).

180 This explanation reveals that *matayoh svānyayor ittham upādānam* (1234cd) is employed in order to corroborate *nāmājātyādivarṇanam* (1234b; an accusative being the object of *akarot*).

Likewise, [as in the case of PSV shown above,] the passage of the *Nyāyamukha* should be explained in the same way. Because of the (syntactical) construction “cognition [is direct perception],” (the word “apprehension” is (also) enjoined in the [sentence of the *Nyāyamukha*].

// TS 1236 //¹⁸¹

Here, the following is the passage of the *Nyāyamukha*:

Cognition, which is, in regard to objects such as forms (*yaj jñānam arthe rūpāda*!), devoid of conception (*avikalpaka*) in terms of a false attribution of non-difference, [i.e., identity,] in relation to the qualification and the designation respectively (*viśeṣaṇābhīdhāyakābhēdopacāreṇa*), is (called) direct perception according to [the etymology that] it occurs in close connection with each sense organ.¹⁸²

[The compound *viśeṣaṇābhīdhāyakābhēdopacāreṇa* is analyzed as follows:] “Qualification” is a genus, etc.; “designation” is a name;¹⁸³ “false attribution” of their “non-difference” (means) from the substrata of the genus, etc., and from the substratum of the name. (This term) “false attribution of non-difference” is employed (only) as a synecdoche (*upalakṣaṇa*). [Namely,] conception is certainly maintained also in the case of the cognition by means of the difference (*bhedena grahaṇam*) such as “cowhood of this” and “so-and-so name of this.”¹⁸⁴

181 M 62b4: *evaṃ Nyāyamukhagrantho vyākhyātavyo diśānayā / jñānam ity abhisambandhāt pratītiḥ tatra coditā* // Tib. P 56a5-6; D 45b7: *de bzün rigs pa'i sgo yi gzuñ // lam 'di ñid kyis bśad bya ste // śes pa źes byar brel pa'i* [D: pa P] *phyir // der ni rtogs pa źes kyañ gsuñs* //.

182 *yaj jñānam arthe*^a *rūpāda viśeṣaṇābhīdhāyakābhēdopacāreṇāvikalpakaṃ tad akṣam akṣaṃ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam* (456, 15-16). Tib. 30a1-2: *śes pa gañ źig gzugs la sogs pa'i don la khyad par rjod par byed pa tha mi dad pa ñe bar btags* [P: brtags D] *pas rtog* [corr.: rtogs PD] *pa med pa dbaṅ po dan dbaṅ po la brten nas 'jug pa de ni mñon sum mo*. Cf. NMukh 3b15-17: 謂若有智。於色等境。遠離一切種類。名言。假立無異。諸門分別。由不共緣。現現別轉。故名現量。No equivalent exists for 諸門 and 由不共緣 (**asādhāraṇapratyayavāt* or *hetuvāt*) in the citation in TSP. Cf. also Tucci 1930: 50; Ui 1965: 635-640; Hattori 1968: 76-78 n. 1. 11; and Katsura 1982: 84-85. The word *abhēdopacāra* is used also in PSV I (Hattori 1968: 232-233).

^a *yaj jñānam arthe* M [see also NP 7, 12-13: *yaj jñānam arthe rūpāda nāmajātyādikalpanārahitaṃ*...]: *yat jñānam artha*- K: *yat jñānārtha*- S.

^b Tosaki (1979b: 110-111 n. 24) suggests the possibility that 種類 is a corruption of 種等 (*jātyādi*).

183 According to this interpretation, *viśeṣaṇābhīdhāyaka* is a *dvandva* compound and it is connected to *abhēdopacāra* in a genitive relation. Further, *viśeṣaṇa* is paraphrased by *jātyādi*, and *abhīdhāyaka* by *nāman* in TSP.

184 Tib. *'di'i ba lan ñid 'di'i* [D: 'di'o P] *min* [P: om. D] *'di'o* [P: om. D] *źes bya ba* (30a3) for *asya gotvam asyedam nameti* (456, 18).

(Opponent:) It is not mentioned here (*atra*!) that conception is cognition (*pratīti*!)! How then is conception as stated before (*yathokta*-!), [i.e., as associated with an expression,] gained?¹⁸⁵

(In order to answer this, the master) states, “**Because of the (syntactical) construction ‘cognition [is direct perception].’**”

The following idea is thereby expressed: When (the master Dignāga) indicates that cognition itself is direct perception in contrast to conception, it is indicated that conception is a property of cognition,¹⁸⁶ and so what is meant here is that that cognition which is devoid of conception in terms of a false attribution of non-difference in relation to name, etc., is (called) direct perception. On the other hand, a cognition which is of a conceptual nature in this sense is not direct perception because it is essentially conception. Inasmuch as these (meanings) are (syntactically) implied, it is established that, in contrast to direct perception, conception is associated with an expression.

In this way it is elucidated that [the above cited passage of the *Nyāyamukha*] comprises both (Dignāga’s) own¹⁸⁷ opinion and that of other (teachers) (*parāparamata*-!).

(M 152b4; S 457, 12; K 373, 8; P 30a7; D 6a2)

Alternatively,¹⁸⁸ [one can interpret the passage of NMukh in the following way:] The master (Dignāga) just stated his own¹⁸⁹ opinion alone. (In order to indicate this, (the master) states:¹⁹⁰

**Alternatively [in the compound *viśeṣaṇābhīdhāyakābhedopacāra*]
“qualification” (means) differentiation (*bheda*) by means of which**

185 *nanu cātra pratītiḥ* [corr.: *cānupratītiḥ* M(?)KS] *kalpaneti noktam. tat katham yathoktakalpanā* [MK: *tathoktakalpanā* S] *labhyata ity* (456, 20-21). Cf. Tib. 30a4: ‘on te dir rtogs [for rtog (?)] pa śes pa’i [corrupt for pa’o (?)] źes ma brjod pa ma yin nam / de ltar [corrupt for de ji ltar (?)] ji skad du bśad pa’i rnam par rtog las rñed ce na /.

186 Cf. *kalpanāpratiśedhāc ca jñānasya sāmānyalabdhatvāt... jñānam iti noktam* (449, 14-16). “Since [perception’s identity as] a cognition is (syntactically) implied through the denial of conception (*kalpanā*)... we do not have to employ the word ‘cognition.’” Cf. also *nanu ca kalpanā jñānadharmaḥ*. ... (451, 24) “Isn’t it the case that conception is a property of cognition...”

187 *parāparamata*- MK [cf. Tib. *bdag dan gzan gyi gzuñ* 30a7]; *paramata*- S (456, 25).

188 No equivalent exists for *yad vā* in the Tibetan.

189 *svamata*- (457, 12); *rañ* [P: om. D] *gzuñ* (30a8).

190 For the *pratīka*, *yad vetyādi* (457, 12-13), the Tibetan reads ... *źes ston pa ni* [P: / added D] *yañ na gañ gis* [P: yin D] *źes bya ba’i* [P: // added D] ... (30a8), *ādi* omitted.

words operate the exclusion of others (*anyāpohakṛt*).¹⁹¹ By this [analysis of the compound, it is proved that the master Dignāga] expressed the exclusion of a genus, etc.

// TS 1237 //¹⁹²

[The compound is] analyzed as follows: “Qualification” (means) differentiation in the sense of exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*). A “designation,” (i.e., a word,) is concerned with this (differentiation) and not with a genus, etc. A “false attribution of non-differentiation” (means the attribution) regarding that (designation).¹⁹³

(M 152b4; S 457, 15; K 373, 13; P 30b1; D 6a1)

(Opponent:) Isn’t it the case that if conception is association with an expression that (conception) is a property-possessor (*dharmin*) and a property-possessor, [i.e., conception,] cannot be attached (*prasaṅga*) to yet another property-possessor,¹⁹⁴ [i.e., cognition,]¹⁹⁵ so that (your) statement — “The negation of that [conception] is made in terms of [its] being a property of that [direct perception as cognition]” — is in vain (*asambandhābhīdhāna*)? Likewise, if direct perception is free from conception, how can it be expressed by the word “direct perception”?

In this way other teachers such as Bharga and Bhāradvāja¹⁹⁶ who consider

191 The source is PS V 11d: *tenānyāpohakṛc chrutiḥ*. For its citations see Hattori 1982: 115 n. 17; and TS 909.

192 M 62b4-5: *yad vā viśeṣaṇaṃ bhedo yenānyāpohakṛc chrutiḥ / jātyādīnāṃ vyavacchedam anena ca karoty ayaṃ* // Tib. P 56a6-7; D 45b7-46a1: *yañ na gžan sel byas pa'i sgra // ldog pas tha dad byas pa yin // 'dir ni rigs la sogs pa rnam // rnam par bcad pa 'di mdzad do* //.

193 According to this second interpretation, each part of the compound, i.e., *viśeṣaṇa* and *abhidhāyaka*, and further, *viśeṣaṇābhīdhāyaka* and *abhedopacāra*, is connected as a *tatpuruṣa* in a genitive relation.

194 *na ca dharmyantare dharmyantarasya prasaṅgaḥ* (457, 15-16). Cf. Tib. 30b2: *chos can gžan du thal bar 'gyur ba yañ ma yin no* //; i.e., either of *dharmyantara-* is omitted.

195 That is, cognition (*jñāna*; identical to *pratīti*) would be a property-possessor (*dharmin*) which conception belongs to, and further, that conception would also be a second property-possessor with relation to an expression because it is considered by Dharmakīrti to be “cognition having an expression” (*abhilāpini pratītiḥ*) with the suffix *-in*. Although the context is not the same as in TSP, the idea that conception is a property-possessor with *abhilāpasamsargayogyapratibhāsa-* as a property is found in PVinT 49b7-50a3 (cf. also DhPr 54, 20-25; mentioned with Jap. tr. in Yaita 1984: 34).

196 *bhargabhāradvāja*-KS (457, 18); *bhartrbhāradvāja*-M. There is an additional remark regarding *bhartr* in the margin of M which mentions the reading *bharga*. Cf. Tib. 30b3: *bha* [D: *bhra* (?) P] *tre dan bha ra dhva dza*. This supports the reading of M.

It is certain that Bhāradvāja means Uddyotakara (see, e.g., the colophone of NV: *śrīparamarṣi-Bhāradvāja-Pāsupatīcārya-śrīmad-Uddyotakarakṛtau*...). The other teacher referred to by the name *bhartr* or *bharga* is not clear. ↗

that being free from conception means non-expressible criticize (our opinion).¹⁹⁷

(In order to) construe (these censures to the effect) that all are shunned, (the

↘ The reading *bhartr* seems to have been kept in some later period. TSop 277, 13-22: *etena yad uktam Ud[yotakareṇa^a: yadi pratyakṣaśabdena pratyakṣam abhidhīyate, katham tat kalpanāpodham. atha kalpanāpodham, katham pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham ity anena śabdenocyata iti^b. yad api Bhartṛhariṇoktam: kalpanā hi jñānam, pratyakṣam api jñānam. pratyakṣajñāne kalpanājñānam pratiśedhatānyasmin jñāne jñānantaram astīti^c pratipāditam. pratipūrvakā hi pratiśedhā bhavantīti nyāyād iti. tat sarvam apāstam. tādātmyapratīśedhasyātrābhimatatvāt*. “By this [definition of direct perception formulated by Dharmakīrti, the following] statement of Uddyotakara [is rejected:] If direct perception is designated by the word ‘direct perception,’ how it that (direct perception) is free from conception? If it is free from conception, how (can) it be stated by the words ‘direct perception is free from conception?’ Also, Bhartṛhari’s statement [is rejected:] Conception is indeed cognition, and direct perception is also cognition. It is shown by (the person) who negates conception, as cognition, in direct perception, as cognition, that there is a cognition in yet another cognition, for negations, logically speaking, presuppose attainment of (what is to be negated). All are rejected because what is meant here by (Dignāga) is the negation of the identity [of direct perception with conception].” This suggests that the reading *bhartr* is understood by the author Vidyākaraśānti in the sense of Bhartṛhari as the proponent of the first objection in TSP. However, this reading is problematic in the following points: First, the omitted notation “Bhartr” for Bhartṛhari has not been attested elsewhere; second, the above stated idea is not found in VP; and last, it is not likely that Bhartṛhari who lived before Dignāga would have made an objection to Buddhist view of conception, to say nothing of the direct objection to Dharmakīrti’s definition.^d

^a For Uddyotakara’s original expression see n. 197.

^b Cf. TSP 457, 16-17: *yadi pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham, katham tat pratyakṣaśabdenocyata iti*.

^c Cf. TSP 457, 15-16: *nanu ca yadi pratītir abhilāpini kalpanā, sā dharmiṇī. na ca dharmyantare dharmyantarasya prasāṅgaḥ*.

^d This problem may be solved when the word *-prabhṛtayaḥ* is taken in the sense of “the followers of Bhartṛhari.” However, I have not found such a reference to Buddhism in the texts of the Vaiyākaraṇa school.

197 NV₁ 130, 6-132, 7 ; NV₂ 207, 21-208, 4. In particular, see the following: *atha pratyakṣaśabdena ko ’rtho ’bhīdhīyata iti. yadi pratyakṣam, katham avācyam. atha na pratyakṣam, avācakaś tarhi pratyakṣaśabdaḥ. . . . kalpanāpodhaśabdenāpi yadi pratyakṣam ucyate, tadā vyāghātaḥ. atha nocyate, tathāpi kalpanāpodhoccāraṇam* [NV₂: *kalpanāpodhavadānam* NV₁] *vyartham. pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham iti ca vākyam. athāśya vākyasya ko ’rthaḥ. yadi pratyakṣam, vyāghātaḥ. katham. pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham iti cānena vākyenābhīdhīyate, na cābhīdheyam iti ko ’nyo bhadantād vaktum arhati. atha na pratyakṣam asyārthaḥ, varnoccāraṇamātram tarhy etad vākyam pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham iti*. “Now, what object is denoted by the words ‘direct perception’ [in Dignāga’s definition]? If it is direct perception, why can it be unexpressed?; and if, (on the contrary,) it is not direct perception, then the word ‘direct perception’ is unexpressive. . . . If direct perception is denoted by the words ‘free from conception,’ then it is a contradiction; and if, (on the contrary,) it is not denoted, even in that case the utterance of the word ‘free from conception’ is meaningless. [Buddhists might think of another possibility:] the sentence ‘Direct perception is free from conception.’ Now, what is the object of this sentence? If it is direct perception, it is a contradiction. Why? [Direct perception] is denoted by the sentence ‘Direct perception is free from conception’ [according to this assumption] but [on the other hand — according to their definition —] it cannot be denoted. Who can maintain (such a contradictory) statement except Buddhists!? If, (on the contrary,) direct perception is not the object of this (sentence), then the sentence ‘Direct perception is free from conception’ is only words.” This passage is referred to also in DhPr 42, 10-17.

master) states:

When (*yadā*!) conception is in this way considered [by us] as essentially such cognition (*evampratītirūpā*!), [i.e., as associated with an expression,] and the negation of the identity of direct perception [with conception] is stated [by Dignāga] [1238], then (*tadā*), even if that (direct perception) is expressed by the words “direct perception” (*adhyakṣa*), etc., it is not irreconcilable with the absence of conception in direct perception, for that (conception) does not (mean) that it is expressed by words [1239]. Otherwise it would follow that (even) colors, smells, and the like were conceptual.¹⁹⁸ This is why what was said by other, dull-minded (teachers) is not to the point [1240]. (Opponent:) If direct perception is designated by the word “direct perception,” why is it free from conception? (Answer:) Not being designated (*anuktaṃ*!) (by the word “perception”), how does one cognize it?

// TS 1238-41 //¹⁹⁹

198 That is, it would follow as an undesirable conclusion that — although colors, smells, as well as other objects of the sense organs, are materials and not of a conceptional character — once a person mentioned them by words, they would be attributed with a conceptional character.

199 M 62b5-63a2: *evampratītirūpā*^a *ca yadaivam*^b *kalpanā matā / tādātmyapratīṣedhaś ca pratyakṣasyopavarṇyate* // [1238]; *tadādhyakṣādisabdena vācyaṭve 'pi na bādhyate/kalpanāviraho 'dhyakṣe na hi sā śabdavācyaṭā* // [1239]; *anyathā rūpagandhādeḥ savikalpakatā bhavet / ato nāspadam evedaṃ yad āhuḥ kudhiyaḥ pare* // [1240]; *yadī pratyakṣāśabdena pratyakṣam abhidhīyate / katham tat kalpanāpoḍham anumuktaṃ*^c *gamyate katham* // [1241]. Tib. (!) P 56a7-8; D 46a1-2: *de lta'i śes pa'i no bo nīd* // *'di la*^d *gañ tshe*^e *rtoḡ* [P: *rtogs* D] *par 'dod* // *de yi bdag nīd dgag pa yañ* [P: *yi* D] // *mñon sum nīd du ñe bar brjod* // [1238]; *de tshe śiñ*^f *la sogs pa'i sgras* // *brjod bya śiñ sogs sgra de yis*^g // *rtoḡ pa dañ bral la gnod min* // [1239]^h; *gžan du gzugs sgra*ⁱ *la sogs pa* // *rtoḡ pa dañ bcas nīd du 'gyur* // [1240ab]^j; *gal te mñon sum źes bya'i sgra* // [1241a]^k. The Tibetan is full of problematic translations and corruptions. However, there is one point worth noticing: *gañ tshe* in 1238b. This suggests that *yadaivam* is a better reading than *yad evam*, because *yadā* is quite effectively correlated with *tadā* (*de tshe*) in 1239a, while *yad* has no relating element.

^a *evampratītirūpā* : *evam* *pratītirūpā* K: *evam* *pratītirūpā* S.

^b *yadaivam* [corr.]: *yad evam* MKS.

^c *anuktaṃ* M: *ayuktaṃ* KS.

^d *'di la* (“here” instead of *evam*) is not clear.

^e *gañ tshe*, i.e., *yadā*.

^f *śiñ*, i.e., *vrkṣa*, instead of *adhyakṣa*.

^g *śiñ sogs sgra de yis* instead of *adhyakṣe*.

^h No translation of Skt. 1239d.

ⁱ *sgra*, i.e., *śabda*, instead of *gandha*.

^j No translation of 1240cd.

^k No translation of 1241b-d.

The negation of identity (means as follows): By the sentence “That in which there is no such conception is (called) direct perception,”²⁰⁰ the author of the definition (Dignāga) negates the identity [of direct perception with conception]. That is to say, (Dignāga meant) that such a kind of cognition which is essentially conception is not (direct perception), and he did not (intend) the negation of what is contained (*ādheya*) (in cognition,) [viz., direct perception’s cognition-hood]. Therefore the first point at issue, above all, should not be criticized.

The second point at issue should certainly not be criticized either for it was not stated (by Dignāga) that the meaning of being free from conception is [the same as] the meaning of not being expressible, but that (being free from conception) means being devoid of conception. Even if cognition which is devoid of conception is designated by words²⁰¹ as a result of verbal ascertainment (*adhyavasāyānurodhāt*), there is nevertheless no conception-hood in (direct perception) just as in colors, etc. This is a mere trifle.

(M 153a1; S 458, 11; K 374, 5; P 30b8; D 6b1)

One might ask (the following): Let conception thus be as explained above. But how is (direct perception)²⁰² established as free from conception?

(In order to answer this, the master) states:

Direct perception is quite vividly cognized to be free from conception because even (a person whose) mind is engaged in other [objects such as past affairs]²⁰³ cognizes blue, etc., with his sense organs.

// TS 1242 //²⁰⁴

200 *yatraiśā kalpanā nāsti tat pratyakṣam* (457, 20) is a citation from PSV on PS I 3d. See Jambuvijaya 1966: 102 n. 4; and Hattori 1968: 86 n. 1. 30. See also n. 7 above.

201 *avikalpakam api jñānam yady apy abhidhīyate śabdenādhyavasāyānurodhāt* (457, 24). Cf. Tib. 30b7: *gal te yañ rtog pa med par* [D: *pas P*] *śes bya ba'i śes pa* [P: *rab D*] *mñon par žen pa'i nor byas nas sgras brjod pa*; i.e., Tib. has *avikalpakam iti* instead of *avikalpakam api* and *śabdena* is correlated with *abhidhīyate* and not with *adhyavasāyānurodhāt*.

202 *kalpanāpōḍham tu katham siddham* (458, 11). Cf. Tib. 30b8: *śes pa ci ltar rtog pa dan bral bar 'gyur ze na* //; i.e., *jñānam* added.

203 The expression *anyatrāsaktamanasāpy akṣair nīlādivedanāt* // is based on PV III 175ab: *anyatragatacitto 'pi cakṣuṣā rūpam īkṣate* /. Cf. Manorathanandin's commentary on *anyatra*: *drśyamānād arthād anyatrātītādau vikalpanīye* (PVV (M) 171, 14). Cf. PV III 519c (*anyārthāsaktiviguṇe*); and TS 730a (*anyatragataciittasya*).

204 M 63a2: *pratyakṣam kalpanāpōḍham vedyate 'tiparisphuṭam / anyatrāsaktamanasāpy akṣair nīlādivedanāt* //. Tib. P 56a8–b1; D 46a2: *mñon sum rtog pa dan bral bar* // *śin tu gsal bar śes bya ste* // *sems ni gžan du kun žen kyan* // *dbañ rten sñon por rtogs phyir ro* //. Jap. tr. in Tosaki 1979a: 275 n. 174.

By this (passage the master) shows that absence of conception is established by means of direct perception in the sense of self-cognition.²⁰⁵

(M 153a1; S 458, 14; K 374, 10; P 31a1; D 6b2)

One might object as follows:²⁰⁶ This same conception which is engaged in other objects cognizes the blue, etc., which is right before one's eyes.²⁰⁷

(In order to answer this, the master) states:

This same conception (which is engaged in other objects) certainly does not cognize the object (which is before one's eyes) because (if it did,) it would then attain the connection of a name with that (object right before one's eyes) by abandoning the name of (its previous object) such as something in the past.

// TS 1243 //²⁰⁸

If the same conception cognized that object (before one's eyes), then, abandoning the designation of (its previous) object such as the past, (the conception) would connect the name of just that (object before one's eyes), such as blue, because it cannot be conceived that two expressions²⁰⁹ are conjoined in one and the same [conception], (as the master) states, "... **by abandoning the name of (its previous object) such as something in the past.**"

The name of that (means) the name of that which is right before one's eyes; **the connection** (*ghaṭaṇā*) **of which** (means) connection (*yojanā*); **attainment** (*āpti*) of which (means) acquirement (*prāpti*).²¹⁰ (This should be understood) in

205 Cf. Tib. 'dis ni rañ rig pa'i mñon sum gyis rtog pa dañ bral bar gyur pa yin no (31a1) for *anena svasaṃvittiyā* (instr.) *pratyakṣataḥ* (abl.) *kalpanāvirahaḥ* (458, 12). For the word *kalpanāviraha* see n. 228.

206 *syād etat* (458, 14); 'di sñam du ... sñam du sems na / [D: sems na / sems na P (for sems na /)] (31a1-2).

207 *purovasthaṃ* MS (458, 14) [cf. Tib. *mdun na gnas pa*]: *purasthaṃ* K. A similar expression, *purovasthitam*, is found in TSP 298, 20; and PVSVT 345, 8.

208 M 63a2-3: *nāsāv eva vikalpo hi tam arthaṃ pratipadyate / atītādyabhīdhātīyāgāt tan-nāmaghaṭanāptiḥ* //. Tib. P 56b1-2; D 46a2-3: *rnam par rtog pa 'di ñid ni // don de rtogs par byed pa yin^a // 'das pa la sogs miñ btañ* [D: *gtañ* P] *nas // de yi miñ gis sbyor byed 'thob* //. The Tib. *pratīka* for *pāda* c reads 'das pa la sogs pa'i brjod pa 'gags [P: 'gag D] pa (31a4), **atītādyabhīdhātīyāga* (an ablative case-ending omitted). Jap. tr. in Tosaki 1979a: 275 n. 174.

^a Tib. *yin* deviates from Skt. negative *na*.

209 Cf. Tib. *gcig la brjod pa* [corr.: *pas* PD] *gnis dan 'dres par rtog pa med pa'i phyir* (31a3) for *ekatrābhilāpadvayasamsargāpratīteḥ* (458, 16-17).

210 Cf. Tib. *de sbyor ba na* [PD; corrupt for *ni* (?)] *bsre ba ste der 'gyur ba ni thobs ste* (31a4) for /

the sense of *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga*).

(M 153a2; S 458, 19; K 374, 18; P 31a5; D 6b4)

One might think (the following): (If that is the case,) then²¹¹ why is this not understood: that yet another conception [which is completely different from the one which cognizes other objects] cognizes at that time that object (such as the blue which is before one's eyes)?

(In order to answer this, the master) states:

At that time there is no further conception which is connected with the name of that (object before one's eyes), because (such a different conception, which would have to be) perceptible, is not cognized and because two (conceptions) in simultaneity are not maintained.

// TS 1244 //²¹²

By this (passage the master) states that there are respectively (two fallacies): a contradiction with direct perception (*pratyaṅkṣavirodha*) and a contradiction with doctrinal agreement (*abhyūpagamavirodha*) on the assumption of two conceptions in simultaneity (*sakṛdvikalpadvayapratijñā*).²¹³ (The word) **two** (should be) supplied with “conceptions.”²¹⁴

↘ *tasya ghaṭanā yojanā, tasyā āptiḥ prātiḥ* (458, 18).

211 *tarhi* (458, 19); omitted in the Tibetan.

212 M 63a3-4: *tadā tannāmasaṃsargī vikalpo 'sty aparo na ca / drśyasyāpratisaṃvitter an-iṣṭeś ca dvayoḥ sakṛt* //. Tib. P 56b2; D 46a3: *de tshe min dan don 'dres pas // rnam rtog la yod gžan du min // snān ba so sor ma dmigs pas // cig car gñis snān bar mi 'dod* //. Jap. tr. in Tosaki 1979a: 275 n. 174.

213 The expression is based on PV III 178ab: *tayaivānubhave drṣṭam na vikalpadvayaṃ sakṛt* /. “When [a form and its cognition] are directly experienced by that (cognition of the form) itself, the (opponent's) assumption of two cognitions in simultaneity is not experienced.” In reference to this Kamalaśīla explains here the same idea more minutely by indicating the two fallacies, i.e., *pratyaṅkṣavirodha* and *abhyūpagamavirodha*, in the assumption that there are simultaneously two different conceptions in one mind (*sakṛdvikalpadvayapratijñā*). Cf. PVV (M) 172, 7-8 (on PV III 178ab): *tayaiva rūpabuddhyā rūpasya svātmanas cānubhave 'bhyūpagamāyāne, rūpaṃ iti rūpānubhava iti ca vikalpadvayaṃ sakṛt syāt. tac ca nāsty, anubhavabādhitatvāt*. “If a form and the own essence (of that form) are assumed to be ‘directly experienced’ by ‘that’ cognition of the form ‘itself,’ ‘there would be two kinds of conception,’ i.e., ‘This is a form.’ and ‘This is a direct experience of the form.’ However, they do not exist because they are negated by actual experience.”

214 *sakṛdvikalpadvayapratijñāyām āha. dvayor iti vikalpayor iti śeṣaḥ*. Cf. *āha — dvayor iti. vikalpayor iti śeṣaḥ* KS (458, 21-22) (concerning the punctuation). Tib. 31a5-7: *rnam par rtog pa gñis cig car 'byun ba ... bśad do // gñis zes bya ba la rnam par rtog par zes bya ba lhag ma'o* //.

(M 153a3; S 458, 23; K 374, 24; P 31a7; D 6b6)

By the (following verse the master) summarizes:

[Sense cognition] is thus directly experienced in coexistence with a conceptual mental cognition (*vikalpapakamanojñāna*!). Therefore it is evident that sense-perception is devoid of conception.

// TS 1245 //²¹⁵

(M 153a3; S 458, 24; K 374, 27; P 31a7; D 6b6)

Another (teacher)²¹⁶ might state on some occasion²¹⁷ that the simultaneous

215 M 63a4: *vikalpapakamanojñānasahabhāvy^a anubhūyate / tasmād indriyavijñānam akalpanam idaṃ sphuṭam* // . Tib. P 56b2-3; D 46a3-4: *rtoḡ [D: rtogs P] bcas yid kyi rnam śes dan* // *lhan cig 'byuñ bar śes byas te* // *de phyir dbaṅ po'i śes pa 'di* // *rtoḡ pa med par gsal* [D: bsaP] *ba yin* // . Cf. Jap. tr. in Tosaki 1979a: 275 n. 174.

^a *vikalpapakamanojñānasahabhāvy* M: *vikalpakam ato jñānasahabhāvy* KS.

216 The gist of the opponent's opinion is that cognitions are falsely conceived to be simultaneous because they rapidly occur one after another as in the case of a fire-brand. Śāntarākṣita's analogy is not original but is based on PV III 133^a, which means that the real opponent flourished before Dharmakīrti. It is hard to attribute this idea to one definite school. The reason is that the idea itself is not of a special kind but is rather common to several schools which claim that cognitions arise not simultaneously but successively. For instance, as pointed out by Oki (1973: 90) and by Ichigō (1985a: 84), a similar idea is found in AMV (64a18-20)^b as propounded by the Sarvāstivādin Vasumitra. Further, the opponent introduced in MA 24^c, which is parallel to TS in question here is referred to as some Sautrāntika in BSGT^d. The idea that cognitions occur not simultaneously but only successively is traced in NS^e and VS^f too.

^a PV III 133: *manasor yugapadvṛtteḥ savikalpāvikalpayoḥ / vimūḍho laghuvṛtter vā tayor aikyam vyavasyati* // . "Because conceptual cognition and non-conceptual cognition occur simultaneously — alternatively, because they occur quickly — a dull-minded person regards them as one." The former alternative is expressed from Dharmakīrti's own standpoint and the latter is the opponent's idea.

^b AMV 64a18-20: 尊者世友曰。非一眼識頓取多色生。速疾故。非俱謂俱。是增上慢。如旋火輪。非輪謂輪。是增上慢。 "Ācārya Vasumitra states as follows: It is not the case that a single eye-cognition occurs from grasping numerous forms simultaneously. Because of its rapidity, however, one regards what is non-simultaneous as simultaneous; this is a false cognition (**abhimāna*) as a fire-brand (**alātacakra*), which (because of rapidity) is regarded as a wheel when it is not a wheel, is a false cognition." Vasumitra expresses the same idea regarding ear-, nose- and tongue-perceptions (AMV 64c3-5; c16; and c27). A similar discussion is found in AKBh 33, 8-10 and AKV 85, 27-31.

^c MA 24: *dkar po dag la sogs pa la // śes pa de ni rim 'byuñ ste // mgyogs par 'byuñ phyir blun po dag // cig car sñam du śes pa yin* // . Eng. tr. in Ichigō 1985a: CXXXVII. Jap. tr. in Ichigō 1985b: 134; and Yamaguchi 1991: 26.

^d BSGT 199, 15-21: *gžan dag ni khra bo lta bu sna tshogs su snañ ba'i śes pa ni rim can mgyogs pa kho nar 'dod de / ji skad du / dkar po dag la sogs pa la // śes pa de ni rim 'byuñ ste // mgyogs par 'byuñ phyir blun po dag // cig car sñam du śes pa yin // źes dBu ma rgyan las 'byuñ ba bžin no* // . Fr. tr. in Mimaki 1980: 152. Matsumoto (1978: 165) points out that the opponent in the same MA 24 is regarded by Darmarīnchen as the specific Sautrāntika called *sGo na phyed tshal pa*. Cf. Fukuda 1987: 3.

^e NS 3. 2. 56-58: *jñānāyauḡapadyād ekam manañ. na, yugapad anekakriyopalaḡdheḡ. alāta-cakradarśanavat tadupalaḡdhir āśusaḡcārāt*. "There is (only) one mind (in a body) because cognitions ↗

occurrence (of sense-perception) with conception is not established. Therefore, assuming this (idea, the master) states:

One might suppose that (these) cognitions occur only successively.

// TS 1246ab //²¹⁸

(But) if (cognitions) occur successively, (as assumed by the opponent), why are they²¹⁹ cognized simultaneously? (In order to explain this point, the master) states (the opponent's position):²²⁰

But the misconception of their simultaneous occurrence (*sakṛd-bhāvābhimāna*) (results) from their rapid occurrence, similar to [the cognition of a Catherine wheel with regard to] a fire-brand.

// TS 1246cd //²²¹

Similar to a fire-brand (*alātavat*) (means) as in the case of a fire-brand (*alāta iva*).²²² In the same way as there is in the case of a fire-brand, due to its rapid movement, a cognition of the form of a simultaneous Catherine wheel as a result of

↘ arise non-simultaneously. (Objection:) That is not the case, because many (cognitive) actions arise simultaneously. (Answer:) They are cognized so because they come about rapidly as in the case of a fire-brand." NBh 898, 2-3: *tathā buddhīnām kriyānām cāsvūrttitvād vidyamānaḥ kramo na grhyate, kramasyāgrahanād yugapat kriyā bhavantīti abhimāno bhavati*. "(As in the case of a Catherine wheel) since cognitions and [their] actions arise rapidly, their real sequential order is not cognized (and consequently) because of the non-cognition of the sequential order the misconception comes about that there are actions in simultaneity." Further, in a series of discussions of PV III 133-140, PV III 136 is commented upon by Vibhūticandra as a refutation to NS 1. 1. 16 (*yugapajjñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam*). See Tosaki 1979a: 219 n. 38.

¹ VS 3. 2. 3: *prayatnāyugapadyāj jñānāyugapadyāc caikam manah*. "There is (only) one mind (in a body) because efforts are made non-simultaneously and because cognitions arise non-simultaneously." Cf. PBh 89, 13-14.

217 The exact meaning of "on some occasion" (*kadācit*) is not clear.

218 M 63a4 - 5: *krameṇaivopajāyante vijñānānīti cen matam / sakṛdbhāvābhimānas tu śighravṛtter alātavat* // [1246a-d]. Tib. P 56b3-4; D 46a4: *rnam rtog rim gyis skye ba ñid // yin yan mgal me'i 'khor lo bzin // myur bar 'jug la cig car bar // mñon par sems pa yin ze na //*. For the Tib. *pratīka* for Skt. *pāda* cd see n. 220.

219 Cf. Tib. *ji ltar de cig car rig par 'gyur ze na* / (31a8) for *katham yugapat pravedyante* (458, 25).

220 Cf. Tib. *mgal me bzin du mgyogs par 'byuñ zes bya ba la sogs pa* (31a8); i.e., *ādi* is added.

221 The text is presented in n. 218.

222 Cf. Pāṇini 5. 1. 116: *tatra tasyeva*. "The affix *vati* comes also in the sense of 'like what is therein or thereof'" (in Vasu 1891: 889).

a connection between the cognitions of those (fires in successive moments),²²³ there is a misconception of simultaneous occurrence because of a rapid arising of cognitions.

Alternatively²²⁴ (one could interpret the example as follows): By the word **fire-brand** the cognitions which refer to that object (*viṣayin*) are expressed, because (the word) “object” (*viṣaya*) is metaphorically attributed to the cognitions which refer to that object.²²⁵ (In this case, too, the meaning of the suffix) *-vat* (*vatiḥ*) is the same as before.²²⁶

(M 153a4; S 459, 12; K 375, 7; P 31b3; D 7a2)

(By the following verse the master) refutes the (above) opponent’s view:

At the time [when the object before one’s eyes is cognized] a conception which is connected with the name of the entity (*-bhāvanāmānuṣaṅgavān*!) existing right before one’s eyes and which is perceptible (*dṛśya*) is not found. Therefore nothing at all was stated [by the opponent] in regard to this (issue).

// TS 1247 //²²⁷

The meaning of this verse is considered to be as follows: What constitutes the major topic (*prakṛta*) here is not a demonstration of simultaneous occurrence but

223 *taddarśanānām ghaṭanād* (459, 9). Cf. Tib. 31b1: *de la lta ba rnam sbyor ba ṅid kyi phyir ro* //; i.e., *eva* is added after *ghaṭnād*.

The expression is based on PV III 140d (from Dharmakīrti’s own standpoint): *na dṛśm̐ ghaṭnena s̐a* // . “[The erroneous cognition of a Catherine wheel] is not produced by the connection of perceptions.”

224 *atha vā* (459, 10); *rnam pa gcig tu na* (31b2).

225 This latter interpretation fits MAV 84, 17–19: *dper na mgal me’i khor lo mthoñ ba bžin te / mthoñ ba de ni myur du bskor ba’i phyir ro źes zer ro* // . “... For example, as in the case of perceiving a fire-brand, because those [— each momentary —] perceptions occur rapidly.”

226 Cf. Tib. 31b2: *gžan ni s̐a ma bžin no* // for *pūrvavad vatiḥ* (459, 11). “The other [element of the example, i.e., *-vat*,] is the same as before.”

227 M 63a5: *na tadābhimukhībhūtabhāvanāmānuṣaṅgavān^a / vikalpo vidyate dṛśya ity atroktaṃ na kiṃcana^b* // . Tib. (!) P 56b4; D 46a4–5: *ma yin^c de tshe mñon gyur pa’i // dños po min^d dan rjes ’brel bar // ldan pa’i rnam rtog snañ ba źes // ’di^e ni cuñ zad bstan pa med* // .

^a *bhāvanāmānuṣaṅgavān* MK: *°bhāvānām anuṣaṅgavān* S.

^b *atroktaṃ na kiṃcana* MS: *evoktaṃ na + + nā* K.

^c *ma yin* (wrongly translated as a negative answer to the opponent’s idea; cf. *že na* in Tib. 1246d) instead of *na* ... *vidyate* in skt.

^d Corrupt for *min* (*nāman*) (?)

^e Corrupt for *dir* (*atra*) (?)

the absence of conception from [direct] cognition (*dhiyaḥ kalpanāvirahaḥ*).²²⁸ Further,²²⁹ that (absence) is established by means of the non-perception of conception which is equipped with the conditions for perception (*upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta*)²³⁰ and which is connected with the name of that (object before one's eyes) at the time when even (a person whose) mind is engaged in other (objects) directly experiences the object which is right before him. Therefore no refutation has been presented (above) to this (establishment of simultaneous occurrence). That is to say, even if (the two) cognitions²³¹ were successively cognized, [as assumed by the opponent,] conception at least (*tu*)²³² would not be cognized. Therefore there is no impediment to the real topic (in the above objection).²³³

(M 153a5; S 459, 17; K 375, 15; P 31b5; D 7a4)

(In order to) show that even this false cognition of simultaneous occurrence (which the opponent assumes) is not erroneous, (the master) states:

[Further, the opponent's assumption of] the misconception of that (simultaneous occurrence) is an error and this (cognition of the object right before one's eyes) is vivid and without intervals; this same (cognition) is, moreover, a cognition of that object (*arthavijñānaṃ* !). Therefore (its) simultaneity [with the conception of another object] is evident.

// TS 1248 // ²³⁴

228 The expression is based on PVin I 50, 12-13: *yañ na dbaṅ po'i blo rtoḡ pa dañ bral bar sgrub par byed pa ni mñon sum ñid de* /. "Moreover, the absence of conception from sense-cognition is proved by the very direct perception." Cf. *pratyakṣasādhana evendriyadhiyaḥ kalpanāvirahaḥ* in Franco 1987: 459 n. 241 (identical to the above Tib. except *yañ na* but the construction is different). Cf. nn. 205 and 260.

229 *sa cānyatra*- MK: *sa ca anyatra*- S (459, 13).

230 Cf. NVV 524, 6: *na santi pratyakṣe kalpanāḥ, upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prātānām anupalambhāt, bhūta-le ghaṭavat*. "Conceptions do not exist in direct perception because those which are equipped with the conditions for perception are not perceived as in the case of a pot on the ground."

231 The exact meaning of *jñāne* (dual; 459, 15) is not clear. Cf. Tib. 31b5: *gal te ñes pa* [P: *par* D] *rim gyis rig* [D: *rigs* P] *par bya ba yin gyi*, where *ñes pa* is possibly corrupt for *śes pa* (*jñāna*).

232 Cf. Speijer 1886 (p. 373, Rem. 2) regarding the syntax of *yadi... tu* ("even if... at least").

233 *iti na prakṛtasya vyāghātaḥ* (459, 16); Tib. *śes bya ba'i skabs la gnod pa med do* // (31b5).

234 M 63a5-6: *bhrāntis tadabhimānaś ca tad vyaktaṃ ca niranantaram / tad eva cārtha-vijñānaṃ yaugapadyam^a ataḥ sphuṭam* //. Tib. (!) P 56b4-5; D 46a5: *'khrul pa'i mñon pa'i na rgyal de'añ^b // don gyi śes pa de ñid dañ // rgyun mi 'chad par lhan cig pa* [D: *par* P]^c // *de yi phyir na gsal ba yin* //.

The subject of the discussion should (syntactically) be connected as “There is no error.”²³⁵ (The compound) **misconception of that** is to be analyzed as the misconception of that simultaneous occurrence. [Generally speaking,] the establishment of erroneousness is made by means of a counter-proof (*bādhakapramāṇa*). In this case, however, there is no counter-evidence (*bādhaka*) through which an error would be (demonstrated). But why does it not exist? (In order to answer this, the master) states, “**and this is vivid and without intervals,**” [and so on.]²³⁶ **This**, i.e., the cognition of the object right before one’s eyes, is **without intervals** (*nirantaram*!)²³⁷ (and) vividly (*spaṣṭam*) perceived at the same time as when one’s mind is occupied with other objects,²³⁸ and²³⁹ **this very**, i.e., such a kind of,²⁴⁰ **cognition of the object** is called direct perception. Therefore how can it be an error?

(M 153a7; S 459, 23; K 375, 23; P 32a1; D 7a6)

Not only is there no evidence for the establishment of the erroneousness of simultaneous occurrence, there are even counter-evidences (against such erroneousness). (In order to show them the master) states:

In the state of seeing a dancer, etc., every (kind of cognition) is cognized simultaneously. [Regarding this, the opponent might assume (the following): It is experienced to be simultaneous] in spite of inter-

↘ ^a *cārthavijñānam yaugapadyam* [corr.]: *cārthavijñānayaugapadyam* MKS. The correction is based on TSP 259, 22: *tad eva cedṛśam arthavijñānam*.

^b Tib. *pratīka: de ni rlom pa yañ* (31b6; corrupt for *de'i rlom pa yañ*); *de'i* [P: *de ni* D] *rlom pa* (31b6).

^c Tib. *pratīka: de ni bar med par gsal te* (31b8).

235 What is meant here is that the simultaneous of sense-perception with conception (cf. 458, 24: *vikalpasahabhāvitva*) which is the subject of the discussion (*prakṛta*) and which the opponent claims to be “false cognition of simultaneous occurrence” (*sakṛdbhāvābhimāna*) is not an error.

236 This *pratīka* implies the subsequent *pādas*, too, in the sense of *tad vyaktam ca nirantaram ityādi*.

237 *nirantaram* [M: *nirantara*-KS (459, 21)] *viṣayā*. The reading of M is supported by Tib. 31b8: *bar med par ste* [P: / added D].

238 This passage is an explanation of *yaugapadyam* in 1248d; i.e., Kamalaśīla understands *yaugapadyam* in relation to *pāda* b (*tad vyaktam ca nirantaram*). Cf. Tib. 1248 in n. 234.

239 *ca* (459, 22); omitted in the Tibetan.

240 Cf. Tib. *de ñid snān ba'i don rnam par śes pa ni* (32a1); i.e., **tad eva dṛśyam arthavijñānam* (?) instead of *tad eva cedṛśam arthavijñānam* (459, 22).

ventions by manifold (sense-cognitions), and (hence) this (simultaneous cognition) is an error due to (their) rapid occurrence [1249].²⁴¹ [However, this idea is not tenable for the following reasons:]

1. There is (also) a rapid occurrence in cognitions of (sounds such as) *latā* and *tāla*, etc. Therefore, why doesn't a misconception of simultaneity occur in this case, too [1250]?
2. Also, when there are only purely mental conceptions, the sequence (of those conceptions) would not be determined.
3. Moreover, rapid occurrence would be equally true of all cognitions because they do not stay any length of time, and therefore it would follow that there is no recognition of sequential order with regard to any object.

[In reality, any object] appears to be cognized in simultaneity as, for example, in a cognition of sound, etc., [when a dancer is observed by eye-cognition] [1251–52].

// TS 1249–52 //²⁴²

241 I follow the reading of M (see n. 242) because it fits well with the Tibetan; another reading shown by Ga (see n. 242, a) does not make sense.^a The point of discussion is concerned with the words “in spite of interventions by manifold (sense-cognitions)” (*bahubhir vyavadhāne 'pi*; *pāda* c) which is expressed by the opponent. Śāntarakṣita does not maintain this idea. In the translation above, I take *pāda* ab as Śāntarakṣita's own statement but another interpretation is also possible, viz., taking the whole verse as the idea of the opponent: “(Objection:) In the state of seeing a dancer, etc., every (kind of cognition) is cognized simultaneously in spite of interventions by manifold (sense-cognitions), and (hence) this (simultaneous cognition) is an error due to (their) rapid occurrence.” The difference between the interpretations is caused by the words *vedyate sakrt* (*pāda* b; “be cognized simultaneously”); i.e., the words mean “to be [directly] cognized, [viz., directly perceived,] to be simultaneous” in the first interpretation as Śāntarakṣita's own idea, whereas the same words could be taken to mean “to be [wrongly] cognized, [viz., misunderstood by conception,] to be simultaneous” as the opponent's idea. I suppose that this double interpretation is possible — though it is strange — when Kamalaśīla's way of explanation (see n. 245) is taken into consideration.

^a The reading of Ga (see n. 242, a) would mean as follows: “In the state of seeing a dancer, etc., every (kind of cognition) is [directly] cognized simultaneously in spite of interventions by manifold (sense-cognitions). (Objection:) This (simultaneous cognition) is an error due to (their) rapid occurrence.” This leads to an unacceptable idea that the opponent's idea is expressed only in *pāda* d and, consequently, the words *bahubhir vyavadhāne 'pi* (*pāda* c) are expressed as Śāntarakṣita's own idea.

242 M 63a6: *nartakīḍṛṣṭyavasthādāv akhilam vedyate sakrt / bahubhir vyavadhāne 'pi bhrāntiḥ sā cāśuvṛttitaḥ* ^a // [1249]; *latātālādibuddhīnām atyarthaṃ laghuvartanam / sakṛd-bhāvā* ^b *bhimāno 'taḥ kim atrāpi na vartate* ^c // [1250]; *śuddhe ca mānase kalpe vyavasāyeta na kramah / tulyā* ^d *ca sarvabuddhīnām āśuvṛttiś cirāsthiteḥ* // [1251]; *ataḥ sarvatra* ✓

[According to the opponent's view the following should be maintained:] Although each (kind of) cognition is intervened by (any of the other) five kinds of cognitions in the state of seeing a dancer, etc. (*-ādi-*!),²⁴³ it appears as if²⁴⁴ it were not inter-

\\ *viṣaye na kramagrahaṇaṃ bhavet / sakṛdgrahaṇabhāsa tu bhavet chabādibodhavat* // [1252]. Tib. (!) P 56b5-8; D 46a5-b1: *gar mkhan la lta'i gnas skabs sogs // ma lus par ni cig car mthoñ // mañ po rnam kyis bar bcad kyañ // myur du 'jig pas de 'khrul pa'i^e //* [1249]; *lcug ma'i sgra^f la sogs rnam kyis^g // blo ni śin tu myur 'byuñ ba'i^h // 'di la'añ cig car 'byuñ ba yi* [D: the *pāda* om. P] *// na rgyal ci phyir 'byuñ mi 'gyur //* [1250]; *yid kyi rtog pa 'ba' zig la'añ // rim du nes par* [D: *pa* P] *bas byedⁱ min // blo rnam kun kyañ myur 'byuñ zin // riñ* [corr.: *rim* PD]^k *du gnas pa min par mtshuñs^l //* [1251]; *de phyir yul rnam thams cad la // rim gyis 'dzin par mi 'gyur gyi // sgra la sogs pa'i blo bzin du // cig car 'dzin par snañ bar 'gyur //* [1252].

TS 1249 is based on PV III 136 (see n. 244); and TS 1250 is based on PV III 135d (*varṇayor vā sakṛcchruṭiḥ*). The source of 1251ab is PV III 138cd: *śuddhe manovikalpe ca na kramagrahaṇaṃ bhavet* //. For Jap. tr. of TS 1249-51ab see Tosaki 1979a: 222 n. 43; and 224 n. 47. TS 1252c is based on PV III 197c (*sakṛdgrahāvabhāsaḥ*).

Further, TS 1250 is identical with MA 25: *lcug ma'i sgra la sogs pa'i blo // rab tu mgyogs par 'byuñ yin na // de phyir cig car 'byuñ ba'i blo // 'dir yañ ci phyir 'byuñ mi 'gyur //*; and TS 1251 is identical with MA 26: *yid kyi rtog pa 'ba' zig la'añ // rim du ses par mi 'gyur ro // riñ du gnas pa ma yin pas // blo rnam kun kyañ mgyogs 'byuñ 'dra //*. Also, Tib. 1252abd is identical word for word with MA 27abd: *de phyir yul rnam thams cad la // rim gyis 'dzin par mi 'gyur gyi // (rnam pa dag ni tha dad ltar //) cig car 'dzin par snañ bar 'gyur //*; i.e., the original Skt. MA27ab must be *ataḥ sarvatra viṣaye na kramagrahaṇaṃ bhavet* /, and MA 27d must be *sakṛdgrahaṇabhāsa tu bhavet* //. MA 27c is different from TS 1252c. Cf. Jap. tr. of MA 27 in Matsumoto 1986: 187.

^a *bhrāntiḥ sā cāśuvṛttitaḥ* MS: *bhrāntiś ced āśuvṛttitaḥ* Ga. For the examination of the latter reading see n. 241, a.

^b *bhāvā* MS: *bhavā* K.

^c *na vartate* KS: *nivartate* M (?).

^d *tulyā* MS: *alpā* K.

^e The meaning of the genitive is not clear.

^f

lcug ma'i sgra (i.e., **latāśabda*) for *latātāla*.

^g *kyis*, corrupt for *kyi* modifying *blo* (?).

^h The meaning of the genitive is not clear; corrupt for *'byuñ bas* (?).

ⁱ No translation of *ataḥ*.

^j The meaning of *bas byed* is not clear to me.

^k Corrected to *riñ* [: *rim*; for *cira*] by MA 26c above.

^l The reading *tulyā* [: *alpā* K] in Skt. 1251c is ascertained by this *mtshuñs* and by MA 26d (*'dra*) above.

243 *nartakīdarśanādy*[MK: *ādi*- om. S (460, 10)]*avasthāyām*.

244 *avyavahiteva pratibhāti* (460, 10). Cf. Tib. *bar ma chod pa ñid du snañ ste* (32a3); i.e., either **avyavahitaiva* or **avyavahitatvena*. I do not follow the Tibetan because it is evident from the context that Kamalāśīla owes the expression to PV III 136: *sakṛtsaṃgatasarvārtheṣv indriyeṣv iha satsv api / pañcabhir vyavadhāne 'pi bhāty avyavahiteva yā* //. "In this case [i.e., in the opponent's assumption that cognitions do not occur simultaneously, he would have to maintain that a sense cognition] manifests itself — in spite of interventions by (the rest of the) five (cognitions) — as if it were not intervened (by them) even when there were (all the six kinds of) sense organs at work, simultaneously accompanied by their respective objects."

vened. [However this is not tenable.]²⁴⁵ Namely, when one sees a dancer, at the very same time one hears a sound such as a song, enjoys a taste such as camphor-cake, smells a fragrance of a flower in front of one's nose, feels a touch such as fan wind, and thinks of a gift (for the dancer) such as a dress or an ornament. Therefore, if [— as is assumed by the opponent —] **in spite of interventions by manifold (sense cognitions)** an error of simultaneous occurrence of (sense) cognitions were generated due to their rapid arising, then [the following undesirable conclusions would follow]:

1. As there is a very rapid occurrence of hearing syllables (*varṇasruti*), for example, when one (hears words) like (-ādi!)²⁴⁶ **latā and tāla**, or *sara* and *rasa*,²⁴⁷ as a result of an intervention by each cognition,²⁴⁸ it would follow that the syllables appear (in the mind) simultaneously²⁴⁹ and consequently there would be neither a

245 TSP 459, 24-460, 10 (*ekaikā... pratibhāti*) is the assumption of the opponent's way explaining the example of seeing a dancer, etc., where the difference from Śāntarakṣita/Kamalaśīla's idea is expressed by the formulation... *vyavadhīyamānāpi... avyavahiteva pratibhāti*. The subsequent word in the text, *tathā hi*, is somewhat strange in usage: the explanation after *tathā hi* belongs not to the opponent's but to Śāntarakṣita/Kamalaśīla's own idea, and after this explanation Kamalaśīla refers to the opponent's idea again (460, 13: *tataś ca yadi bahubhir vyavadhāne 'pi*). I tentatively assume that the most possible interpretation of this syntax is that TS 1249ab provides room for the double interpretation which is suggested in n. 241.

246 *ity evamādāv* MK: *ity evamādāv* S (460, 14-15).

247 The same illustration is explained by Devendrabuddhi in the commentary on PV III 135d (n. 242) in PVP 201a4-6: *gal te myur bar 'jug pa'i phyir rnam par chad pa med par mgal* [D: 'gal P] *me'i 'khor lo la sogs pa la mthoñ ba la mtshams sbyor ba de'i tshe / mtsho 'jes bya ba de lta bu la sogs pa'i yi ge dag gi 'jug pa ches śin tu myur ba de ltar na / go rim med par 'dzin par 'gyur ro // de ltar na go rim tha dad pa las mñan pa tha dad par mi 'gyur te / dper na mtsho dañ ro 'je bya ba lta bu'o //*. "If [an opponent assumes that] because of rapid occurrence there is a connection (**pratisamdhāna*) in the perception of a fire-brand, etc., then there (must also be) a very rapid occurrence of (two) *varṇas* such as *rasa*, etc. In this case they would be recognized without sequential order. If this were the case, there would be no distinction in hearing (*mñan pa*) caused by a distinction in sequential order as, for example, in the case of *sara* and *rasa*." This reveals that there are two aspects in the illustration by *sara* and *rasa*: First, the opponent's assumption would lead to the undesirable consequence that there would be no sequential order in the two syllables, *sa* and *ra*,^a in the word *sara*, and they would be heard simultaneously; and second, as its result, there could be neither a phonetic nor semantic distinction between two different words such as *sara* and *rasa*.

^a The same example is used in PVSV in a different context where the *varṇas* of *sara* mean four phonemes (i.e., *s*, *a*, *r*, and *a*) in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the word *varṇa*. See PV I 301-302, especially PVSV 160, 19ff.; and Wakahara 1988: 12-13 (Jap. tr.); and 26 n. 30.

248 The meaning of this phrase (*ekaikajñānavyavadhānād* 460, 15) is not clear from the context.

249 This *prasaṅga* is expressed in terms of the former aspect of the example, i.e., the distinction of *sa* and *ra* (see n. 247).

distinction in hearing nor a distinction in apprehension of the (corresponding) objects (even) when words such as *sara* and *rasa* are heard.²⁵⁰

2. Further, when only pure (*śuddhe*!) conceptions in the form of pondering upon various objects (*nānāvidhārtha*!) are generated (successively in the mind) without any intervention by cognitions such as eye-cognition which are distinct (from pure conceptions), as there is a rapid occurrence,²⁵¹ there would be no determination of the sequence (of those conceptions).

3. Moreover, a rapid occurrence is true of all cognitions as they, being momentary, would not stay any length of time,²⁵² so that it would (even) follow that there would be no cognition in sequence for any object!

Like the cognition of sound, etc., (means) like a cognition of sound, etc., in the state of observing a dancer.

(M 153b2; S 460, 22; K 376, 17; P 32b1; D 7b5)

Further, (in order to) show that this example “like a fire-brand” is devoid of a probandum (*sādhayavikala*)²⁵³ (the master) states:

250 This further *prasaṅga* is related to the latter aspect of the example, i.e., the distinction between *sara* and *rasa* (see n. 247). The distinction in hearing (*śrutibheda*) means a phonetic difference between *sara* and *rasa*, whereas the distinction in apprehension of the (corresponding) objects (*arthapratītibheda*) means a semantical difference between the two words.

For *śrutibhedo 'rthapratītibhedaś ca na syāt* (460, 16), the Tibetan reads *thos pa tha dad pa'i rtog pa tha dad par mi 'gyur ro* // (32a6). “There would not be that distinction in cognition of the objects which is a distinction in hearing.”

251 *śuddhe* [cf. *suddhe* M^a: *buddher* KS] *viñātīyacakṣurādīvijñānāvyavahite nānāvidhārthacintārūpe* [M: *nānāvidyārthacintārūpe* KS] *vikalpe samutpadyamāne śighravṛttir iti* (460, 17-18). This reading is also supported by the Tibetan (32a7): *rigs mi mthun pa'i mig rnam par śes pa la sogs pas bar ma chod pa'i rnam pa du ma'i rten sems pa'i no bo'i rnam par rtog pa la 'ba' zig skye ba na*... Cf. also TS 1251a: *śuddhe ca mānase kalpe*.

The passage has a parallel in MAV 88, 5-7: *sems pa dan dpyod pa la sogs pa'i dus na*^b *'byun ba can rigs mi 'dra ba mig la sogs pa'i śes pa dan ma 'dres pa bar chad med pa 'byun ba yañ gsal bar*^b *mgyogs par 'byun na ci'i phyir cig car du mi śes*/. “When (conceptions) — which occur (in the mind) at the time when one considers or reflects, etc., not mixed with and intervened by (other) cognitions such as eye-cognition which are distinct (from those conceptions) — quite vividly occur in rapidity, why are they not cognized simultaneously?”

^a The scribe of TSP in M makes free use of *s*; in many cases he uses dental *s* for palatal *ś*.

^b Cf. TS 1216ab: *cintotprekṣādikāle ca vispaṣṭam yā pravedyate* /.

252 Cf. MAV 88, 9-10: *phra rol gyi lugs las kyañ rab tu myur du 'jig pa dan ldan pa'i blo rnam ni gañ yañ yun rin du gnas pa med do źes 'byun ste*/. “Even from the opponent's view, any cognitions which are of the character of perishing very rapidly do not last for any length of time.”

253 The syllogism intended here can be reconstructed from 1246 in the following way: Cognitions ↗

In the case of a fire-brand too, the error which simultaneously has the form of a wheel does not happen on account of a connection of (different) perceptions since it manifests itself vividly [1253]. That is to say, the connection is made only by recollection (*smṛti*) and not by (direct) perception (*darśana*) because past objects are not grasped by (direct) perception [1254] and the object of this (recollection) is not vivid because it is (already) utterly lost. Therefore it follows that [under the assumption by the opponent] this appearance of a wheel would not be vivid [1255].

// TS 1253-55 //²⁵⁴

The reason is as follows: It is not the case that an error by mental cognition (*mānasī bhrāntiḥ*) arises in connecting successive (*kramavartīni*!)²⁵⁵ (direct) cognitions. Then what (kind of error) is it? An error in the form of a wheel, which

which occur successively are wrongly conceived to be simultaneous because they occur quite rapidly as in the case of a fire-brand. The probandum of this syllogism is the wrong conception of simultaneity (*sakṛdbhāvābhimāna*) and it is further paraphrased by *mānasī bhrāntiḥ* ("an error by mental cognition" 460, 23; 461, 15). Kamalaśīla points out here that the example "as in the case of a fire-brand" is devoid of a probandum; i.e., it is a fallacious example where the concerned probans (*sādhana*dharmā, *hetu*) exists, but the probandum (*sādhya*dharmā) does not. As for the illustration of this fallacy, see NB III 124 and NBT 240, 6. Cf. also HTU 267, 21-22; TSop 307, 5-9; and NP 6, 4-7.

254 M 63b2-3: *alāte 'pi sakṛd bhrāntīś cakrābhāsā pravartate / na dr̥śām pratisamdhānād vispaṣṭaṃ pratibhāsanāt* // [1253]; *tathā hi pratisamdhānaṃ smṛtyaiva kriyate na tu / darśanena vyatītasya viśayasyānavagrahāt* // [1254]; *yaś cāsyā viśayo nāsau vinaṣṭatvāt parisphuṭaḥ / tataḥ parisphuṭo nāyaṃ cakrābhāsaḥ prasajyate* // [1255]. Tib. (!) P 56b8-57a2; D 46b1-2: *mgal me la yañ 'khrul pa yis^a // cig car 'khor lor snañ bar 'byuñ // gsal bar so sor snañ ba'i phyir // mthoñ bas mtshams sbyor ma yin no* // [1253]; *'di ltar mtshams rnam sbyor ba ni // dran par byed pas^b sbyor yin gyi* [D: *gyis* P] // *mthoñ bas min te 'das pa yi // yul dan 'dzin pa min phyir ro* // [1254]; *'di yi yul du gañ gyur pa // de ni 'zig pas* [P: *par* D] *gsal ma yin // de phyir 'khor lor snañ ba 'di // gsal ba min par 'gyur ba'i phyir^c* // [1255]. Jap. tr. of TS 1253-55 in Tosaki 1979a (p. 227, n. 53) where he points out that these three verses are similar in contents to PV III 140.

Cf. MA 28-30: *mgal me la yañ cig car du // 'khor lor snañ ba'i 'khrul ba 'byuñ // gsal bar rab tu snañ ba'i phyir // mthoñ ba'i mtshams sbyor ma yin no* // [28]; *'di ltar mtshams rnam sbyor ba ni // dran pas byed pa 'ñid yin gyi // mthoñ bas ma yin 'das pa yi // yul la 'dzin pa min phyir ro* // [29]; *de yi yul du gañ 'gyur ba // de ni 'zig pas gsal mayin // de phyir 'khor lor snañ ba 'di // gsal ba ma yin 'gyur ba'i rigs* // [30]. Among these, MA 28 is identical with TS 1253, and MA 29-30 has already been identified by Ichigō (1985a: 92) with TS 1254-55. Jap. tr. in Ichigō 1985b: 135-136 (vv. 27-30); and Yamaguchi 1991: 27-28 (vv. 28-30) and 53-54.

^a The meaning of this instrumental is not clear.

^b *dran par byed pas* for *smṛtyā* (?); *eva* omitted.

^c No equivalent exists for *phyir* in Skt.

255 *kramavartīni darśanāni* [corr.]: *kramavar(t)inī darśanāni* MKS (460, 23). The correction is already indicated by Tosaki (1979a: 227 n. 53) from the following Tib. 32b2: *'di ni rim pa dan ldan par mthoñ bar sbyor ba skye ba'i yid kyi 'khrul pa ni ma yin no* //.

simultaneously originates from the sense organs as a single unity,²⁵⁶ arises by means of a specific causal complex (*sāmagrīviśeṣabalāt*).²⁵⁷ [This error is not caused by mental cognition] because it manifests itself quite vividly, for, [as stated by Dharmakīrti,] (cognition) combined with conception cannot manifest itself vividly.²⁵⁸ **That is to say**, if a connection is made, it is (made) **only by recollection and not** by sense cognition because that (cognition) which occurs by force of closeness to something real is not efficient for recognizing past objects, **and the object of this recollection is not vivid — why? — because it is (already) utterly lost.** Therefore, because of the consequence that it would have a non-vivid image [of its object], this (cognition) is not a mental error. Then what is it?²⁵⁹ (It is an error) originating in the sense organs. Hence the example is devoid of a probandum.

(M 153b4; S 461, 17; K 377, 5; P 32b6; D 8a2)

After explaining in this way the absence of conception in cognition (*dhiyaḥ kalpanāvirahaḥ*) by means of direct perception,²⁶⁰ (the master) now explains it by means of inference:²⁶¹

256 It is not fully clear to me with which words “simultaneously” (*sakṛd*) and “as a single unity” (*ekaiva*) should be syntactically correlated. Cf. Tib. 32b2-3: *cig car dbaṅ po las skyes pa'i 'khor lo'i rnam pa can gyi 'khrul pa tshogs pa'i khyad par gyi stobs kyis gcig ṅid skye ba yin te /*.

257 Generally speaking, perception of a form (*rūpavijñāna*) is caused by the sense organ (*indriya*), object (*viśaya*), light (*āloka*), and attention (*manaskāra*). These four factors are the “causal complex” (*kāraṇasāmagrī*) for producing the perception. Cf. PVSV 41, 1.

In this context too, these four factors seem to be intended by the expression “a specific causal complex.” However, it is not clear what factor differentiates this “specific causal complex” which generates an *erroneous* cognition in the form of a Catherine wheel (*alātacakra*) from an ordinary “causal complex” which produces a *non-erroneous* perception. Kamalaśīla states that this erroneous cognition originates from the sense organ (*indriyaja*- 461, 11). According to Dharmottara, on the other hand, a rapid movement (*āśubhramaṇa*) illustrated by a fire-brand is a cause of erroneous cognition and is a cause which originates from the object (NBṬ 55, 3: *viśayagataṃ vibhramakāraṇam*) by which the very sense organ is injured (cf. NBṬ 55, 7: *sarvair eva ca vibhramakāraṇair indriyaviśayabāhyādhyātmikāśrayagatair indriyam eva vikartavyam*; PVinṬ 48a2: *mnyur du bskor ba ni dbaṅ po ṅams par byed pa'i rgyu yul la gnas pa'i bya ba'i khyad par ro //*; and Jap. tr. of the latter passage in Yaita 1984: 28).

258 *na hi vikalpānubaddhasya spaṣṭapratibhāsītvaṃ yuktam* (461, 12). Kamalaśīla paraphrases TS 1253d (*viśpaṣṭaṃ pratibhāsanāt*) in the preceding expression *viśpaṣṭapratibhāsanāt* (461, 11-12), and it is further reinforced here by the above expression based on PV III 283ab: *na vikalpānubaddhasya spaṣṭārthapratibhāsītā /* (for the interpretation of the verse see Tosaki 1979a: 377). The verse is also referred to in another location (485, 20).

259 For *kim tarhi* (461, 15) the Tibetan reads 'o na ci'i phyir ze na (32b5; “then why?”). Cf. *kim tarhi* (460, 23-461, 11); 'o na ci ze na (32b2).

260 *pratyaḥkṣataḥ* (461, 17); *mñon sum gyis* [D: *gyi* P] (32b6). For the words *dhiyaḥ kalpanāvirahaḥ* see n. 228.

261 *yadi vetyādi* M: *yadi cetyādi* KS (461, 18).

Furthermore, if (*yadi vā*!) there is in a certain entity (*yasya*!) no causal basis (*kāraṇa*) to ascertain a certain form, that (entity) is not ascertained as such by wise people [1256], as for example a white horse (*karka*), where there is no dewlap, etc., (is not established) as a cow; and in direct perception (*ākṣa*) there is no cognition of an object — as a causal basis (*nibandhana*) — qualified by qualifiers for ascertaining a conceptuality (*savikalpakabhāva*) [1257–58ab]. The (cows) *śābaleya*, etc., are heterogeneous examples. Otherwise, undesirable conclusions would follow [1258cd]. Moreover, the reason is not unestablished (*aprasiddha*) because (qualifiers) such as genus are negated (by us) and because (they are) not determined as different [from their substratum, even if it were assumed that genus, etc., are real entities,] and as such, [i.e., as not thus determined,] qualifiers do not exist²⁶² [1259].

// TS 1256–59 // ²⁶³

Syllogism: If there is no causal basis (*nimitta*) in a certain (entity) for ascertaining a certain form (*yadrūpavyavasthitau*!),²⁶⁴ that (entity) is not ascertained as such by

262 The translation of the *pāda* d follows the structure of Kamalaśīla's commentary: *pāda* c, *bhedena cāparicchedāt* (ablative clause), constitutes a second alternative reason for *pāda* a, on the one hand; *pāda* d, an independent sentence (!), follows as a direct consequence of *pāda* c, on the other.

263 M 63b3–6: *yadi vā yasya*^a *bhāvasya yadrūpasthitikāraṇam / na vidyate na tattvena sa vyavasthāpyate buddhaiḥ* // [1256]; *avidyamānasāsnādir yathā karko gavātmanā / viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇam*^b *na ca vidyate* // [1257]; *savikalpakabhāvasya sthiter ākṣe nibandhanam / vipakṣaḥ śābaleyādir anyathātiprasajyate* // [1258]; *na cāprasiddhatā hetor jātyādeḥ pratiśedhataḥ / bhedena cāparicchedān na cāsty evaṃ viśeṣaṇam* // [1259]. Tib. (!) P 57a2–5; D 46b2–4: *gžan yañ dños po gañ žig gyis // gañ gi ño bor bžag* [P: *gžag* D] *pa'i rgyu // med phyir*^c *de ni de ñid du // blo ldan rnams kyis gžag* [D: *bžag* P] *mi bya* // [1256]; *duñ dkar po la ba lañ gi* // [P: / PD] *rañ bžin lkog šal med sogs bžin // bye brag can dañ bye brag gi* // don dzin [P: *mdzad* D] *pa yañ med pa yin* // [1257]; *'di la*^d *rtog pa dañ bcas pa'i // dños por bžag* [P: *gžag* D] *pa'i rgyu mtshan med* // *ba khra po sogs mi mthun phyogs* // *gžan du ha can thal ches* [P: *chos* D] *'gyur* // [1258]; *rigs la sogs pa bkag pa yis*^e // *gtan tshigs ma grub pa ñid yin* // *dbye bas yons su ma bcad phyir*^f // *de bžin bye brag rnams kyañ med*^g // [1259].

^a *yadi vā yasya* M: *yadi cāpy asya* KS.

^b *-ārthagrahaṇam* MKS: *-ārtham grahaṇam* PaGa.

^c *phyir* looks superfluous; correlated with *yadi* (?)

^d *'di la* instead of (?) *ākṣe*.

^e Tib. *pratīka*: *rigs la sogs pa bkag pa'i phyir* (33a3).

^f Tib. *pratīka*: *tha dad du ni ma bcad phyir* (33a3–4).

^g Tib. *pratīka*: *de ltar khyad par yod ma yin* (33a4–5).

264 *yadrūpavyavasthitau*: *yadrūpaṃ vyavasthitau* KS (461, 18); M unclear. Cf. Tib. 32b6–7: *gañ gi ño bor rnam par bžag* [P: *gžag* D] *pa'i*.

the wise, as, for example, a white horse (*karka*) — where there is no aggregation of a hump, etc., as a causal basis for naming it cow — (is not ascertained) as a cow; and there is no cognition of that object — as causal basis — which is qualified by qualifiers as causal basis for ascertaining a conceptuality in direct perception which is generated due to its unique object such as blue. [This is a formulation using] a non-perception of the cause (*kāraṇānupalabdhi*) (as a logical reason).²⁶⁵

(Cows) like *śābaleya*, *bāhuleya*, etc., (serve) as heterogeneous (examples for the logical pervasion).

Furthermore, the following is the counter-evidence [against the contrary conclusion]: [If one did not admit the above stated pervasion, then] it would follow that any (entity) is ascertained in any form, and it would follow that someone who ascertains [a form of an entity] acts without preceding deliberation. That is the meaning of the condensed statement (*saṃkṣepārtha*)²⁶⁶ [in 1258d].

White horse (*karka*) (means) white horse (*śuklo śvaḥ*). The words “**such as a genus**” should be supplied with a “qualification²⁶⁷.”

Even if (opponents assume that) a genus, etc., should be real entities, [the reason] is still not unestablished (*asiddhatā*). Indicating this point (the master) states, “**and because (they are) not determined as different**,” which should be supplied with “[as different] from form, etc., which are assumed [by the opponents] as qualified²⁶⁸ [by qualifiers such as a genus.]”

(Opponent:) Even if a genus (*jāteḥ* !),²⁶⁹ [etc.,] is not determined as different, why doesn’t (the genus, etc.,) exist as²⁷⁰ a qualifier?

(In order to answer this, the master) states, “**and as such qualifiers do not exist**,” where **as such** (*evam iti* !)²⁷¹ (means as qualifiers) which are not determined as different. Therefore (the reason) “cognition of an object qualified by qualifiers”

265 This syllogism is examined again from TS 1264 onwards.

266 Cf. Tib. 33a2: *spyi'i don to* //; i.e., “general meaning” for *saṃkṣepārthaḥ* (461, 23).

267 Cf. Tib. 33a3: *rigs la sogs pa bkag pa'i phyir*, i.e., **jātyādeḥ pratiṣedhataḥ* instead of *jātyāder* (461, 24).

268 *viśeṣyatvena* (462, 11-12); *khyad par* [D: *pa P*] *ñid du* (33a4).

269 *bhedenāpariccheto jāteḥ* [corr.: *jātas* MK: *jātaḥ* S] (462, 12). Cf. Tib. 33a4: *rigs tha dad du ma bcad pa*.

270 Tib. *khyad par du* (33a4) for *viśeṣaṇam* (462, 12).

271 *na cāsty evaṃ viśeṣaṇam iti. evam iti bhedenāparicchinnam* [corr.: *na cāsty evam iti. bhedenāparicchinnam* MKS (462, 13). Cf. Tib. 33a4-5: *de ltar khyad par yod ma yin* [P: // added D] *zés bya ba smos te* / [D: / om. P] *de ltar zés bya ba ni* [P: ni om. D] *tha dad* [P: *sñad* D] *du ma bcad na'o* // [P: / D].

is not found [in direct perception].²⁷² Hence this reason is not unestablished.

(M 153b7; S 462, 15; K 377, 26; P 33a6; D 8a7)

²⁷³One might assume (the following): (An entity) such as a genus could never be a qualifier. However, the very nature of a word (*śabdasvarūpa*) itself (*eva*) will be a qualifier.

(Supposing this idea, the master) states:

Also, a name which is [assumed to be] the particular of a word (*śab-dasya svalakṣaṇam*) is never the signifier (*vācaka*) either, for (the ideas) that the [object-]particular is the signified and that [the word-particular] is the signifier have been refuted.²⁷⁴ Hence it is maintained that a signifier-signified [relation] (*vācyavācaka*) is only a falsely imputed thing.

// TS 1260-61ab //²⁷⁵

There is no verbal convention with regard to the [object-]particular²⁷⁶ nor is

272 That is, entities which are not cognized as distinct from their substratum cannot be other than that object; therefore, they are utterly nonexistent. This is a stock phrase which Buddhists very often express when they negate the reality of those entities which are considered to be unreal. For examples of this issue in the case of a whole (*avayavin*) see Funayama 1990: 611-612.

273 As is suggested by Stcherbatsky (1930: 23 n. 2), the subsequent discussion seems to be somehow related with the statements of Vinītadeva and Dharmottara. However, the real intention of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla with regard to their real opponent(s) on this issue is still not clear. As pointed out by Pind (1991) concerning *śabdāsāmānya* and *śabdaviśeṣa*, the idea that there is a signifier-signified relation between an individual signified object and an individual word had been already refuted by Dignāga. Hence the discussion of our authors may also be expressed from a general standpoint, not directed to real contemporary teachers. Cf. n. 50.

274 This refutation is originally maintained by Dignāga. See the following verse that Pind (1991: 269) considers to come from the *Sāmānyaparīkṣā*, a lost work of Dignāga: *nārthaśabdaviśeṣasya vācyavācakateṣyate / tasya pūrvam adṛṣṭatvāt sāmānyam tūpekṣyate* //. This idea was followed by Śāntarakṣita in the chapter *Śabdārthaparīkṣā* of TS. Cf. TS 871: *tatra svalakṣaṇam tāvan na śabdaiḥ prati-pādyate / samketavyavahārāptakālavṛtyāptiviyogataḥ* //; TS 1089: *na vācyam vācakam vāpi paramārthena kimcana / kṣaṇabhaṅgiṣu bhāveṣu vyāpakatvaviviyogataḥ* //; and TS 1092: *na hi teṣv asti sāmānyam vācyam tasya ca vācakam / na vācakam ca śabdasya kṣaṇabhaṅgi svalakṣaṇam* //.

275 M 63b6: *nāmāpi vācakam naiva yac chabdasya svalakṣaṇam / svalakṣaṇasya vācyavācakatve hi dūṣite* // [1260]; *adhyāropitam evāto vācyavācakam iṣyate* // [1261ab]. Tib. (!) P 57a5-6; D 46b4-5: *sgra yi raṅ gi mtshan ṅid gaṅ // miṅ yaṅ* [P: *daṅ* D] *rjod byed min pa ṅid // brjod bya raṅ gi mtshan ṅid daṅ // rjod byed ṅid kyaṅ sun bton te* // [1260]; *de phyir brjod bya rjod byed du* // 'dod pa de^a ni sgro btags yin // [1261ab].

^a No equivalent for *de* in the Sanskrit.

276 The word *svalakṣaṇe* (462, 16) is commented upon as “= *arthasvalakṣaṇe*” in the margin of M.

there in the word-particular (*śabdasvalakṣaṇa*)²⁷⁷ because neither continues (to exist) at the time of activities.²⁷⁸ Moreover, there is no other nature of a word which is beyond the particular; nor is it the case that an object free from verbal convention is connected with a word,²⁷⁹ because (this involves the fault of) over-extension (*atiprasaṅga*)^{279a}; nor is there a conception which is beyond the connection with a word.²⁸⁰ Therefore **a signifier-signified relation is only a falsely imputed thing** and not real.²⁸¹

(M 153b8; S 462, 20; K 378, 10; P 33b1; D 8b2)

One might assume the following: If this is the case, direct perception²⁸² in cognizing only a falsely imputed object will be conceptual.²⁸³

277 The word *śabdasvalakṣaṇa* corresponds to *śabdasya svalakṣaṇam* in TS 1260b. The word is used also by Dharmottara in an opponent's statement in NBT 52, 7-8: *śrotravijñānaṃ tarhi śabdasvalakṣaṇagrāhi. śabdasvalakṣaṇam ca kimcid vācyam kimcid vācakam^a ity abhilāpasamsargayogya-pratibhāsam syāt. tathā ca savikalpakam syāt*. "Then ear-cognition is that which grasps the word-particular. Further, the word-particular is the signified, on the one hand, and the signifier, on the other. Therefore (ear-cognition) must have the manifestation of what is capable of the connection with an expression. If that is the case, it must be conceptual."

^a The meaning of *kimcid vācyam kimcid vācakam* is illustrated in NBT 24, 4-5 by the word "pot" (*ghaṭaśabda*) and the word "word" (*śabdaśabda*). DhPr 53, 11-12 states that this double function of *śabdasvalakṣaṇa* is similar to that of a grammatical term "*gha*" (in Pāṇini 1. 1. 22: *taraptamaptaughah*; "The affix *tarap* and *tamap* are called *gha*" in Vasu 1891: 19) which signifies both affixes *tarap* and *tamap* at the same time.

278 The idea *tayor vyavaharakāle 'nanvayāt* (462, 17) is based on PV III 128ab: *ananvayād viśeṣānām samketasyāpravr̥ttitah* /. Cf. PVP 198a3-6 (also in Tosaki 1979a: 210 n. 23, with Jap. tr.) and PVin 96b5-6 regarding the syllogisms formulated by Devendrabuddhi and Dharmottara on this point.

279 *śabdena yojyate* (462, 18); *sgras* [D: *sgra* P] *sbyor ba* (33a8).

279a The following passage might be a reference to this idea: *svalakṣaṇasya vācyavācakabhāvapakṣe 'tiprasaṅgam āpādayati paraḥ* (NBT 24, 2).

280 *nāpi śabdajoyanam antareṇa vikalpaḥ* (462, 18-19). This statement presupposes that in Dignāga's definition of conception *nāmajātyādiyojanā* means *śabdajoyanā*, expressing the same content as Dharmakīrti's definition.

281 *na pāramārthikaḥ* (462, 19-20); *don dam pa* [P: *par* D] *ni ma yin no* (33b1).

282 *pratyakṣam* (462, 20); *mñon sum gyis* [D: *gyi* P] (33b1).

283 That is, if the signified, the signifier, and their relation are only falsely imputed and not related to reality, the object of direct perception will also be something falsely imputed by conception, so that it will follow that such a cognition is conceptual.

This idea is possible only on the assumption that direct perception cognizes as its object a falsely imputed object of a word (*vācyā*). In other words, "direct perception" exclusively means ear-cognition (*śrotravijñāna*) in this context. This opponent expresses the same idea as that in NBT 52, 7-8 (see n. 277). Then, interestingly, Śāntarakṣita / Kamalaśīla and Dharmottara take quite different ↗

(In order to answer this, the master) states:

Direct perception, on the other hand, cognizes an object (i.e., the particular,) which is not falsely imputed because (direct perception) exists when a particular exists and — inasmuch as when there exists something which intervenes, etc., that (particular) does not exist — that (direct perception) is also absent.²⁸⁴

// TS 1261cd-62 // ²⁸⁵

That (particular) does not exist is (syntactically) connected [as its logical consequence] with **that (direct perception) is also absent**, which means because that particular **does not exist, that** direct perception²⁸⁶ **is also absent**, viz., does not exist. In what case does the particular not exist? Hence (the master) states, “**when there exists something which intervenes, etc.**”²⁸⁷ By the word “etc.” inaccessi-

↘ attitudes towards the same problem (as for Dharmottara see NBT 52, 9-53, 3). A difference between them lies in the fact that Dharmottara admits — even if only hypothetically — a signifier-signified relation in the dimension of *svalakṣaṇa*, whereas Śāntarakṣita / Kamalaśīla denies it completely.

284 The set of formulae stated here, i.e., a positive concomitance (*anvaya*; “If the particular exists, direct perception exists.”) and a negative concomitance (*vyatireka*; “If the particular does not exist, direct perception does not either”), constitutes a means to ascertain a relation between the two. In other words, Śāntarakṣita states that the particular is the real cause for the generation of direct perception.

285 M 63b1-64a1: *anāropitam arthaṃ ca^a pratyakṣaṃ pratipadyate* // [1261cd]; *svalakṣaṇasya sadbhāve sadbhāvāt tadabhāvataḥ / vyavadhānādibhāve ca^a tasyāpi vyatirekataḥ* // [1262]. Tib. (!) P 57a6-7; D 46b5-6: ^b*sgro btags dañ bral don ñid^c du // mñon sum ñid^c ni šes par bya* // [1261cd]; *rañ gi mtshan ñid yod gyur la // mod la de ni med gyur na^d // de yañ ldog par 'gyur ba ni^e* // *dños po^f bar bcad sogs phyir ro^g* // [1262].

^a No equivalent for both *ca* in the Tibetan. As for the latter usage, M originally reads *-bhāvāc ca*; and then it is corrected to *-bhāve ca*.

^b Cf. Tib. *pratīka*: *mñon sum gyis ni* (33b1-2).

^c No equivalent for *ñid* in the Sanskrit. Instead the Sanskrit has only one *ca*.

^d Cf. Tib. *pratīka*: *de ni med pa las* (33b2) for *tadabhāvataḥ*.

^e Cf. Tib. *pratīka*: *de yañ ldog* [D: *bzlog P*] *pa yin phyir* (33b2) for *tasyāpi vyatirekataḥ*.

^f *dños po* is not adequate, compared with the Sanskrit.

^g Cf. Tib. *pratīka*: *chod pa la sogs pa* [D: / added P] *srid phyir* (33b3) for *vyavadhānādi*. See also n. 287.

286 Cf. Tib. 33b2: *mñon sum* [P: *gyis* D] *ldog pa yin te* for *pratyakṣasya vyatirekato* (462, 22-23).

287 *vyavadhānādīti* (462, 23-24). In order to be a full answer to the question, it has to be *vyavadhānādibhāva iti* or *ityādi*. The Tib. *pratīka* reads *chod pa la sogs pa srid* [D: / added P] *phyir žes bya ba la sogs pa*; i.e., **vyavadhānādibhāvād ityādi*. It is very interesting that this corresponds to M before correction (see n. 285). Cf. PV III 65d-66: *nākṣajā matiḥ // abhāve 'rthabalāj jāter arthaśaktyanapekṣaṇe / vyavadhānādibhāve 'pi jāyetendriyajā matiḥ* //. “Sense cognition does not arise in relation to the non-existent because it arises by means of an object. If it were not dependent on the (causal) power of an object, sense cognition would arise even when an intervenient, etc., exists.”

bility in space, time, etc., (is intended).

(M 154a1; S 462, 25; K 378, 15; P 33b4; D 8b4)

By the (following verse the master) explains²⁸⁸ another valid cognition (*pramāṇāntara*) [to establish the non-conceptuality of direct perception]:

(With regard to) the essence of blue, etc. — as it has nothing in common with another — verbal agreement is not possible; and hence the cognition of this (blue, etc.,) is not connected with speech.

// TS 1263 //²⁸⁹

(With regard to) the essence, i.e., the nature,²⁹⁰ of blue, etc . . . verbal agreement is not possible, i.e., verbal convention is not possible. For the question “Why?” (the master) states the reason,²⁹¹ (having) nothing in common with another.

288 *āha* (462, 25); *’chad de* (33b4).

289 M 64a1-2: *āśakyasamayo hy ātmā nīlādīnām ananyabhāk / teṣām ataś ca saṃvittir nābhijalpā^anuṣaṅgiṇī* // [1263]. Tib. (!) P 57a7; D 46b6: *ñhon po la sogs bdag ñid la // brda sbyor mi nus gzan rten min^b // des na de dag rañ rig^c ni // brjod dañ rjes ’brel can ma yin^d //*.

The verse is a slight modification of PV III 249 (identical to PVin I v. 21): *āśakyasamayo hy ātmā sukhādīnām ananyabhāk / teṣām ataḥ svasaṃvittir nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇī* /. See Appendix I, A and D. As for *ca* in *pāda* c, Dharmakīrti’s verse as well as the Tibetan of TS has *sva-* (i.e., *svasaṃvittir*; “self-cognition”). However, *ca* fully makes sense and seems even preferable in the context of TS in the following sense: *sukhādi-* “pleasure, etc.” in PV / PVin is necessarily an object of self-cognition, whereas *nīlādi-* “blue, etc.” is no doubt an object of ordinary perception in the wider sense, i.e., the object of sense-perception (*indriyapratyakṣa*). By means of replacing *sukhādīnām* with *nīlādīnām* and, likewise, *sva-* with *ca*, Śāntarakṣita gives to the original verse which is concerned with the establishment of nonconceptuality in the self-cognition of pleasure, etc., a wider connotation which fits his own context, i.e., the establishment of the non-conceptuality of direct perception in general.

Other examples of the secondary usage of Dharmakīrti’s verse in question are found in TSP 358, 8-9: *āśakyasamayo hy ātmā nāmādīnām ananyabhāk / tathā ’sato* [K: *mato* S] *na vācyaṭvaṃ kathamcid upapadyate //*; and TBV 185, 19: *āśakyasamayo hy ātmā nāmādīnām ananyabhāk / teṣām ato na cānyatvaṃ kathamcid upapadyate //*.

^a *nābhijalpā*- MK: *nābhijalpā*- S.

^b Tib. *pratīka*: *gzan la brten min* (33b4); *gzan la brten min* [D: *brten pa* (instead of *brten min*) P] (33b5); cf. *ñhon po la sogs pa’i bdag ñid (kyi rañ bzin) la brda mi nus pa* (33b4).

^c *rañ rig*, i.e., *svasaṃvittir*, which differs from Skt. *ca saṃvittir*.

^d Tib. *pratīka*: *brjod dañ rjes ’brel can ma yin* (33b8).

290 M reads either *svabhāvā* or *svabhāva* / for *svabhāvaḥ* (463, 7).

291 The subject of *ananyabhāk* is (*nīlādīnām*) *ātmā* although it is not explicitly stated. Kamalaśīla suggests here that *ananyabhāk* should be taken as a reason for the preceding passage *āśakyasamayo . . . nīlādīnām*. This idea is considered to be implied by Devendrabuddhi when he explains the syntactical relation between *ananyabhāk* and *āśakyasamayo* in PV III 249ab (see Appendix I, C, passages c and d, and d). The same idea is corroborated in PVinT 107a2-3 by the statement that *hi* in the Skt. *pāda* a ↗

²⁹²(Having) nothing in common with another (means) being unique (*asādhārana*) in the sense that it is not present at the time of (verbal) activity²⁹³ since verbal agreement aims at activity. Thus verbal convention does not exist with regard to this [essence of blue, etc.]

Further, this verbal agreement occurs (only) with regard to an (entity) which is objectified (by direct perception) (*viṣayīkṛta*) and not with regard to a non-objectified (entity).²⁹⁴ [As to the former case,]²⁹⁵ first of all, direct perception which has not (yet) come about²⁹⁶ does not objectify an essence of blue, etc. (Second, if

\ means *yasmāt*. The Tibetan of PVin I v. 21a, i.e., *phyir*, is also considered to be under the influence of Dharmottara's interpretation. On this issue see Vetter 1966: 104-105 Anm. 37.

292 It is very interesting to note that in composing the subsequent commentary Kamalaśīla secondarily used^a Devendrabuddhi's commentary on PV III 249 (see Appendix I, C and E) and incorporated it into Kamalaśīla's own commentary. The textual relation between PVP and TSP is evident. However, as long as TSP is not identical with PVP word for word, it is not certain whether the textual relation is direct without the medium of a third text.

^a For a view on this type of citation see Steinkellner 1988: 116.

293 Cf. Appendix I, C and E, passage c. Cf. also PVT (R) 123a1-2: *gañ gi phyir 'gžan la mi brten pa* [= *ananyabhāḥ*] *ste thun moñ ma yin pa rañ rig pa'i yul yin pas te* /.

294 Cf. Appendix I, C and E, passage e. *nāviṣayīkṛte* is an addition by Kamalaśīla. The second *ca* in TSP (i.e., *cāyam* 463, 10) apparently shows that the sentence is borrowed from PVP or some other text which is based on PVP; otherwise this *ca* in such a position would be meaningless in the context of TSP.

Devendrabuddhi's corresponding sentence reads: *tha sñad 'di la yañ yul du byas par 'gyur ro // bde ba la sogs pa'i bdag ñid ma skyes pa rañ rig pas yul du byed pa ma yin te* / (passages e and f), where self-cognition (*rañ rig pa*) corresponds in TSP to direct perception. Hence the word *viṣayīkṛta* means **pratyakṣeṇa viṣayīkṛta*. The following syntactical difference between the two texts deserves attention: In TSP *ayaṃ samayo* is the subject of the sentence, whereas in PVP it is shown with the locative *la*. The Tibetan of TSP understands the sentence in a different way, viz., as an alternative interrogation (33b6: *gžan yan brda 'di yul du byas pa ma yin nam yul du ma byas pa yin la* / [corr.: *la yin* / P; *yin la* / yin na D for *yin la* /]).

295 The alternatives *utpannam* and *anutpannam* constitute a sub-classification of the entity which is objectified by direct perception (*viṣayīkṛta*). A similar classification is found in PVinT where Dharmottara enumerates the following alternatives: If a relation of an essence of pleasure, etc., with a word were possible, it would be made either (1) by the cognition itself which cognizes that essence or (2) by another cognition, and in the first case, that essence which is related with a word would be either (1a) the entity which has not come about at the time of the relation or (1b) the one which has already come about (cf. PVinT 107a5-6: *gañ gi phyir rig pa de ñid kyis bdag ñid la sgra bkod pa 'am śes pa gžan gyis yin / rig pa ñid kyis yin na yañ sgra 'god pa na skyes pa 'am ma skyes pa la* [P: *ma D*] *yin* /). Of these, the case 1a is, Dharmottara states, not possible because having not yet come about means being non-existent (cf. PVinT 107a6: *re žig ma skyes pa la bkod par mi nus te / gañ gi phyir ma skyes pa ni ma byuñ ba yin no* //) and because of other arguments as well.

296 Cf. Appendix I, B, C, and E, passage f. According to PVP as well as PVin I, the words *ma skyes pa* (i.e., *anutpanna-*) modify *bde ba la sogs pa'i bdag ñid* (i.e., *sukhādinām ātmā*) in Dharmakīrti's /

direct perception) which has (already) come about [were concerned with verbal agreement, it would be realized in such a form that] it would, after taking hold of an expression (*abhilāpa*), connect (that essence with that expression).²⁹⁷ [However, the essence of blue, etc., which has come about cannot be concerned with this stage of verbal agreement for the following reason:] Neither the object (*na viṣayo*!),²⁹⁸ (i.e., the essence of blue, etc.,) exists any longer at the time of [direct perception's] coming about, nor direct perception, as the object-possessor, (exists any longer) at the time of employing the expression, insofar as they are momentary. Therefore who on earth connects [an expression] to what (real entity)!?²⁹⁹ In this sense too,³⁰⁰ **for the essence of blue, etc., verbal agreement is not possible.**

Of these (means) of blue, etc. **Is not connected with speech** (means) is not subject to expressions.

A syllogism (relevant) to this (is as follows): If a (cognition) is without verbal agreement with regard to a certain (entity), it is not conceptual with regard to that (entity) as, for example, eye-cognition, [which is without verbal agreement and not conceptual,] with regard to smell; and direct perception is without verbal agreement with regard to the essence of blue, etc. [Therefore direct perception is not concep-

\ context. If the same idea is applied in the context of TSP, then the word *anutmannam* here modifies *nīlādyātmanam*. However, this is not the case because the word order in TSP, *anutpannam pratyakṣam nīlādyātmanam*, does not fit with this interpretation; and it also deviates from Tib. 33b7: *mñon sum ma skyes pa ni*... Probably Kamalaśīla uses the word *anutpanna-* with a different sense from Devendra-buddhi's commentary in accordance with Śāntarakṣita's change in the significance of the verse pointed out in n. 289.

297 Appendix I, C and E, passage g. Cf. also "... self-cognition does not combine 'the essence of pleasure, etc.' which has come about with the expression because, if that were the case, it would connect that (essence) [with that expression] after taking hold of the expression..." (PVP, the passages with** and g).

The sentence in question in TSP is only a hypothetical statement to conclude that direct perception is not concerned with verbal agreement or the connection with an expression, which is shown by the subsequent sentence. The Tibetan understands the sentence differently with a negative particle: *skyes pa na yañ brjod pa blañs nas sbyor ba ma* (!) *yin te* (33b6-7).

298 *na viṣayo nāpi* [corr.]: *viṣaye nāpi* M: *viṣayenāpi* KS (463, 12). The reading is corrected by means of Tib. 37b7: *yul ma yin la* [P: / added D].

299 The corresponding passage in PVP (C, passage h) reads as follows: "However at the time of employing an expression, as far as (entities) are momentary, that (essence of pleasure, etc., which has come about) does not exist or [the object which is connected with the expression] is not the essence of pleasure, etc. Therefore, nothing connects [an expression] to any (real entity)."

300 "Too" (*api*) means that Kamalaśīla's explanation from *kiṃ ca to yojanam* (463, 10-13) is the second reason for *aśakyasamaya*. The first reason is shown by *ananyabhāk* in *pāda* b of the verse, while this second reason, again borrowed from PVP, is stated in terms of the notion of *anutpanna* which is found in the prose commentary on the verse in PVin.

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tual with regard to the essence of blue, etc.] This is (a formulation using) perception of that which is incompatible with a pervader (as a logical reason) (*vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*).³⁰¹

301 Appendix I, C and E, passage I. The syllogism of Devendrabuddhi is translated in Tosaki 1979a: 349 n. 32.

APPENDIX I: SECONDARY USAGES OF PV / PVIN AND PVP

A. PV III 249: asākyasamayo hy ātmā sukhādīnām ananyabhāk /_a teṣām atah
svasamvittir nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇī //_b. Tib.: bde sogs bdag ñid gžan mi brten //
brda byed par ni nus ma yin //_a de phyir de dag rañ rig ni // brjod dañ rjes 'brel
can ma yin //_b

B. PVin I 62, 11-19; 62, 25-29: bde ba la sogs pa rnam s ky i bdag ñid rig pa la ni
rnam par rtog pa srid pa ma yin te / gañ gi phyir /

gžan la brten min bdag ñid phyir // bde sogs rnam s la brda nus min //_a

(v. 21ab)

bde ba la sogs pa so sor ñes pa'i bdag ñid ma skyes pa rnam s ni rig pas yul du byed
pa ma yin te /_f de ni de'i bdag ñid ky i rañ bžin yin pa'i phyir ro // 'di dag la 'di
rjod par byed pa sbyor ba ni ma yin te / bdag ñid la de ltar 'jug par 'gal ba'i phyir
ro //.

.....

de phyir de bag rañ rig ni // brjod dañ rjes 'brel can ma yin //_b (v. 21cd)
brda mi nus pa'i phyir na bde ba la sogs pa rnam s ky i bdag ñid rig pa brjod pa
dañ ma 'brel pa de ni mñon sum gyi tshad ma yin no //.

C. Devendrabuddhi on PV III 249 in PVP P 237a4-b4; D 203a1-7: 'dod chags dañ
že sdañ dañ gti mug dañ bde ba dañ / sdug bsñal la sogs pa ni rañ rig pa dañ /
dbañ po la ltos [D: bltos P] pa med pa ñid ky i phyir* žes bya ba de ni / [D: / om. P]
"bde sogs bdag ñid gžan mi rten" // [D: // om. P] žes bya ba la sogs pas 'chad par
byed do // žes bya gañ la žes pa gañ gis sgra bkod pa 'dzin par 'gyur de ni de dañ
bsres nas 'dzin par 'gyur ba de ltar na brjod pa dañ 'dres par 'gyur gyi / 'dod
chags la sogs pa'i rañ rig pa ni de lta [D: ltar P] ma yin no // de [P: om. D] ltar na
"bde [D: P inserts la] sogs bdag ñid gžan mi rten" / thun moñ ma yin pa yin [P: yin
pa om. D] te / tha sñad ky i dus na ñe bar mi gnas pa'i nañ tshul can žes bya ba'i
tha tshig go //_c des [D: de P] na 'di la sgra tha sñad du byed pa ma yin te /_d tha
sñad 'di la yañ yul du byas par 'gyur ro //_e bde ba la sogs pa'i bdag ñid ma skyes
pa [P: par D] rañ rig pas yul du byed pa ma yin te /_f bde ba la sogs pa'i bdag ñid
kyi no bo ñid du de yañ rañ bžin tha dad pa can med pa ñid yin pa'i phyir ro //
de bas na gañ las brjod [D: rjod P] pa dañ sbyor ba yin /** bde ba la sogs pa'i bdag
ñid skyes [P: skyed D] pa la yañ rañ rig pa brjod [D: rjod P] pa dañ 'dres pa ma yin
no // de ltar na des brjod [D: rjod P] pa bzuñ [D: gzuñ P] nas de la sbyor bar 'gyur
ro //_g brjod pa 'dzin pa yin na yañ skad cig ma ñid yin pa'i phyir /_h de med pa
'am bde ba la sogs pa'i bdag ñid ma yin pas na gañ gis gañ la ci žig sbyor bar byed

/i de ltar na “dod chags la sogs pa'i bdag ñid ni brda [D: brda'P] byed par ni nus med can yin no”//j rgyu “de phyir” ‘dod chags la sogs pa “de dag ran rig [P: rigs D] ni” gañ yin pa de ni / “brjod [D: rjod P] dan rjes 'brel can ma yin” / brjod [D: rjod P] pa dan 'dres pa ma yin no //k sbyor ba ni gañ žig gañ la brda mi 'dzin pa de ni de la rnam par rtog par mi 'gyur te / dri la mig gi rnam par šes pa lta bu'o // ‘dod chags la sogs pa'i ran rig pa yañ brda [D: brda'P] ‘dzin pa ma yin no žes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pa'o //l

* Cf. *rāgādisukhādiṣu svasamvedanam indriyānapekṣatvān mānaṣaṃ pratyakṣam iti* (Vibhūticandra's gloss found in the footnote on PV III 249, p. 194, n. 1).

**For the translation see n. 297.

D. TS 1263: *aśakyasamayo hy ātmā nīlādīnām ananyabhāk* /_a *teṣām ataś ca samvittir nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇī* //_b. Cf. Tib. (!) P 57a7; D 46b6: ñnon po la sogs bdag ñid la // brda sbyor mi nus gžan rten min //_a des na de dag ran rig ni // brjod dan rjes 'brel can ma yin //_b.

E. TSP on TS 1263 (463, 8–16): ... “*ananyabhāg*” *asādhāraṇaḥ vyavahārakāla-pratyupasthāyīti yāvat.* _c *vyavahārārthatvāt samasyeti nātra śabdasaṃketah.* _d *kiṃ ca viśayīkṛte cāyam samayo bhavati.* _e *nāviśayīkṛte. na tāvad anutpannam pratyakṣam nīlādyātmānam viśayīkaroti.* _f *utpannam cābhilāpam ādāya yojayet.* _g *utpatikāle 'bhilāpagrahanakāle ca kṣaṇikatvān.* _h *na viśayo nāpi* [corr.: *viśayenāpi* MKS] *pratyakṣam viśayīti kena kutra yojanam;* _i *ity ato 'py “aśakyasamayo nīlādīnām ātmā.”* _j *“teṣām” iti nīlādīnām. “nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇī”ti nāviṣṭābhilāpā.* _k *tatra prayogaḥ: yad yatrāgrhītasamayam na tat tatra savikalpakam bhavati, tadyathā cakṣurvijñānam gandhe. agrhītasamayam ca pratyakṣam nīlādyātmanīti vyāpakaviruddhoḥpalambhah.* _l

Cf. Tib. P 33b5–34a2; D 8b5–9a2: ... “gžan la brten min” ni thun moñ ma yin pa ste / tha sñad kyi dus su mi gnas pa žes bya ba'i tha tshig go // _c brda ni tha sñad kyi don du yin pa'i phyir 'di la sgra brdar [P: sgrar for sgra brdar D] byed pa ma yin no // _d gžan yañ brda 'di yul du byas pa ma yin nam _e yul du ma byas pa yin la / [corr.: la yin / P; yin la / yin na D for yin la] re žig mñon sum ma skyes pa ni sñon po la sogs pa'i bdag ñid yul du byed pa ma yin la / _f skyes pa na yañ brjod pa blañs nas sbyor ba ma yin te / _g skye ba'i dus dan mñon par brjod pa 'dzin pa'i dus na skad cig ma ñid yin pa'i phyir _h yul ma yin la / [D: / om. P] mñon sum yul can yañ ma yin pa'i phyir / gañ gis gañ du sbyor bar byed / [P: // D] _i ces bya ba 'di las kyan “ñnon po la sogs pa'i bdag ñid la [D: las P] brda bya bar mi nus so” // _j de dag ces bya ba ni sñon po la sogs pa'o // “brjod dan rjes 'brel can ma yin” / [P: // D]

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zés bya ba ni brjod pa dan mi ldan pa'o //_k de la sbyor ba ni gañ zig gañ la brda
ma bzuñ ba de ni de la rtog pa dan bcas par 'gyur ba ma yin te / dri la mig gi
rnam par ses pa bžin no // mñon sum gyis kyañ sñon po la sogs pa'i bdag ñid la
brda gzuñ ba ma yin no // [P: // om. D] zés bya ba ni [P: / added D] khyab [D:
khyad P] par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pa'o //₁

APPENDX II: A LIST OF CORRECTIONS TO SHASTRI'S EDITION

I. TS (1212-1263)

- 1217d *sedṛśy: sadṛśy* (n. 74)
 1226b *jātiśabdo 'stu: jātiśabdas tu* (n. 149)
 1230d *kalpate: kalpyate* (n.161)
 1231a *cāvyavahāryam: vā vyavahāryam* (n. 161)
 1235b *eva sa bruvan: evam abruvan* (n. 175)
 1238a *evampratītirūpā: evam pratītarūpā* (n. 199)
 1238b *yadaivam: yad evam* (n. 199)
 1241d *anuktaṃ: ayuktaṃ* (n. 199)
 1245a *vikalpapakamanojñāna: vikalpapakam ato jñāna-* (n. 215)
 1247b *-bhāvanāmānuṣaṅgavān: -bhāvanām anuṣaṅgavān* (n. 227)
 1248ab *cārthavijñānam yaugapadyam: cārthavijñānayaugapadyam* (n. 234)
 1256a *yadi vā yasya: yadi cāpy asya* (n. 263)
 1263d *nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇī: nābhirjalpānuṣaṅgiṇī* (n. 289)

II. TSP (448, 19-463, 16)

- 450, 8 *anubhavasiddhatvād: anusiddhatvād* (n. 57)
 450, 17 *antarmātravīparivartinam: antarmātrāvīparivart(t)inam* (n. 69)
 450, 23 *tasyā vyavasthānāt: tasyāvyavasthānāt* (nn. 77-78)
 452, 17 *parihārāntaram: parihārāntam* (n. 118)
 452, 23 *yadṛcchāśabdeṣu prayujyamāneṣu nāmnā: yadṛcchāśabdeṣu nāmnā*
 (n. 124)
 453, 9 *seyam ity anena: seyam iti. anena* (n. 129)
 453, 20 *°avaṣayasambandhād: °avaṣasambandhād* (n. 138)
 453, 20 *anyad anyadravyam: anyad dravyam* (n. 139)
 453, 22 *-darśane: -daśane* (n. 140)
 453, 23 *cāvasthāntarasamāśraye: cāvasthāntaram samāśrayeta* (n. 141)
 453, 25 *avaśyābhyupagantavyā: avaśyam abhyupagantavyā* (n. 141a)
 454, 24 *pāramārthikāḥ: paramārthikāḥ* (n. 153)
 455, 15f. *avaśyābhyupagantavyā: avaśyam abhyupagantavyā* (n. 157)
 455, 18 *abhyupagatāyām: abhyupamatāyām* (n. 162)
 456, 11f. *nāmāyojanāvinābhāvinīty: nāmāyojanā vinā bhāvinīty* (n. 177)
 456, 15 *yaj jñānam arthe rūpāḍau: yat jñānārtharūpāḍau* (n. 182)
 456, 20 *cātra pratītiḥ: cānupratītiḥ* (n. 185)

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- 456, 20 *yathoktakalpanā: tathoktakalpanā* (n. 185)
 456, 25 *parāparamata-: paramata-* (n. 187)
 458, 21 *āha. dvayor iti vikalpayor: āha — dvayor iti. vikalpayor* (n. 214)
 459, 13 *cānyatra-: ca anyatra-* (n. 229)
 459, 21 *nirantaram viṣayā-: nirantaraviṣayā-* (n. 237)
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 460, 14f. *ity evamādāv: ity evamādav* (n. 246)
 460, 17 *śuddhe: buddher* (n. 251)
 460, 17 *nānāvidhārtha-: nānāvidyārtha-* (n. 251)
 460, 23 *kramavartīni: kramavart(t)inī* (n. 255)
 461, 18 *yadi vetyādi: yadi cetyādi* (n. 261)
 461, 18 *yadrūpavyavasthitau: yadrūpaṃ vyavasthitau* (n. 264)
 462, 12 *jāteḥ: jātaḥ* (n. 269)
 462, 13 *na cāsty evam iti. evam iti bhedenā-: na cāsty evam iti. bhedenā-*
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 463, 12 *na viṣayo nāpi: na viṣayeṇāpi* (n. 298)

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